13.7CLNov 14, 2023Code
SimpleSafetyTests: a Test Suite for Identifying Critical Safety Risks in Large Language ModelsBertie Vidgen, Nino Scherrer, Hannah Rose Kirk et al. · oxford
The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.
FinanceBench: A New Benchmark for Financial Question AnsweringPranab Islam, Anand Kannappan, Douwe Kiela et al.
FinanceBench is a first-of-its-kind test suite for evaluating the performance of LLMs on open book financial question answering (QA). It comprises 10,231 questions about publicly traded companies, with corresponding answers and evidence strings. The questions in FinanceBench are ecologically valid and cover a diverse set of scenarios. They are intended to be clear-cut and straightforward to answer to serve as a minimum performance standard. We test 16 state of the art model configurations (including GPT-4-Turbo, Llama2 and Claude2, with vector stores and long context prompts) on a sample of 150 cases from FinanceBench, and manually review their answers (n=2,400). The cases are available open-source. We show that existing LLMs have clear limitations for financial QA. Notably, GPT-4-Turbo used with a retrieval system incorrectly answered or refused to answer 81% of questions. While augmentation techniques such as using longer context window to feed in relevant evidence improve performance, they are unrealistic for enterprise settings due to increased latency and cannot support larger financial documents. We find that all models examined exhibit weaknesses, such as hallucinations, that limit their suitability for use by enterprises.
Introducing v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark from MLCommonsBertie Vidgen, Adarsh Agrawal, Ahmed M. Ahmed et al. · deepmind, oxford
This paper introduces v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark, which has been created by the MLCommons AI Safety Working Group. The AI Safety Benchmark has been designed to assess the safety risks of AI systems that use chat-tuned language models. We introduce a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which for v0.5 covers only a single use case (an adult chatting to a general-purpose assistant in English), and a limited set of personas (i.e., typical users, malicious users, and vulnerable users). We created a new taxonomy of 13 hazard categories, of which 7 have tests in the v0.5 benchmark. We plan to release version 1.0 of the AI Safety Benchmark by the end of 2024. The v1.0 benchmark will provide meaningful insights into the safety of AI systems. However, the v0.5 benchmark should not be used to assess the safety of AI systems. We have sought to fully document the limitations, flaws, and challenges of v0.5. This release of v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark includes (1) a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which comprises use cases, types of systems under test (SUTs), language and context, personas, tests, and test items; (2) a taxonomy of 13 hazard categories with definitions and subcategories; (3) tests for seven of the hazard categories, each comprising a unique set of test items, i.e., prompts. There are 43,090 test items in total, which we created with templates; (4) a grading system for AI systems against the benchmark; (5) an openly available platform, and downloadable tool, called ModelBench that can be used to evaluate the safety of AI systems on the benchmark; (6) an example evaluation report which benchmarks the performance of over a dozen openly available chat-tuned language models; (7) a test specification for the benchmark.
8.3CLSep 9, 2025
No for Some, Yes for Others: Persona Prompts and Other Sources of False Refusal in Language ModelsFlor Miriam Plaza-del-Arco, Paul Röttger, Nino Scherrer et al.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into our daily lives and personalized. However, LLM personalization might also increase unintended side effects. Recent work suggests that persona prompting can lead models to falsely refuse user requests. However, no work has fully quantified the extent of this issue. To address this gap, we measure the impact of 15 sociodemographic personas (based on gender, race, religion, and disability) on false refusal. To control for other factors, we also test 16 different models, 3 tasks (Natural Language Inference, politeness, and offensiveness classification), and nine prompt paraphrases. We propose a Monte Carlo-based method to quantify this issue in a sample-efficient manner. Our results show that as models become more capable, personas impact the refusal rate less and less. Certain sociodemographic personas increase false refusal in some models, which suggests underlying biases in the alignment strategies or safety mechanisms. However, we find that the model choice and task significantly influence false refusals, especially in sensitive content tasks. Our findings suggest that persona effects have been overestimated, and might be due to other factors.