Yusuf Hakan Kalayci

Shaddin Dughmi, Mahdi Haghifam, Yusuf Hakan Kalayci

Many inference-time language-model pipelines combine a cheap reward signal with an expensive verifier, such as exact answer checking in mathematical reasoning or hidden-test execution in code generation. We formalize this setting using a learning-theoretic lens as generative active search: a cost-sensitive first-positive search problem in which a policy adaptively samples candidates from an unknown distribution, observes cheap scores, and pays for verifier labels until it finds a positive example. For a fixed prompt, the generator and reward model induce two unknown objects: a distribution over reward scores and a score-conditioned success function. When these quantities are known, we characterize the distribution-aware optimal policy using a dynamic programming approach. In the realistic and practical setting where both the score distribution and success function are unknown, we propose ADAP, a shellwise adaptive generate-rank-verify algorithm that progressively increases the number of sampled responses and top-ranked verifications. Under the monotonicity assumption that higher reward scores are no less likely to pass verification, we show that ADAP achieves expected cost within a constant factor of the distribution-aware optimum. We complement this result with learning-theoretic lower bounds, based on a centered star number, showing that structural assumptions on the score--label relationship are necessary. Experiments on mathematical reasoning and competitive programming validate the predicted advantage over both fixed non-adaptive policies and difficulty-adaptive baselines.

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, Evi Micha

Permanent citizens' assemblies are ongoing deliberative bodies composed of randomly selected citizens, organized into panels that rotate over time. Unlike one-off panels, which represent the population in a single snapshot, permanent assemblies enable shifting participation across multiple rounds. This structure offers a powerful framework for ensuring that different groups of individuals are represented over time across successive panels. In particular, it allows smaller groups of individuals that may not warrant representation in every individual panel to be represented across a sequence of them. We formalize this temporal sortition framework by requiring proportional representation both within each individual panel and across the sequence of panels. Building on the work of Ebadian and Micha (2025), we consider a setting in which the population lies in a metric space, and the goal is to achieve both proportional representation, ensuring that every group of citizens receives adequate representation, and individual fairness, ensuring that each individual has an equal probability of being selected. We extend the notion of representation to a temporal setting by requiring that every initial segment of the panel sequence, viewed as a cumulative whole, proportionally reflects the structure of the population. We present algorithms that provide varying guarantees of proportional representation, both within individual panels and across any sequence of panels, while also maintaining individual fairness over time.

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, David Kempe, Vikram Kher

We introduce a novel definition for a small set R of k points being "representative" of a larger set in a metric space. Given a set V (e.g., documents or voters) to represent, and a set C of possible representatives, our criterion requires that for any subset S comprising a theta fraction of V, the average distance of S to their best theta*k points in R should not be more than a factor gamma compared to their average distance to the best theta*k points among all of C. This definition is a strengthening of proportional fairness and core fairness, but - different from those notions - requires that large cohesive clusters be represented proportionally to their size. Since there are instances for which - unless gamma is polynomially large - no solutions exist, we study this notion in a resource augmentation framework, implicitly stating the constraints for a set R of size k as though its size were only k/alpha, for alpha > 1. Furthermore, motivated by the application to elections, we mostly focus on the "ordinal" model, where the algorithm does not learn the actual distances; instead, it learns only for each point v in V and each candidate pairs c, c' which of c, c' is closer to v. Our main result is that the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) of Aziz and Lee is (alpha, gamma) representative with gamma <= 1 + 6.71 * (alpha)/(alpha-1). Our results lead to three notable byproducts. First, we show that the EAR achieves constant proportional fairness in the ordinal model, giving the first positive result on metric proportional fairness with ordinal information. Second, we show that for the core fairness objective, the EAR achieves the same asymptotic tradeoff between resource augmentation and approximation as the recent results of Li et al., which used full knowledge of the metric. Finally, our results imply a very simple single-winner voting rule with metric distortion at most 44.

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, Jiasen Liu, David Kempe

In multiwinner approval voting, forming a committee that proportionally represents voters' approval ballots is an essential task. The notion of justified representation (JR) demands that any large "cohesive" group of voters should be proportionally "represented". The "cohesiveness" is defined in different ways; two common ways are the following: (C1) demands that the group unanimously approves a set of candidates proportional to its size, while (C2) requires each member to approve at least a fixed fraction of such a set. Similarly, "representation" have been considered in different ways: (R1) the coalition's collective utility from the winning set exceeds that of any proportionally sized alternative, and (R2) for any proportionally sized alternative, at least one member of the coalition derives less utility from it than from the winning set. Three of the four possible combinations have been extensively studied: (C1)-(R1) defines Proportional Justified Representation (PJR), (C1)-(R2) defines Extended Justified Representation (EJR), (C2)-(R2) defines Full Justified Representation (FJR). All three have merits, but also drawbacks. PJR is the weakest notion, and perhaps not sufficiently demanding; EJR may not be compatible with perfect representation; and it is open whether a committee satisfying FJR can be found efficiently. We study the combination (C2)-(R1), which we call Full Proportional Justified Representation (FPJR). We investigate FPJR's properties and find that it shares PJR's advantages over EJR: several proportionality axioms (e.g. priceability, perfect representation) imply FPJR and PJR but not EJR. We also find that efficient rules like the greedy Monroe rule and the method of equal shares satisfy FPJR, matching a key advantage of EJR over FJR. However, the Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule may violate FPJR, so neither of EJR and FPJR implies the other.