Chi Wang

Shaokun Zhang, Jieyu Zhang, Jiale Liu et al. · uw

Researchers and practitioners have recently reframed powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) as agents, enabling them to automate complex tasks largely via the use of specialized functions. To facilitate the development of LLM agents, we present a novel paradigm of training LLM agents without modifying the LLM weights, which is particularly useful when the LLMs are difficult or inaccessible for modifications. Inspired by how humans continuously forge tools to adapt to real-world tasks, rather than change our biological structure to fit a static set of tools, we propose to progressively forge agent's functions to better solve the downstream tasks instead of modifying the LLM weights. By treating the functions as learnable `agent parameters' and leveraging the fundamental idea of model training in artificial intelligence, we develop AgentOptimizer that employs the LLM to update agents' functions and devise an agent training algorithm with two strategies, roll-back, and early-stop, to streamline the training process. With extensive experiments, we showcase that the agent training paradigm could significantly improve the performance of representative LLM agents in various downstream tasks. We also study the behavior of the agent training regarding aspects like the learning curve and domain transferability.

Tvrtko Sternak, Davor Runje, Dorian Granoša et al.

This paper presents a novel approach to evaluating the security of large language models (LLMs) against prompt leakage-the exposure of system-level prompts or proprietary configurations. We define prompt leakage as a critical threat to secure LLM deployment and introduce a framework for testing the robustness of LLMs using agentic teams. Leveraging AG2 (formerly AutoGen), we implement a multi-agent system where cooperative agents are tasked with probing and exploiting the target LLM to elicit its prompt. Guided by traditional definitions of security in cryptography, we further define a prompt leakage-safe system as one in which an attacker cannot distinguish between two agents: one initialized with an original prompt and the other with a prompt stripped of all sensitive information. In a safe system, the agents' outputs will be indistinguishable to the attacker, ensuring that sensitive information remains secure. This cryptographically inspired framework provides a rigorous standard for evaluating and designing secure LLMs. This work establishes a systematic methodology for adversarial testing of prompt leakage, bridging the gap between automated threat modeling and practical LLM security. You can find the implementation of our prompt leakage probing on GitHub.