Andrew Du

Andrew Du, Roberto Del Prete, Alejandro Mousist et al.

Geospatial foundation models (GeoFMs) promise broad generalisation capacity for Earth observation (EO) tasks, particularly under data-limited conditions. However, their large size poses a barrier to deployment on resource-constrained space hardware. To address this, we present compact variants of a Vision Transformer (ViT)-based GeoFM that preserve downstream task performance while enabling onboard execution. Evaluation across five downstream tasks and validation in two representative flight environments show that model compression and domain adaptation are critical to reducing size and resource demands while maintaining high performance under operational conditions. We further demonstrate reliable on-orbit inference with the IMAGIN-e payload aboard the International Space Station. These results establish a pathway from large GeoFMs to flight-ready, resource-efficient deployments, expanding the feasibility of onboard AI for EO missions.

Andrew Du, Yee Wei Law, Michele Sasdelli et al.

Data collected by Earth-observing (EO) satellites are often afflicted by cloud cover. Detecting the presence of clouds -- which is increasingly done using deep learning -- is crucial preprocessing in EO applications. In fact, advanced EO satellites perform deep learning-based cloud detection on board the satellites and downlink only clear-sky data to save precious bandwidth. In this paper, we highlight the vulnerability of deep learning-based cloud detection towards adversarial attacks. By optimising an adversarial pattern and superimposing it into a cloudless scene, we bias the neural network into detecting clouds in the scene. Since the input spectra of cloud detectors include the non-visible bands, we generated our attacks in the multispectral domain. This opens up the potential of multi-objective attacks, specifically, adversarial biasing in the cloud-sensitive bands and visual camouflage in the visible bands. We also investigated mitigation strategies against the adversarial attacks. We hope our work further builds awareness of the potential of adversarial attacks in the EO community.