Eric Mazumdar

Chengrui Qu, Christopher Yeh, Kishan Panaganti et al.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) commonly adopts centralized training with decentralized execution, where value-factorization methods enforce the individual-global-maximum (IGM) principle so that decentralized greedy actions recover the team-optimal joint action. However, the reliability of this recipe in real-world settings remains unreliable due to environmental uncertainties arising from the sim-to-real gap, model mismatch, and system noise. We address this gap by introducing Distributionally robust IGM (DrIGM), a principle that requires each agent's robust greedy action to align with the robust team-optimal joint action. We show that DrIGM holds for a novel definition of robust individual action values, which is compatible with decentralized greedy execution and yields a provable robustness guarantee for the whole system. Building on this foundation, we derive DrIGM-compliant robust variants of existing value-factorization architectures (e.g., VDN/QMIX/QTRAN) that (i) train on robust Q-targets, (ii) preserve scalability, and (iii) integrate seamlessly with existing codebases without bespoke per-agent reward shaping. Empirically, on high-fidelity SustainGym simulators and a StarCraft game environment, our methods consistently improve out-of-distribution performance. Code and data are available at https://github.com/crqu/robust-coMARL.

Yizhou Zhang, Eric Mazumdar

Learning stationary policies in infinite-horizon general-sum Markov games (MGs) remains a fundamental open problem in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). While stationary strategies are preferred for their practicality, computing stationary forms of classic game-theoretic equilibria is computationally intractable -- a stark contrast to the comparative ease of solving single-agent RL or zero-sum games. To bridge this gap, we study Risk-averse Quantal response Equilibria (RQE), a solution concept rooted in behavioral game theory that incorporates risk aversion and bounded rationality. We demonstrate that RQE possesses strong regularity conditions that make it uniquely amenable to learning in MGs. We propose a novel two-timescale Actor-Critic algorithm characterized by a fast-timescale actor and a slow-timescale critic. Leveraging the regularity of RQE, we prove that this approach achieves global convergence with finite-sample guarantees. We empirically validate our algorithm in several environments to demonstrate superior convergence properties compared to risk-neutral baselines.

Chengrui Qu, Yizhou Zhang, Nicholas Lanzetti et al.

Many emerging agentic paradigms require agents to collaborate with one another (or people) to achieve shared goals. Unfortunately, existing approaches to learning policies for such collaborative problems produce brittle solutions that fail when paired with new partners. We attribute these failures to a combination of free-riding during training and a lack of strategic robustness. To address these problems, we study the concept of strategic risk aversion and interpret it as a principled inductive bias for generalizable cooperation with unseen partners. While strategically risk-averse players are robust to deviations in their partner's behavior by design, we show that, in collaborative games, they also (1) can have better equilibrium outcomes than those at classical game-theoretic concepts like Nash, and (2) exhibit less or no free-riding. Inspired by these insights, we develop a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that integrates strategic risk aversion into standard policy optimization methods. Our empirical results across collaborative benchmarks (including an LLM collaboration task) validate our theory and demonstrate that our approach consistently achieves reliable collaboration with heterogeneous and previously unseen partners across collaborative tasks.

Tinashe Handina, Eric Mazumdar

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the model class one optimizes over$\unicode{x2013}$and the more data one has access to$\unicode{x2013}$the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real-world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects the relationship between performance at equilibrium and the expressivity of model classes. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view$\unicode{x2013}$meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as model classes get larger or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this result in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning. In particular, we show that each of these settings admits a Braess' paradox-like phenomenon in which optimizing over less expressive model classes allows one to achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.