Kshama Dwarakanath

Kshama Dwarakanath, Danial Dervovic, Peyman Tavallali et al.

We propose a novel group of Gaussian Process based algorithms for fast approximate optimal stopping of time series with specific applications to financial markets. We show that structural properties commonly exhibited by financial time series (e.g., the tendency to mean-revert) allow the use of Gaussian and Deep Gaussian Process models that further enable us to analytically evaluate optimal stopping value functions and policies. We additionally quantify uncertainty in the value function by propagating the price model through the optimal stopping analysis. We compare and contrast our proposed methods against a sampling-based method, as well as a deep learning based benchmark that is currently considered the state-of-the-art in the literature. We show that our family of algorithms outperforms benchmarks on three historical time series datasets that include intra-day and end-of-day equity stock prices as well as the daily US treasury yield curve rates.

Kshama Dwarakanath, Svitlana S Vyetrenko, Tucker Balch

We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a marketplace typically charges fees for facilitating trade. The goal of this work is to design a dynamic fee schedule for the marketplace that is equitable and profitable to all traders while being profitable to the marketplace at the same time (from charging fees). Since the traders adapt their strategies to the fee schedule, we present a reinforcement learning framework for simultaneously learning a marketplace fee schedule and trading strategies that adapt to this fee schedule using a weighted optimization objective of profits and equitability. We illustrate the use of the proposed approach in detail on a simulated stock exchange with different types of investors, specifically market makers and consumer investors. As we vary the equitability weights across different investor classes, we see that the learnt exchange fee schedule starts favoring the class of investors with the highest weight. We further discuss the observed insights from the simulated stock exchange in light of the general framework of equitable marketplace mechanism design.