James Bishop

Ieva Raminta Staliūnaitė, James Bishop, Andreas Vlachos

The task of Error Prediction, namely predicting whether a model output is correct, is commonly tackled with Uncertainty Quantification (UQ). However, while uncertainty metrics capture when models lack knowledge or capacity to make a prediction, they also reflect aleatoric uncertainty, which is inherent in the model input and context. This paper presents a method for improving error prediction for Large Language Models (LLMs), by disentangling input ambiguity from UQ signal. We conduct experiments on the task of Question Answering (QA) with six UQ metrics and show that UQ metrics are more predictive of errors on unambiguous instances than on questions with multiple plausible answers. We use Gated Experts and Selective Prediction to incorporate gold and predicted ambiguity labels into the error prediction pipeline. We find that ambiguity information improves error prediction scores across model families, training and evaluation paradigms, datasets (including allegedly unambiguous ones), and sources of aleatoric uncertainty, yielding improvements of over 10 points of PRR for individual UQ metrics on standard datasets.

Edmund Dable-Heath, Boyko Vodenicharski, James Bishop

Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even in the face of human irrationality. We present a general framework for modelling corrigibility in a multi-agent setting as a 2 player game in which the agents always have a move in which they can ask the human for supervision. This is formulated as a Bayesian game for the purpose of introducing uncertainty over the human beliefs. We further analyse two specific cases. First, a two player corrigibility game, in which we want corrigibility displayed in both agents for both common payoff (monotone) games and harmonic games. Then we investigate an adversary setting, in which one agent is considered to be a `defending' agent and the other an `adversary'. A general result is provided for what belief over the games and human rationality the defending agent is required to have to induce corrigibility.