Kerem Oktar

Ilia Sucholutsky, Lukas Muttenthaler, Adrian Weller et al. · berkeley, cambridge

Biological and artificial information processing systems form representations of the world that they can use to categorize, reason, plan, navigate, and make decisions. How can we measure the similarity between the representations formed by these diverse systems? Do similarities in representations then translate into similar behavior? If so, then how can a system's representations be modified to better match those of another system? These questions pertaining to the study of representational alignment are at the heart of some of the most promising research areas in contemporary cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. In this Perspective, we survey the exciting recent developments in representational alignment research in the fields of cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. Despite their overlapping interests, there is limited knowledge transfer between these fields, so work in one field ends up duplicated in another, and useful innovations are not shared effectively. To improve communication, we propose a unifying framework that can serve as a common language for research on representational alignment, and map several streams of existing work across fields within our framework. We also lay out open problems in representational alignment where progress can benefit all three of these fields. We hope that this paper will catalyze cross-disciplinary collaboration and accelerate progress for all communities studying and developing information processing systems.

Shuyue Stella Li, Bhargavi Paranjape, Kerem Oktar et al.

User preferences evolve across months of interaction, and tracking them requires inferring when a stated preference has been changed by a subsequent life event. We define this problem as long-horizon personalization and observe that progress on it is limited by data availability and measurement, with no existing resource providing both naturalistic long-horizon interactions and the ground-truth provenance needed to diagnose why models fail. We introduce a data generator that produces conversations from a structured mental state graph, yielding ground-truth provenance for every preference change across 6-month timelines, and from it construct HorizonBench, a benchmark of 4,245 items from 360 simulated users with 6-month conversation histories averaging ~4,300 turns and ~163K tokens. HorizonBench provides a testbed for long-context modeling, memory-augmented architectures, theory-of-mind reasoning, and user modeling. Across 25 frontier models, the best model reaches 52.8% and most score at or below the 20% chance baseline. When these models err on evolved preferences, over a third of the time they select the user's originally stated value without tracking the updated user state. This belief-update failure persists across context lengths and expression explicitness levels, identifying state-tracking capability as the primary bottleneck for long-horizon personalization.

Kerem Oktar, Ilia Sucholutsky, Tania Lombrozo et al.

The increasing prevalence of artificial agents creates a correspondingly increasing need to manage disagreements between humans and artificial agents, as well as between artificial agents themselves. Considering this larger space of possible agents exposes an opportunity for furthering our understanding of the nature of disagreement: past studies in psychology have often cast disagreement as two agents forming diverging evaluations of the same object, but disagreement can also arise from differences in how agents represent that object. AI research on human-machine alignment and recent work in computational cognitive science have focused on this latter kind of disagreement, and have developed tools that can be used to quantify the extent of representational overlap between agents. Understanding how divergence and misalignment interact to produce disagreement, and how resolution strategies depend on this interaction, is key to promoting effective collaboration between diverse types of agents.

Sasha Robinson, Kerem Oktar, Katherine M. Collins et al.

With increasing integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into areas of high-stakes human decision-making, it is important to understand the risks they introduce as advisors. To be useful advisors, LLMs must sift through large amounts of content, written with both benevolent and malicious intent, and then use this information to convince a user to take a specific action. This involves two social capacities: vigilance (the ability to determine which information to use, and which to discard) and persuasion (synthesizing the available evidence to make a convincing argument). While existing work has investigated these capacities in isolation, there has been little prior investigation of how these capacities may be linked. Here, we use a simple multi-turn puzzle-solving game, Sokoban, to study LLMs' abilities to persuade and be rationally vigilant towards other LLM agents. We find that puzzle-solving performance, persuasive capability, and vigilance are dissociable capacities in LLMs. Performing well on the game does not automatically mean a model can detect when it is being misled, even if the possibility of deception is explicitly mentioned. However, LLMs do consistently modulate their token use, using fewer tokens to reason when advice is benevolent and more when it is malicious, even if they are still persuaded to take actions leading them to failure. To our knowledge, our work presents the first investigation of the relationship between persuasion, vigilance, and task performance in LLMs, and suggests that monitoring all three independently will be critical for future work in AI safety.

Philipp Schoenegger, Francesco Salvi, Jiacheng Liu et al. · oxford

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

Kerem Oktar, Katherine M. Collins, Jose Hernandez-Orallo et al.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems have historically been used as tools that execute narrowly defined tasks. Yet recent advances in AI have unlocked possibilities for a new class of models that genuinely collaborate with humans in complex reasoning, from conceptualizing problems to brainstorming solutions. Such AI thought partners enable novel forms of collaboration and extended cognition, yet they also pose major risks-including and beyond risks of typical AI tools and agents. In this commentary, we systematically identify risks of AI thought partners through a novel framework that identifies risks at multiple levels of analysis, including Real-time, Individual, and Societal risks arising from collaborative cognition (RISc). We leverage this framework to propose concrete metrics for risk evaluation, and finally suggest specific mitigation strategies for developers and policymakers. As AI thought partners continue to proliferate, these strategies can help prevent major harms and ensure that humans actively benefit from productive thought partnerships.

Addison J. Wu, Ryan Liu, Kerem Oktar et al.

Human communication is motivated: people speak, write, and create content with a particular communicative intent in mind. As a result, information that large language models (LLMs) and AI agents process is inherently framed by humans' intentions and incentives. People are adept at navigating such nuanced information: we routinely identify benevolent or self-serving motives in order to decide what statements to trust. For LLMs to be effective in the real world, they too must critically evaluate content by factoring in the motivations of the source -- for instance, weighing the credibility of claims made in a sales pitch. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive study of whether LLMs have this capacity for motivational vigilance. We first employ controlled experiments from cognitive science to verify that LLMs' behavior is consistent with rational models of learning from motivated testimony, and find they successfully discount information from biased sources in a human-like manner. We then extend our evaluation to sponsored online adverts, a more naturalistic reflection of LLM agents' information ecosystems. In these settings, we find that LLMs' inferences do not track the rational models' predictions nearly as closely -- partly due to additional information that distracts them from vigilance-relevant considerations. However, a simple steering intervention that boosts the salience of intentions and incentives substantially increases the correspondence between LLMs and the rational model. These results suggest that LLMs possess a basic sensitivity to the motivations of others, but generalizing to novel real-world settings will require further improvements to these models.

Maya Malaviya, Ilia Sucholutsky, Kerem Oktar et al.

Being able to learn from small amounts of data is a key characteristic of human intelligence, but exactly {\em how} small? In this paper, we introduce a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to examine classification in an extremely data-scarce setting, asking whether humans can learn more categories than they have exemplars (i.e., can humans do "less-than-one shot" learning?). An experiment conducted using this paradigm reveals that people are capable of learning in such settings, and provides several insights into underlying mechanisms. First, people can accurately infer and represent high-dimensional feature spaces from very little data. Second, having inferred the relevant spaces, people use a form of prototype-based categorization (as opposed to exemplar-based) to make categorical inferences. Finally, systematic, machine-learnable patterns in responses indicate that people may have efficient inductive biases for dealing with this class of data-scarce problems.