Eric Y. Stutheit-Zhao

Nika Haghtalab, Michael I. Jordan, Eric Zhao

We provide a unifying framework for the design and analysis of multicalibrated predictors. By placing the multicalibration problem in the general setting of multi-objective learning -- where learning guarantees must hold simultaneously over a set of distributions and loss functions -- we exploit connections to game dynamics to achieve state-of-the-art guarantees for a diverse set of multicalibration learning problems. In addition to shedding light on existing multicalibration guarantees and greatly simplifying their analysis, our approach also yields improved guarantees, such as obtaining stronger multicalibration conditions that scale with the square-root of group size and improving the complexity of $k$-class multicalibration by an exponential factor of $k$. Beyond multicalibration, we use these game dynamics to address emerging considerations in the study of group fairness and multi-distribution learning.

Eric Zhao, Tatjana Chavdarova, Michael Jordan

Variational inequalities (VIs) are a broad class of optimization problems encompassing machine learning problems ranging from standard convex minimization to more complex scenarios like min-max optimization and computing the equilibria of multi-player games. In convex optimization, strong convexity allows for fast statistical learning rates requiring only $Θ(1/ε)$ stochastic first-order oracle calls to find an $ε$-optimal solution, rather than the standard $Θ(1/ε^2)$ calls. This note provides a simple overview of how one can similarly obtain fast $Θ(1/ε)$ rates for learning VIs that satisfy strong monotonicity, a generalization of strong convexity. Specifically, we demonstrate that standard stability-based generalization arguments for convex minimization extend directly to VIs when the domain admits a small covering, or when the operator is integrable and suboptimality is measured by potential functions; such as when finding equilibria in multi-player games.

Eric Zhao, Alexander R. Trott, Caiming Xiong et al.

We study the problem of training a principal in a multi-agent general-sum game using reinforcement learning (RL). Learning a robust principal policy requires anticipating the worst possible strategic responses of other agents, which is generally NP-hard. However, we show that no-regret dynamics can identify these worst-case responses in poly-time in smooth games. We propose a framework that uses this policy evaluation method for efficiently learning a robust principal policy using RL. This framework can be extended to provide robustness to boundedly rational agents too. Our motivating application is automated mechanism design: we empirically demonstrate our framework learns robust mechanisms in both matrix games and complex spatiotemporal games. In particular, we learn a dynamic tax policy that improves the welfare of a simulated trade-and-barter economy by 15%, even when facing previously unseen boundedly rational RL taxpayers.