Liming Wang

Tian Wu, Liming Wang, Zijian Wen et al.

The emergence of Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) has transformed the scaling of large language models by enabling vast model capacity through sparse activation. Yet, converting these performance gains into practical edge deployment remains difficult, as the massive memory footprint and communication demands often overwhelm resource-limited environments. While centralized cloud-based solutions are available, they are frequently plagued by prohibitive infrastructure costs, latency issues, and privacy concerns. Moreover, existing edge-oriented optimizations largely overlook the complexities of heterogeneous hardware, focusing instead on isolated or uniform device setups. In response, this paper proposes Prism, an inference framework engineered for collaborative MoE serving across diverse GPU-equipped edge servers. By leveraging the intrinsic sparsity and input locality of MoE workloads, Prism minimizes inter-server communication and optimizes expert placement within diverse resource constraints. The framework integrates an activation-aware placement strategy that balances local request coverage with memory utilization, supplemented by a runtime migration mechanism to adapt expert distribution to dynamic workload changes. Experiments on contemporary MoE models and datasets demonstrate that Prism reduces inference latency by up to 30.6% and significantly lowers communication costs compared to state-of-the-art baselines, confirming the effectiveness of cooperative edge-based MoE serving.

Pengwei Zhan, Liming Wang, Yi Tang

Cryptographic protocols have been widely used to protect the user's privacy and avoid exposing private information. QUIC (Quick UDP Internet Connections), including the version originally designed by Google (GQUIC) and the version standardized by IETF (IQUIC), as alternatives to the traditional HTTP, demonstrate their unique transmission characteristics: based on UDP for encrypted resource transmitting, accelerating web page rendering. However, existing encrypted transmission schemes based on TCP are vulnerable to website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks, allowing adversaries to infer the users' visited websites by eavesdropping on the transmission channel. Whether GQUIC and IQUIC can effectively resist such attacks is worth investigating. In this paper, we study the vulnerabilities of GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS to WFP attacks from the perspective of traffic analysis. Extensive experiments show that, in the early traffic scenario, GQUIC is the most vulnerable to WFP attacks among GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS, while IQUIC is more vulnerable than HTTPS, but the vulnerability of the three protocols is similar in the normal full traffic scenario. Features transferring analysis shows that most features are transferable between protocols when on normal full traffic scenario. However, combining with the qualitative analysis of latent feature representation, we find that the transferring is inefficient when on early traffic, as GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS show the significantly different magnitude of variation in the traffic distribution on early traffic. By upgrading the one-time WFP attacks to multiple WFP Top-a attacks, we find that the attack accuracy on GQUIC and IQUIC reach 95.4% and 95.5%, respectively, with only 40 packets and just using simple features, whereas reach only 60.7% when on HTTPS. We also demonstrate that the vulnerability of IQUIC is only slightly dependent on the network environment.