David Kempe

Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe

The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total distance to the voters, given only the rankings, but not the actual distances. As a result, in the worst case, each deterministic rule picks a candidate whose total distance is at least three times larger than that of an optimal one, i.e., has distortion at least 3. A recent breakthrough result showed that achieving this bound of 3 is possible; however, the proof is non-constructive, and the voting rule itself is a complicated exhaustive search. Our main result is an extremely simple voting rule, called Plurality Veto, which achieves the same optimal distortion of 3. Each candidate starts with a score equal to his number of first-place votes. These scores are then gradually decreased via an n-round veto process in which a candidate drops out when his score reaches zero. One after the other, voters decrement the score of their bottom choice among the standing candidates, and the last standing candidate wins. We give a one-paragraph proof that this voting rule achieves distortion 3. This rule is also immensely practical, and it only makes two queries to each voter, so it has low communication overhead. We also generalize Plurality Veto into a class of randomized voting rules in the following way: Plurality veto is run only for k < n rounds; then, a candidate is chosen with probability proportional to his residual score. This general rule interpolates between Random Dictatorship (for k=0) and Plurality Veto (for k=n-1), and k controls the variance of the output. We show that for all k, this rule has distortion at most 3.

Siddartha Devic, David Kempe, Vatsal Sharan et al.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always \emph{uncertain}, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Fransisca Susan, Negin Golrezaei, Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh et al.

We study the problem of actively learning a non-parametric choice model based on consumers' decisions. We present a negative result showing that such choice models may not be identifiable. To overcome the identifiability problem, we introduce a directed acyclic graph (DAG) representation of the choice model. This representation provably encodes all the information about the choice model which can be inferred from the available data, in the sense that it permits computing all choice probabilities. We establish that given exact choice probabilities for a collection of item sets, one can reconstruct the DAG. However, attempting to extend this methodology to estimate the DAG from noisy choice frequency data obtained during an active learning process leads to inaccuracies. To address this challenge, we present an inclusion-exclusion approach that effectively manages error propagation across DAG levels, leading to a more accurate estimate of the DAG. Utilizing this technique, our algorithm estimates the DAG representation of an underlying non-parametric choice model. The algorithm operates efficiently (in polynomial time) when the set of frequent rankings is drawn uniformly at random. It learns the distribution over the most popular items among frequent preference types by actively and repeatedly offering assortments of items and observing the chosen item. We demonstrate that our algorithm more effectively recovers a set of frequent preferences on both synthetic and publicly available datasets on consumers' preferences, compared to corresponding non-active learning estimation algorithms. These findings underscore the value of our algorithm and the broader applicability of active-learning approaches in modeling consumer behavior.

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, David Kempe, Vikram Kher

We introduce a novel definition for a small set R of k points being "representative" of a larger set in a metric space. Given a set V (e.g., documents or voters) to represent, and a set C of possible representatives, our criterion requires that for any subset S comprising a theta fraction of V, the average distance of S to their best theta*k points in R should not be more than a factor gamma compared to their average distance to the best theta*k points among all of C. This definition is a strengthening of proportional fairness and core fairness, but - different from those notions - requires that large cohesive clusters be represented proportionally to their size. Since there are instances for which - unless gamma is polynomially large - no solutions exist, we study this notion in a resource augmentation framework, implicitly stating the constraints for a set R of size k as though its size were only k/alpha, for alpha > 1. Furthermore, motivated by the application to elections, we mostly focus on the "ordinal" model, where the algorithm does not learn the actual distances; instead, it learns only for each point v in V and each candidate pairs c, c' which of c, c' is closer to v. Our main result is that the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) of Aziz and Lee is (alpha, gamma) representative with gamma <= 1 + 6.71 * (alpha)/(alpha-1). Our results lead to three notable byproducts. First, we show that the EAR achieves constant proportional fairness in the ordinal model, giving the first positive result on metric proportional fairness with ordinal information. Second, we show that for the core fairness objective, the EAR achieves the same asymptotic tradeoff between resource augmentation and approximation as the recent results of Li et al., which used full knowledge of the metric. Finally, our results imply a very simple single-winner voting rule with metric distortion at most 44.

Siddartha Devic, Aleksandra Korolova, David Kempe et al.

Rankings are ubiquitous across many applications, from search engines to hiring committees. In practice, many rankings are derived from the output of predictors. However, when predictors trained for classification tasks have intrinsic uncertainty, it is not obvious how this uncertainty should be represented in the derived rankings. Our work considers ranking functions: maps from individual predictions for a classification task to distributions over rankings. We focus on two aspects of ranking functions: stability to perturbations in predictions and fairness towards both individuals and subgroups. Not only is stability an important requirement for its own sake, but -- as we show -- it composes harmoniously with individual fairness in the sense of Dwork et al. (2012). While deterministic ranking functions cannot be stable aside from trivial scenarios, we show that the recently proposed uncertainty aware (UA) ranking functions of Singh et al. (2021) are stable. Our main result is that UA rankings also achieve multigroup fairness through successful composition with multiaccurate or multicalibrated predictors. Our work demonstrates that UA rankings naturally interpolate between group and individual level fairness guarantees, while simultaneously satisfying stability guarantees important whenever machine-learned predictions are used.

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, Jiasen Liu, David Kempe

In multiwinner approval voting, forming a committee that proportionally represents voters' approval ballots is an essential task. The notion of justified representation (JR) demands that any large "cohesive" group of voters should be proportionally "represented". The "cohesiveness" is defined in different ways; two common ways are the following: (C1) demands that the group unanimously approves a set of candidates proportional to its size, while (C2) requires each member to approve at least a fixed fraction of such a set. Similarly, "representation" have been considered in different ways: (R1) the coalition's collective utility from the winning set exceeds that of any proportionally sized alternative, and (R2) for any proportionally sized alternative, at least one member of the coalition derives less utility from it than from the winning set. Three of the four possible combinations have been extensively studied: (C1)-(R1) defines Proportional Justified Representation (PJR), (C1)-(R2) defines Extended Justified Representation (EJR), (C2)-(R2) defines Full Justified Representation (FJR). All three have merits, but also drawbacks. PJR is the weakest notion, and perhaps not sufficiently demanding; EJR may not be compatible with perfect representation; and it is open whether a committee satisfying FJR can be found efficiently. We study the combination (C2)-(R1), which we call Full Proportional Justified Representation (FPJR). We investigate FPJR's properties and find that it shares PJR's advantages over EJR: several proportionality axioms (e.g. priceability, perfect representation) imply FPJR and PJR but not EJR. We also find that efficient rules like the greedy Monroe rule and the method of equal shares satisfy FPJR, matching a key advantage of EJR over FJR. However, the Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule may violate FPJR, so neither of EJR and FPJR implies the other.

Han-Ching Ou, Christoph Siebenbrunner, Jackson Killian et al.

Motivated by a broad class of mobile intervention problems, we propose and study restless multi-armed bandits (RMABs) with network effects. In our model, arms are partially recharging and connected through a graph, so that pulling one arm also improves the state of neighboring arms, significantly extending the previously studied setting of fully recharging bandits with no network effects. In mobile interventions, network effects may arise due to regular population movements (such as commuting between home and work). We show that network effects in RMABs induce strong reward coupling that is not accounted for by existing solution methods. We propose a new solution approach for networked RMABs, exploiting concavity properties which arise under natural assumptions on the structure of intervention effects. We provide sufficient conditions for optimality of our approach in idealized settings and demonstrate that it empirically outperforms state-of-the art baselines in three mobile intervention domains using real-world graphs.

Ashudeep Singh, David Kempe, Thorsten Joachims

Fairness has emerged as an important consideration in algorithmic decision-making. Unfairness occurs when an agent with higher merit obtains a worse outcome than an agent with lower merit. Our central point is that a primary cause of unfairness is uncertainty. A principal or algorithm making decisions never has access to the agents' true merit, and instead uses proxy features that only imperfectly predict merit (e.g., GPA, star ratings, recommendation letters). None of these ever fully capture an agent's merit; yet existing approaches have mostly been defining fairness notions directly based on observed features and outcomes. Our primary point is that it is more principled to acknowledge and model the uncertainty explicitly. The role of observed features is to give rise to a posterior distribution of the agents' merits. We use this viewpoint to define a notion of approximate fairness in ranking. We call an algorithm $φ$-fair (for $φ\in [0,1]$) if it has the following property for all agents $x$ and all $k$: if agent $x$ is among the top $k$ agents with respect to merit with probability at least $ρ$ (according to the posterior merit distribution), then the algorithm places the agent among the top $k$ agents in its ranking with probability at least $φρ$. We show how to compute rankings that optimally trade off approximate fairness against utility to the principal. In addition to the theoretical characterization, we present an empirical analysis of the potential impact of the approach in simulation studies. For real-world validation, we applied the approach in the context of a paper recommendation system that we built and fielded at the KDD 2020 conference.

Sixie Yu, David Kempe, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked public goods games capture this tension, with networks encoding strategic interdependence among agents. Conventional models of public goods games posit solely individual self-interest as a motivation, even though altruistic motivations have long been known to play a significant role in agents' decisions. We introduce a novel extension of public goods games to account for altruistic motivations by adding a term in the utility function that incorporates the perceived benefits an agent obtains from the welfare of others, mediated by an altruism graph. Most importantly, we view altruism not as immutable, but rather as a lever for promoting the common good. Our central algorithmic question then revolves around the computational complexity of modifying the altruism network to achieve desired public goods game investment profiles. We first show that the problem can be solved using linear programming when a principal can fractionally modify the altruism network. While the problem becomes in general intractable if the principal's actions are all-or-nothing, we exhibit several tractable special cases.

Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh, Chen-Yu Wei, Haipeng Luo et al.

We revisit the problem of online learning with sleeping experts/bandits: in each time step, only a subset of the actions are available for the algorithm to choose from (and learn about). The work of Kleinberg et al. (2010) showed that there exist no-regret algorithms which perform no worse than the best ranking of actions asymptotically. Unfortunately, achieving this regret bound appears computationally hard: Kanade and Steinke (2014) showed that achieving this no-regret performance is at least as hard as PAC-learning DNFs, a notoriously difficult problem. In the present work, we relax the original problem and study computationally efficient no-approximate-regret algorithms: such algorithms may exceed the optimal cost by a multiplicative constant in addition to the additive regret. We give an algorithm that provides a no-approximate-regret guarantee for the general sleeping expert/bandit problems. For several canonical special cases of the problem, we give algorithms with significantly better approximation ratios; these algorithms also illustrate different techniques for achieving no-approximate-regret guarantees.

Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, David Kempe

In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a blocking pair (chosen adversarially) indicating that this matching is unstable. For one-to-one matching markets, our main result is an essentially tight upper bound of $O(n^2\log n)$ on the deterministic query complexity of interactively learning a stable matching in this coarse query model, along with an efficient randomized algorithm that achieves this query complexity with high probability. For many-to-many matching markets in which participants have responsive preferences, we first give an interactive learning algorithm whose query complexity and running time are polynomial in the size of the market if the maximum quota of each agent is bounded; our main result for many-to-many markets is that the deterministic query complexity can be made polynomial (more specifically, $O(n^3 \log n)$) in the size of the market even for arbitrary (e.g., linear in the market size) quotas.

Yu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe

We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score from each ballot based on the ballot's rank order; the candidate with the highest total score wins the election. The cost of a candidate is his sum of distances to all voters, and the distortion of an election is the ratio between the cost of the elected candidate and the cost of the optimum candidate. We consider the case when candidates are representative of the population, in the sense that they are drawn i.i.d. from the population of the voters, and analyze the expected distortion of positional voting rules. Our main result is a clean and tight characterization of positional voting rules that have constant expected distortion (independent of the number of candidates and the metric space). Our characterization result immediately implies constant expected distortion for Borda Count and elections in which each voter approves a constant fraction of all candidates. On the other hand, we obtain super-constant expected distortion for Plurality, Veto, and approving a constant number of candidates. These results contrast with previous results on voting with metric preferences: When the candidates are chosen adversarially, all of the preceding voting rules have distortion linear in the number of candidates or voters. Thus, the model of representative candidates allows us to distinguish voting rules which seem equally bad in the worst case.

Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh, David Kempe

We propose a general framework for interactively learning models, such as (binary or non-binary) classifiers, orderings/rankings of items, or clusterings of data points. Our framework is based on a generalization of Angluin's equivalence query model and Littlestone's online learning model: in each iteration, the algorithm proposes a model, and the user either accepts it or reveals a specific mistake in the proposal. The feedback is correct only with probability $p > 1/2$ (and adversarially incorrect with probability $1 - p$), i.e., the algorithm must be able to learn in the presence of arbitrary noise. The algorithm's goal is to learn the ground truth model using few iterations. Our general framework is based on a graph representation of the models and user feedback. To be able to learn efficiently, it is sufficient that there be a graph $G$ whose nodes are the models and (weighted) edges capture the user feedback, with the property that if $s, s^*$ are the proposed and target models, respectively, then any (correct) user feedback $s'$ must lie on a shortest $s$-$s^*$ path in $G$. Under this one assumption, there is a natural algorithm reminiscent of the Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm, which will efficiently learn $s^*$ even in the presence of noise in the user's feedback. From this general result, we rederive with barely any extra effort classic results on learning of classifiers and a recent result on interactive clustering; in addition, we easily obtain new interactive learning algorithms for ordering/ranking.

Yu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe

In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterthwaite regarding voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well common voting rules approximate the social optimum. In order to quantify the quality of approximation, it is natural to consider the candidates and voters as embedded within a common metric space, and to ask how much further the chosen candidate is from the population as compared to the socially optimal one. We use this metric preference model to explore a fundamental and timely question: does the social welfare of a population improve when candidates are representative of the population? If so, then by how much, and how does the answer depend on the complexity of the metric space? We restrict attention to the most fundamental and common social choice setting: a population of voters, two independently drawn candidates, and a majority rule election. When candidates are not representative of the population, it is known that the candidate selected by the majority rule can be thrice as far from the population as the socially optimal one. We examine how this ratio improves when candidates are drawn independently from the population of voters. Our results are two-fold: When the metric is a line, the ratio improves from $3$ to $4-2\sqrt{2}$, roughly $1.1716$; this bound is tight. When the metric is arbitrary, we show a lower bound of $1.5$ and a constant upper bound strictly better than $2$ on the approximation ratio of the majority rule. The positive result depends in part on the assumption that candidates are independent and identically distributed. However, we show that independence alone is not enough to achieve the upper bound: even when candidates are drawn independently, if the population of candidates can be different from the voters, then an upper bound of $2$ on the approximation is tight.

Xinran He, Ke Xu, David Kempe et al.

We study the problem of learning influence functions under incomplete observations of node activations. Incomplete observations are a major concern as most (online and real-world) social networks are not fully observable. We establish both proper and improper PAC learnability of influence functions under randomly missing observations. Proper PAC learnability under the Discrete-Time Linear Threshold (DLT) and Discrete-Time Independent Cascade (DIC) models is established by reducing incomplete observations to complete observations in a modified graph. Our improper PAC learnability result applies for the DLT and DIC models as well as the Continuous-Time Independent Cascade (CIC) model. It is based on a parametrization in terms of reachability features, and also gives rise to an efficient and practical heuristic. Experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the ability of our method to compensate even for a fairly large fraction of missing observations.