Sean Hendryx

Evan Wang, Federico Cassano, Catherine Wu et al.

While scaling training compute has led to remarkable improvements in large language models (LLMs), scaling inference compute has not yet yielded analogous gains. We hypothesize that a core missing component is a lack of diverse LLM outputs, leading to inefficient search due to models repeatedly sampling highly similar, yet incorrect generations. We empirically demonstrate that this lack of diversity can be mitigated by searching over candidate plans for solving a problem in natural language. Based on this insight, we propose PlanSearch, a novel search algorithm which shows strong results across HumanEval+, MBPP+, and LiveCodeBench (a contamination-free benchmark for competitive coding). PlanSearch generates a diverse set of observations about the problem and then uses these observations to construct plans for solving the problem. By searching over plans in natural language rather than directly over code solutions, PlanSearch explores a significantly more diverse range of potential solutions compared to baseline search methods. Using PlanSearch on top of Claude 3.5 Sonnet achieves a state-of-the-art pass@200 of 77.0% on LiveCodeBench, outperforming both the best score achieved without search (pass@1 = 41.4%) and using standard repeated sampling (pass@200 = 60.6%). Finally, we show that, across all models, search algorithms, and benchmarks analyzed, we can accurately predict performance gains due to search as a direct function of the diversity over generated ideas. Code can be found at https://github.com/scaleapi/plansearch.

Hugh Zhang, Jeff Da, Dean Lee et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved impressive success on many benchmarks for mathematical reasoning. However, there is growing concern that some of this performance actually reflects dataset contamination, where data closely resembling benchmark questions leaks into the training data, instead of true reasoning ability. To investigate this claim rigorously, we commission Grade School Math 1000 (GSM1k). GSM1k is designed to mirror the style and complexity of the established GSM8k benchmark, the gold standard for measuring elementary mathematical reasoning. We ensure that the two benchmarks are comparable across important metrics such as human solve rates, number of steps in solution, answer magnitude, and more. When evaluating leading open- and closed-source LLMs on GSM1k, we observe accuracy drops of up to 8%, with several families of models showing evidence of systematic overfitting across almost all model sizes. Further analysis suggests a positive relationship (Spearman's r^2 = 0.36) between a model's probability of generating an example from GSM8k and its performance gap between GSM8k and GSM1k, suggesting that some models may have partially memorized GSM8k. Nevertheless, many models, especially those on the frontier, show minimal signs of overfitting, and all models broadly demonstrate generalization to novel math problems guaranteed to not be in their training data.

Priyanshu Kumar, Elaine Lau, Saranya Vijayakumar et al.

For safety reasons, large language models (LLMs) are trained to refuse harmful user instructions, such as assisting dangerous activities. We study an open question in this work: does the desired safety refusal, typically enforced in chat contexts, generalize to non-chat and agentic use cases? Unlike chatbots, LLM agents equipped with general-purpose tools, such as web browsers and mobile devices, can directly influence the real world, making it even more crucial to refuse harmful instructions. In this work, we primarily focus on red-teaming browser agents, LLMs that manipulate information via web browsers. To this end, we introduce Browser Agent Red teaming Toolkit (BrowserART), a comprehensive test suite designed specifically for red-teaming browser agents. BrowserART is consist of 100 diverse browser-related harmful behaviors (including original behaviors and ones sourced from HarmBench [Mazeika et al., 2024] and AirBench 2024 [Zeng et al., 2024b]) across both synthetic and real websites. Our empirical study on state-of-the-art browser agents reveals that, while the backbone LLM refuses harmful instructions as a chatbot, the corresponding agent does not. Moreover, attack methods designed to jailbreak refusal-trained LLMs in the chat settings transfer effectively to browser agents. With human rewrites, GPT-4o and o1-preview-based browser agents attempted 98 and 63 harmful behaviors (out of 100), respectively. We publicly release BrowserART and call on LLM developers, policymakers, and agent developers to collaborate on improving agent safety