Eason Yu

Soichiro Nishimori, Shinri Okano, Keigo Habara et al.

Riichi Mahjong is a multi-player, imperfect-information game characterized by stochasticity and high-dimensional state spaces. These attributes present a unique combination of challenges that mirror complex real-world decision-making problems in reinforcement learning. While prior research has heavily relied on supervised learning from human play logs to pre-train the policy, algorithms capable of learning \textit{tabula rasa} (from scratch) offer greater potential for general applicability, as evidenced by the AlphaZero lineage. To facilitate such research, we introduce \textbf{Mahjax}, a fully vectorized Riichi Mahjong environment implemented in JAX to enable large-scale rollout parallelization on Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). We also provide a high-quality visualization tool to streamline debugging and interaction with trained agents. Experimental results demonstrate that Mahjax achieves throughputs of up to \textbf{2 million} and \textbf{1 million steps per second} on eight NVIDIA A100 GPUs under the no-red and red rules, respectively. Furthermore, we validate the environment's utility for reinforcement learning by showing that agents can be trained effectively to improve their rank against baseline policies.

Eason Yu, Tzu Hao Liu, Yunke Wang et al.

Finding Nash equilibria in imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. While regularization-based methods have recently achieved last-iteration convergence to a regularized equilibrium, they require the regularization strength to shrink toward zero to approximate a Nash equilibrium, often leading to unstable learning in practice. Instead, we fix the regularization strength at a large value for robustness and achieve convergence by iteratively refining the reference policy. Our main theoretical result shows that this procedure guarantees strictly monotonic improvement and convergence to an exact Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, without requiring a uniqueness assumption. Building on this framework, we develop a practical algorithm, Nash Policy Gradient (NashPG), which preserves the generalizability of policy gradient methods while relying solely on the current and reference policies. Empirically, NashPG achieves comparable or lower exploitability than prior model-free methods on classic benchmark games and scales to large domains such as Battleship and No-Limit Texas Hold'em, where NashPG consistently attains higher Elo ratings.