Yiming Li

Yiming Li, Yang Bai, Yong Jiang et al. · tsinghua

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated their superiority in practice. Arguably, the rapid development of DNNs is largely benefited from high-quality (open-sourced) datasets, based on which researchers and developers can easily evaluate and improve their learning methods. Since the data collection is usually time-consuming or even expensive, how to protect their copyrights is of great significance and worth further exploration. In this paper, we revisit dataset ownership verification. We find that existing verification methods introduced new security risks in DNNs trained on the protected dataset, due to the targeted nature of poison-only backdoor watermarks. To alleviate this problem, in this work, we explore the untargeted backdoor watermarking scheme, where the abnormal model behaviors are not deterministic. Specifically, we introduce two dispersibilities and prove their correlation, based on which we design the untargeted backdoor watermark under both poisoned-label and clean-label settings. We also discuss how to use the proposed untargeted backdoor watermark for dataset ownership verification. Experiments on benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of our methods and their resistance to existing backdoor defenses. Our codes are available at \url{https://github.com/THUYimingLi/Untargeted_Backdoor_Watermark}.

Yiming Li, Mingyan Zhu, Xue Yang et al. · tsinghua

Deep learning, especially deep neural networks (DNNs), has been widely and successfully adopted in many critical applications for its high effectiveness and efficiency. The rapid development of DNNs has benefited from the existence of some high-quality datasets ($e.g.$, ImageNet), which allow researchers and developers to easily verify the performance of their methods. Currently, almost all existing released datasets require that they can only be adopted for academic or educational purposes rather than commercial purposes without permission. However, there is still no good way to ensure that. In this paper, we formulate the protection of released datasets as verifying whether they are adopted for training a (suspicious) third-party model, where defenders can only query the model while having no information about its parameters and training details. Based on this formulation, we propose to embed external patterns via backdoor watermarking for the ownership verification to protect them. Our method contains two main parts, including dataset watermarking and dataset verification. Specifically, we exploit poison-only backdoor attacks ($e.g.$, BadNets) for dataset watermarking and design a hypothesis-test-guided method for dataset verification. We also provide some theoretical analyses of our methods. Experiments on multiple benchmark datasets of different tasks are conducted, which verify the effectiveness of our method. The code for reproducing main experiments is available at \url{https://github.com/THUYimingLi/DVBW}.

Hanbo Cai, Pengcheng Zhang, Hai Dong et al. · tsinghua

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely and successfully adopted and deployed in various applications of speech recognition. Recently, a few works revealed that these models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where the adversaries can implant malicious prediction behaviors into victim models by poisoning their training process. In this paper, we revisit poison-only backdoor attacks against speech recognition. We reveal that existing methods are not stealthy since their trigger patterns are perceptible to humans or machine detection. This limitation is mostly because their trigger patterns are simple noises or separable and distinctive clips. Motivated by these findings, we propose to exploit elements of sound ($e.g.$, pitch and timbre) to design more stealthy yet effective poison-only backdoor attacks. Specifically, we insert a short-duration high-pitched signal as the trigger and increase the pitch of remaining audio clips to `mask' it for designing stealthy pitch-based triggers. We manipulate timbre features of victim audios to design the stealthy timbre-based attack and design a voiceprint selection module to facilitate the multi-backdoor attack. Our attacks can generate more `natural' poisoned samples and therefore are more stealthy. Extensive experiments are conducted on benchmark datasets, which verify the effectiveness of our attacks under different settings ($e.g.$, all-to-one, all-to-all, clean-label, physical, and multi-backdoor settings) and their stealthiness. The code for reproducing main experiments are available at \url{https://github.com/HanboCai/BadSpeech_SoE}.

Yiming Li, Mengxi Ya, Yang Bai et al.

Third-party resources ($e.g.$, samples, backbones, and pre-trained models) are usually involved in the training of deep neural networks (DNNs), which brings backdoor attacks as a new training-phase threat. In general, backdoor attackers intend to implant hidden backdoor in DNNs, so that the attacked DNNs behave normally on benign samples whereas their predictions will be maliciously changed to a pre-defined target label if hidden backdoors are activated by attacker-specified trigger patterns. To facilitate the research and development of more secure training schemes and defenses, we design an open-sourced Python toolbox that implements representative and advanced backdoor attacks and defenses under a unified and flexible framework. Our toolbox has four important and promising characteristics, including consistency, simplicity, flexibility, and co-development. It allows researchers and developers to easily implement and compare different methods on benchmark or their local datasets. This Python toolbox, namely \texttt{BackdoorBox}, is available at \url{https://github.com/THUYimingLi/BackdoorBox}.

Jianshuo Dong, Han Qiu, Yiming Li et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by \textbf{flipping only one critical bit} on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at \url{https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA}.

Yiming Li, Linghui Zhu, Xiaojun Jia et al.

Currently, deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely adopted in different applications. Despite its commercial values, training a well-performing DNN is resource-consuming. Accordingly, the well-trained model is valuable intellectual property for its owner. However, recent studies revealed the threats of model stealing, where the adversaries can obtain a function-similar copy of the victim model, even when they can only query the model. In this paper, we propose an effective and harmless model ownership verification (MOVE) to defend against different types of model stealing simultaneously, without introducing new security risks. In general, we conduct the ownership verification by verifying whether a suspicious model contains the knowledge of defender-specified external features. Specifically, we embed the external features by modifying a few training samples with style transfer. We then train a meta-classifier to determine whether a model is stolen from the victim. This approach is inspired by the understanding that the stolen models should contain the knowledge of features learned by the victim model. In particular, \revision{we develop our MOVE method under both white-box and black-box settings and analyze its theoretical foundation to provide comprehensive model protection.} Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of our method and its resistance to potential adaptive attacks. The codes for reproducing the main experiments of our method are available at https://github.com/THUYimingLi/MOVE.

Guanhao Gan, Yiming Li, Dongxian Wu et al. · tsinghua

Deep neural networks are valuable assets considering their commercial benefits and huge demands for costly annotation and computation resources. To protect the copyright of DNNs, backdoor-based ownership verification becomes popular recently, in which the model owner can watermark the model by embedding a specific backdoor behavior before releasing it. The defenders (usually the model owners) can identify whether a suspicious third-party model is ``stolen'' from them based on the presence of the behavior. Unfortunately, these watermarks are proven to be vulnerable to removal attacks even like fine-tuning. To further explore this vulnerability, we investigate the parameter space and find there exist many watermark-removed models in the vicinity of the watermarked one, which may be easily used by removal attacks. Inspired by this finding, we propose a mini-max formulation to find these watermark-removed models and recover their watermark behavior. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method improves the robustness of the model watermarking against parametric changes and numerous watermark-removal attacks. The codes for reproducing our main experiments are available at \url{https://github.com/GuanhaoGan/robust-model-watermarking}.

Hongwei Li, Tao Dai, Yiming Li et al.

Image representation is critical for many visual tasks. Instead of representing images discretely with 2D arrays of pixels, a recent study, namely local implicit image function (LIIF), denotes images as a continuous function where pixel values are expansion by using the corresponding coordinates as inputs. Due to its continuous nature, LIIF can be adopted for arbitrary-scale image super-resolution tasks, resulting in a single effective and efficient model for various up-scaling factors. However, LIIF often suffers from structural distortions and ringing artifacts around edges, mostly because all pixels share the same model, thus ignoring the local properties of the image. In this paper, we propose a novel adaptive local image function (A-LIIF) to alleviate this problem. Specifically, our A-LIIF consists of two main components: an encoder and a expansion network. The former captures cross-scale image features, while the latter models the continuous up-scaling function by a weighted combination of multiple local implicit image functions. Accordingly, our A-LIIF can reconstruct the high-frequency textures and structures more accurately. Experiments on multiple benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of our method. Our codes are available at \url{https://github.com/LeeHW-THU/A-LIIF}.

Junfeng Guo, Yiming Li, Lixu Wang et al.

The prosperity of deep neural networks (DNNs) is largely benefited from open-source datasets, based on which users can evaluate and improve their methods. In this paper, we revisit backdoor-based dataset ownership verification (DOV), which is currently the only feasible approach to protect the copyright of open-source datasets. We reveal that these methods are fundamentally harmful given that they could introduce malicious misclassification behaviors to watermarked DNNs by the adversaries. In this paper, we design DOV from another perspective by making watermarked models (trained on the protected dataset) correctly classify some `hard' samples that will be misclassified by the benign model. Our method is inspired by the generalization property of DNNs, where we find a \emph{hardly-generalized domain} for the original dataset (as its \emph{domain watermark}). It can be easily learned with the protected dataset containing modified samples. Specifically, we formulate the domain generation as a bi-level optimization and propose to optimize a set of visually-indistinguishable clean-label modified data with similar effects to domain-watermarked samples from the hardly-generalized domain to ensure watermark stealthiness. We also design a hypothesis-test-guided ownership verification via our domain watermark and provide the theoretical analyses of our method. Extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets are conducted, which verify the effectiveness of our method and its resistance to potential adaptive methods. The code for reproducing main experiments is available at \url{https://github.com/JunfengGo/Domain-Watermark}.

Yiming Li, Zhifang Guo, Zhirong Ye et al. · tsinghua

In this paper, we describe in detail our system for DCASE 2022 Task4. The system combines two considerably different models: an end-to-end Sound Event Detection Transformer (SEDT) and a frame-wise model, Metric Learning and Focal Loss CNN (MLFL-CNN). The former is an event-wise model which learns event-level representations and predicts sound event categories and boundaries directly, while the latter is based on the widely adopted frame-classification scheme, under which each frame is classified into event categories and event boundaries are obtained by post-processing such as thresholding and smoothing. For SEDT, self-supervised pre-training using unlabeled data is applied, and semi-supervised learning is adopted by using an online teacher, which is updated from the student model using the Exponential Moving Average (EMA) strategy and generates reliable pseudo labels for weakly-labeled and unlabeled data. For the frame-wise model, the ICT-TOSHIBA system of DCASE 2021 Task 4 is used. Experimental results show that the hybrid system considerably outperforms either individual model and achieves psds1 of 0.420 and psds2 of 0.783 on the validation set without external data. The code is available at https://github.com/965694547/Hybrid-system-of-frame-wise-model-and-SEDT.

Najeeb Moharram Jebreel, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Yiming Li

Training deep neural networks (DNNs) usually requires massive training data and computational resources. Users who cannot afford this may prefer to outsource training to a third party or resort to publicly available pre-trained models. Unfortunately, doing so facilitates a new training-time attack (i.e., backdoor attack) against DNNs. This attack aims to induce misclassification of input samples containing adversary-specified trigger patterns. In this paper, we first conduct a layer-wise feature analysis of poisoned and benign samples from the target class. We find out that the feature difference between benign and poisoned samples tends to be maximum at a critical layer, which is not always the one typically used in existing defenses, namely the layer before fully-connected layers. We also demonstrate how to locate this critical layer based on the behaviors of benign samples. We then propose a simple yet effective method to filter poisoned samples by analyzing the feature differences between suspicious and benign samples at the critical layer. We conduct extensive experiments on two benchmark datasets, which confirm the effectiveness of our defense.

Chengxiao Luo, Yiming Li, Yong Jiang et al.

Recent studies revealed that deep neural networks (DNNs) are exposed to backdoor threats when training with third-party resources (such as training samples or backbones). The backdoored model has promising performance in predicting benign samples, whereas its predictions can be maliciously manipulated by adversaries based on activating its backdoors with pre-defined trigger patterns. Currently, most of the existing backdoor attacks were conducted on the image classification under the targeted manner. In this paper, we reveal that these threats could also happen in object detection, posing threatening risks to many mission-critical applications ($e.g.$, pedestrian detection and intelligent surveillance systems). Specifically, we design a simple yet effective poison-only backdoor attack in an untargeted manner, based on task characteristics. We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our attack, it can trick the model to lose detection of any object stamped with our trigger patterns. We conduct extensive experiments on the benchmark dataset, showing its effectiveness in both digital and physical-world settings and its resistance to potential defenses.

Tinghao Xie, Xiangyu Qi, Ping He et al.

We present a novel defense, against backdoor attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), wherein adversaries covertly implant malicious behaviors (backdoors) into DNNs. Our defense falls within the category of post-development defenses that operate independently of how the model was generated. The proposed defense is built upon a novel reverse engineering approach that can directly extract backdoor functionality of a given backdoored model to a backdoor expert model. The approach is straightforward -- finetuning the backdoored model over a small set of intentionally mislabeled clean samples, such that it unlearns the normal functionality while still preserving the backdoor functionality, and thus resulting in a model (dubbed a backdoor expert model) that can only recognize backdoor inputs. Based on the extracted backdoor expert model, we show the feasibility of devising highly accurate backdoor input detectors that filter out the backdoor inputs during model inference. Further augmented by an ensemble strategy with a finetuned auxiliary model, our defense, BaDExpert (Backdoor Input Detection with Backdoor Expert), effectively mitigates 17 SOTA backdoor attacks while minimally impacting clean utility. The effectiveness of BaDExpert has been verified on multiple datasets (CIFAR10, GTSRB and ImageNet) across various model architectures (ResNet, VGG, MobileNetV2 and Vision Transformer).

Tong Xu, Yiming Li, Yong Jiang et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The backdoor adversaries intend to maliciously control the predictions of attacked DNNs by injecting hidden backdoors that can be activated by adversary-specified trigger patterns during the training process. One recent research revealed that most of the existing attacks failed in the real physical world since the trigger contained in the digitized test samples may be different from that of the one used for training. Accordingly, users can adopt spatial transformations as the image pre-processing to deactivate hidden backdoors. In this paper, we explore the previous findings from another side. We exploit classical spatial transformations (i.e. rotation and translation) with the specific parameter as trigger patterns to design a simple yet effective poisoning-based backdoor attack. For example, only images rotated to a particular angle can activate the embedded backdoor of attacked DNNs. Extensive experiments are conducted, verifying the effectiveness of our attack under both digital and physical settings and its resistance to existing backdoor defenses.

Sheng Yang, Yiming Li, Yong Jiang et al.

Recent studies have demonstrated that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks during the training process. Specifically, the adversaries intend to embed hidden backdoors in DNNs so that malicious model predictions can be activated through pre-defined trigger patterns. In this paper, we explore the backdoor mechanism from the angle of the model structure. We select the skip connection for discussions, inspired by the understanding that it helps the learning of model `shortcuts' where backdoor triggers are usually easier to be learned. Specifically, we demonstrate that the attack success rate (ASR) decreases significantly when reducing the outputs of some key skip connections. Based on this observation, we design a simple yet effective backdoor removal method by suppressing the skip connections in critical layers selected by our method. We also implement fine-tuning on these layers to recover high benign accuracy and to further reduce ASR. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of our method.

Ruixiang Tang, Jiayi Yuan, Yiming Li et al.

In the field of natural language processing, the prevalent approach involves fine-tuning pretrained language models (PLMs) using local samples. Recent research has exposed the susceptibility of PLMs to backdoor attacks, wherein the adversaries can embed malicious prediction behaviors by manipulating a few training samples. In this study, our objective is to develop a backdoor-resistant tuning procedure that yields a backdoor-free model, no matter whether the fine-tuning dataset contains poisoned samples. To this end, we propose and integrate a honeypot module into the original PLM, specifically designed to absorb backdoor information exclusively. Our design is motivated by the observation that lower-layer representations in PLMs carry sufficient backdoor features while carrying minimal information about the original tasks. Consequently, we can impose penalties on the information acquired by the honeypot module to inhibit backdoor creation during the fine-tuning process of the stem network. Comprehensive experiments conducted on benchmark datasets substantiate the effectiveness and robustness of our defensive strategy. Notably, these results indicate a substantial reduction in the attack success rate ranging from 10\% to 40\% when compared to prior state-of-the-art methods.

Boheng Li, Yishuo Cai, Haowei Li et al.

Model quantization is widely used to compress and accelerate deep neural networks. However, recent studies have revealed the feasibility of weaponizing model quantization via implanting quantization-conditioned backdoors (QCBs). These special backdoors stay dormant on released full-precision models but will come into effect after standard quantization. Due to the peculiarity of QCBs, existing defenses have minor effects on reducing their threats or are even infeasible. In this paper, we conduct the first in-depth analysis of QCBs. We reveal that the activation of existing QCBs primarily stems from the nearest rounding operation and is closely related to the norms of neuron-wise truncation errors (i.e., the difference between the continuous full-precision weights and its quantized version). Motivated by these insights, we propose Error-guided Flipped Rounding with Activation Preservation (EFRAP), an effective and practical defense against QCBs. Specifically, EFRAP learns a non-nearest rounding strategy with neuron-wise error norm and layer-wise activation preservation guidance, flipping the rounding strategies of neurons crucial for backdoor effects but with minimal impact on clean accuracy. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our EFRAP can defeat state-of-the-art QCB attacks under various settings. Code is available at https://github.com/AntigoneRandy/QuantBackdoor_EFRAP.

Zilan Wang, Junfeng Guo, Jiacheng Zhu et al.

Recent advances in large-scale text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have enabled a variety of downstream applications, including style customization, subject-driven personalization, and conditional generation. As T2I models require extensive data and computational resources for training, they constitute highly valued intellectual property (IP) for their legitimate owners, yet making them incentive targets for unauthorized fine-tuning by adversaries seeking to leverage these models for customized, usually profitable applications. Existing IP protection methods for diffusion models generally involve embedding watermark patterns and then verifying ownership through generated outputs examination, or inspecting the model's feature space. However, these techniques are inherently ineffective in practical scenarios when the watermarked model undergoes fine-tuning, and the feature space is inaccessible during verification ((i.e., black-box setting). The model is prone to forgetting the previously learned watermark knowledge when it adapts to a new task. To address this challenge, we propose SleeperMark, a novel framework designed to embed resilient watermarks into T2I diffusion models. SleeperMark explicitly guides the model to disentangle the watermark information from the semantic concepts it learns, allowing the model to retain the embedded watermark while continuing to be adapted to new downstream tasks. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of SleeperMark across various types of diffusion models, including latent diffusion models (e.g., Stable Diffusion) and pixel diffusion models (e.g., DeepFloyd-IF), showing robustness against downstream fine-tuning and various attacks at both the image and model levels, with minimal impact on the model's generative capability. The code is available at https://github.com/taco-group/SleeperMark.

Sheng Yang, Jiawang Bai, Kuofeng Gao et al.

Given the power of vision transformers, a new learning paradigm, pre-training and then prompting, makes it more efficient and effective to address downstream visual recognition tasks. In this paper, we identify a novel security threat towards such a paradigm from the perspective of backdoor attacks. Specifically, an extra prompt token, called the switch token in this work, can turn the backdoor mode on, i.e., converting a benign model into a backdoored one. Once under the backdoor mode, a specific trigger can force the model to predict a target class. It poses a severe risk to the users of cloud API, since the malicious behavior can not be activated and detected under the benign mode, thus making the attack very stealthy. To attack a pre-trained model, our proposed attack, named SWARM, learns a trigger and prompt tokens including a switch token. They are optimized with the clean loss which encourages the model always behaves normally even the trigger presents, and the backdoor loss that ensures the backdoor can be activated by the trigger when the switch is on. Besides, we utilize the cross-mode feature distillation to reduce the effect of the switch token on clean samples. The experiments on diverse visual recognition tasks confirm the success of our switchable backdoor attack, i.e., achieving 95%+ attack success rate, and also being hard to be detected and removed. Our code is available at https://github.com/20000yshust/SWARM.

Zhixuan Chu, Hui Ding, Guang Zeng et al.

Although the widespread use of AI systems in today's world is growing, many current AI systems are found vulnerable due to hidden bias and missing information, especially in the most commonly used forecasting system. In this work, we explore the robustness and explainability of AI-based forecasting systems. We provide an in-depth analysis of the underlying causality involved in the effect prediction task and further establish a causal graph based on treatment, adjustment variable, confounder, and outcome. Correspondingly, we design a causal interventional prediction system (CIPS) based on a variational autoencoder and fully conditional specification of multiple imputations. Extensive results demonstrate the superiority of our system over state-of-the-art methods and show remarkable versatility and extensibility in practice.

Haoyang Li, Xuejia Chen, Zhanchao XU et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in natural language processing tasks, such as text generation and semantic understanding. However, their performance on numerical reasoning tasks, such as basic arithmetic, numerical retrieval, and magnitude comparison, remains surprisingly poor. This gap arises from their reliance on surface-level statistical patterns rather than understanding numbers as continuous magnitudes. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on either linguistic competence or structured mathematical problem-solving, neglecting fundamental numerical reasoning required in real-world scenarios. To bridge this gap, we propose NumericBench, a comprehensive benchmark to evaluate six fundamental numerical capabilities: number recognition, arithmetic operations, contextual retrieval, comparison, summary, and logical reasoning. NumericBench includes datasets ranging from synthetic number lists to the crawled real-world data, addressing challenges like long contexts, noise, and multi-step reasoning. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-4 and DeepSeek, reveal persistent weaknesses in numerical reasoning, highlighting the urgent need to improve numerically-aware language modeling. The benchmark is released in: https://github.com/TreeAI-Lab/NumericBench.

Yiming Li, Kaiying Yan, Shuo Shao et al.

With the increasing adoption of deep learning in speaker verification, large-scale speech datasets have become valuable intellectual property. To audit and prevent the unauthorized usage of these valuable released datasets, especially in commercial or open-source scenarios, we propose a novel dataset ownership verification method. Our approach introduces a clustering-based backdoor watermark (CBW), enabling dataset owners to determine whether a suspicious third-party model has been trained on a protected dataset under a black-box setting. The CBW method consists of two key stages: dataset watermarking and ownership verification. During watermarking, we implant multiple trigger patterns in the dataset to make similar samples (measured by their feature similarities) close to the same trigger while dissimilar samples are near different triggers. This ensures that any model trained on the watermarked dataset exhibits specific misclassification behaviors when exposed to trigger-embedded inputs. To verify dataset ownership, we design a hypothesis-test-based framework that statistically evaluates whether a suspicious model exhibits the expected backdoor behavior. We conduct extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, verifying the effectiveness and robustness of our method against potential adaptive attacks. The code for reproducing main experiments is available at https://github.com/Radiant0726/CBW

Yiming Li, Zhao Zhang

Conversational multi-doc question answering aims to answer specific questions based on the retrieved documents as well as the contextual conversations. In this paper, we introduce our winning approach for the "Conversational Multi-Doc QA" challenge in WSDM Cup 2024, which exploits the superior natural language understanding and generation capability of Large Language Models (LLMs). We first adapt LLMs to the task, then devise a hybrid training strategy to make the most of in-domain unlabeled data. Moreover, an advanced text embedding model is adopted to filter out potentially irrelevant documents and several approaches are designed and compared for the model ensemble. Equipped with all these techniques, our solution finally ranked 1st place in WSDM Cup 2024, surpassing its rivals to a large extent. The source codes have been released at https://github.com/zhangzhao219/WSDM-Cup-2024.

Ningyuan Yang, Guanliang Lyu, Mingchen Ma et al.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems faces significant challenges in hardware heterogeneity and control complexity. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) emerges as a critical enabler, providing standardized communication between LLMs and physical devices. We propose IoT-MCP, a novel framework that implements MCP through edge-deployed servers to bridge LLMs and IoT ecosystems. To support rigorous evaluation, we introduce IoT-MCP Bench, the first benchmark containing 114 Basic Tasks (e.g., ``What is the current temperature?'') and 1,140 Complex Tasks (e.g., ``I feel so hot, do you have any ideas?'') for IoT-enabled LLMs. Experimental validation across 22 sensor types and 6 microcontroller units demonstrates IoT-MCP's 100% task success rate to generate tool calls that fully meet expectations and obtain completely accurate results, 205ms average response time, and 74KB peak memory footprint. This work delivers both an open-source integration framework (https://github.com/Duke-CEI-Center/IoT-MCP-Servers) and a standardized evaluation methodology for LLM-IoT systems.

Ting Qiao, Yingjia Wang, Xing Liu et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where an attacker manipulates a small portion of the training data to implant hidden backdoors into the model. The compromised model behaves normally on clean samples but misclassifies backdoored samples into the attacker-specified target class, posing a significant threat to real-world DNN applications. Currently, several empirical defense methods have been proposed to mitigate backdoor attacks, but they are often bypassed by more advanced backdoor techniques. In contrast, certified defenses based on randomized smoothing have shown promise by adding random noise to training and testing samples to counteract backdoor attacks. In this paper, we reveal that existing randomized smoothing defenses implicitly assume that all samples are equidistant from the decision boundary. However, it may not hold in practice, leading to suboptimal certification performance. To address this issue, we propose a sample-specific certified backdoor defense method, termed Cert-SSB. Cert-SSB first employs stochastic gradient ascent to optimize the noise magnitude for each sample, ensuring a sample-specific noise level that is then applied to multiple poisoned training sets to retrain several smoothed models. After that, Cert-SSB aggregates the predictions of multiple smoothed models to generate the final robust prediction. In particular, in this case, existing certification methods become inapplicable since the optimized noise varies across different samples. To conquer this challenge, we introduce a storage-update-based certification method, which dynamically adjusts each sample's certification region to improve certification performance. We conduct extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed method. Our code is available at https://github.com/NcepuQiaoTing/Cert-SSB.

Yinghua Gao, Yiming Li, Xueluan Gong et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where the adversary manipulates a small portion of training data such that the victim model predicts normally on the benign samples but classifies the triggered samples as the target class. The backdoor attack is an emerging yet threatening training-phase threat, leading to serious risks in DNN-based applications. In this paper, we revisit the trigger patterns of existing backdoor attacks. We reveal that they are either visible or not sparse and therefore are not stealthy enough. More importantly, it is not feasible to simply combine existing methods to design an effective sparse and invisible backdoor attack. To address this problem, we formulate the trigger generation as a bi-level optimization problem with sparsity and invisibility constraints and propose an effective method to solve it. The proposed method is dubbed sparse and invisible backdoor attack (SIBA). We conduct extensive experiments on benchmark datasets under different settings, which verify the effectiveness of our attack and its resistance to existing backdoor defenses. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at \url{https://github.com/YinghuaGao/SIBA}.

Yiming Li, Dekun Ma, Ziyan An et al.

Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication techniques enable the collaboration between vehicles and many other entities in the neighboring environment, which could fundamentally improve the perception system for autonomous driving. However, the lack of a public dataset significantly restricts the research progress of collaborative perception. To fill this gap, we present V2X-Sim, a comprehensive simulated multi-agent perception dataset for V2X-aided autonomous driving. V2X-Sim provides: (1) \hl{multi-agent} sensor recordings from the road-side unit (RSU) and multiple vehicles that enable collaborative perception, (2) multi-modality sensor streams that facilitate multi-modality perception, and (3) diverse ground truths that support various perception tasks. Meanwhile, we build an open-source testbed and provide a benchmark for the state-of-the-art collaborative perception algorithms on three tasks, including detection, tracking and segmentation. V2X-Sim seeks to stimulate collaborative perception research for autonomous driving before realistic datasets become widely available. Our dataset and code are available at \url{https://ai4ce.github.io/V2X-Sim/}.

Kunzhe Huang, Yiming Li, Baoyuan Wu et al.

Recent studies have revealed that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers embed hidden backdoors in the DNN model by poisoning a few training samples. The attacked model behaves normally on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be maliciously changed when the backdoor is activated. We reveal that poisoned samples tend to cluster together in the feature space of the attacked DNN model, which is mostly due to the end-to-end supervised training paradigm. Inspired by this observation, we propose a novel backdoor defense via decoupling the original end-to-end training process into three stages. Specifically, we first learn the backbone of a DNN model via \emph{self-supervised learning} based on training samples without their labels. The learned backbone will map samples with the same ground-truth label to similar locations in the feature space. Then, we freeze the parameters of the learned backbone and train the remaining fully connected layers via standard training with all (labeled) training samples. Lastly, to further alleviate side-effects of poisoned samples in the second stage, we remove labels of some `low-credible' samples determined based on the learned model and conduct a \emph{semi-supervised fine-tuning} of the whole model. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets and DNN models verify that the proposed defense is effective in reducing backdoor threats while preserving high accuracy in predicting benign samples. Our code is available at \url{https://github.com/SCLBD/DBD}.

Yiming Li, Linghui Zhu, Xiaojun Jia et al.

Obtaining a well-trained model involves expensive data collection and training procedures, therefore the model is a valuable intellectual property. Recent studies revealed that adversaries can `steal' deployed models even when they have no training samples and can not get access to the model parameters or structures. Currently, there were some defense methods to alleviate this threat, mostly by increasing the cost of model stealing. In this paper, we explore the defense from another angle by verifying whether a suspicious model contains the knowledge of defender-specified \emph{external features}. Specifically, we embed the external features by tempering a few training samples with style transfer. We then train a meta-classifier to determine whether a model is stolen from the victim. This approach is inspired by the understanding that the stolen models should contain the knowledge of features learned by the victim model. We examine our method on both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that our method is effective in detecting different types of model stealing simultaneously, even if the stolen model is obtained via a multi-stage stealing process. The codes for reproducing main results are available at Github (https://github.com/zlh-thu/StealingVerification).

Tongqing Zhai, Yiming Li, Ziqi Zhang et al.

Speaker verification has been widely and successfully adopted in many mission-critical areas for user identification. The training of speaker verification requires a large amount of data, therefore users usually need to adopt third-party data ($e.g.$, data from the Internet or third-party data company). This raises the question of whether adopting untrusted third-party data can pose a security threat. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible to inject the hidden backdoor for infecting speaker verification models by poisoning the training data. Specifically, we design a clustering-based attack scheme where poisoned samples from different clusters will contain different triggers ($i.e.$, pre-defined utterances), based on our understanding of verification tasks. The infected models behave normally on benign samples, while attacker-specified unenrolled triggers will successfully pass the verification even if the attacker has no information about the enrolled speaker. We also demonstrate that existing backdoor attacks cannot be directly adopted in attacking speaker verification. Our approach not only provides a new perspective for designing novel attacks, but also serves as a strong baseline for improving the robustness of verification methods. The code for reproducing main results is available at \url{https://github.com/zhaitongqing233/Backdoor-attack-against-speaker-verification}.

Yiming Li, Ziqi Zhang, Jiawang Bai et al.

The rapid development of deep learning has benefited from the release of some high-quality open-sourced datasets ($e.g.$, ImageNet), which allows researchers to easily verify the effectiveness of their algorithms. Almost all existing open-sourced datasets require that they can only be adopted for academic or educational purposes rather than commercial purposes, whereas there is still no good way to protect them. In this paper, we propose a \emph{backdoor embedding based dataset watermarking} method to protect an open-sourced image-classification dataset by verifying whether it is used for training a third-party model. Specifically, the proposed method contains two main processes, including \emph{dataset watermarking} and \emph{dataset verification}. We adopt classical poisoning-based backdoor attacks ($e.g.$, BadNets) for dataset watermarking, ie, generating some poisoned samples by adding a certain trigger ($e.g.$, a local patch) onto some benign samples, labeled with a pre-defined target class. Based on the proposed backdoor-based watermarking, we use a hypothesis test guided method for dataset verification based on the posterior probability generated by the suspicious third-party model of the benign samples and their correspondingly watermarked samples ($i.e.$, images with trigger) on the target class. Experiments on some benchmark datasets are conducted, which verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.

Yiming Li, Yong Jiang, Zhifeng Li et al.

Backdoor attack intends to embed hidden backdoor into deep neural networks (DNNs), so that the attacked models perform well on benign samples, whereas their predictions will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by attacker-specified triggers. This threat could happen when the training process is not fully controlled, such as training on third-party datasets or adopting third-party models, which poses a new and realistic threat. Although backdoor learning is an emerging and rapidly growing research area, its systematic review, however, remains blank. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive survey of this realm. We summarize and categorize existing backdoor attacks and defenses based on their characteristics, and provide a unified framework for analyzing poisoning-based backdoor attacks. Besides, we also analyze the relation between backdoor attacks and relevant fields ($i.e.,$ adversarial attacks and data poisoning), and summarize widely adopted benchmark datasets. Finally, we briefly outline certain future research directions relying upon reviewed works. A curated list of backdoor-related resources is also available at \url{https://github.com/THUYimingLi/backdoor-learning-resources}.

Yiming Li, Baoyuan Wu, Yan Feng et al.

Adversarial examples have been shown to be the severe threat to deep neural networks (DNNs). One of the most effective adversarial defense methods is adversarial training (AT) through minimizing the adversarial risk $R_{adv}$, which encourages both the benign example $x$ and its adversarially perturbed neighborhoods within the $\ell_{p}$-ball to be predicted as the ground-truth label. In this work, we propose a novel defense method, the robust training (RT), by jointly minimizing two separated risks ($R_{stand}$ and $R_{rob}$), which is with respect to the benign example and its neighborhoods respectively. The motivation is to explicitly and jointly enhance the accuracy and the adversarial robustness. We prove that $R_{adv}$ is upper-bounded by $R_{stand} + R_{rob}$, which implies that RT has similar effect as AT. Intuitively, minimizing the standard risk enforces the benign example to be correctly predicted, and the robust risk minimization encourages the predictions of the neighbor examples to be consistent with the prediction of the benign example. Besides, since $R_{rob}$ is independent of the ground-truth label, RT is naturally extended to the semi-supervised mode ($i.e.$, SRT), to further enhance the adversarial robustness. Moreover, we extend the $\ell_{p}$-bounded neighborhood to a general case, which covers different types of perturbations, such as the pixel-wise ($i.e.$, $x + δ$) or the spatial perturbation ($i.e.$, $ AX + b$). Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets not only verify the superiority of the proposed SRT method to state-of-the-art methods for defensing pixel-wise or spatial perturbations separately, but also demonstrate its robustness to both perturbations simultaneously. The code for reproducing main results is available at \url{https://github.com/THUYimingLi/Semi-supervised_Robust_Training}.

Yiming Li, Peidong Liu, Yong Jiang et al.

Privacy protection is an important research area, which is especially critical in this big data era. To a large extent, the privacy of visual classification data is mainly in the mapping between the image and its corresponding label, since this relation provides a great amount of information and can be used in other scenarios. In this paper, we propose the mapping distortion based protection (MDP) and its augmentation-based extension (AugMDP) to protect the data privacy by modifying the original dataset. In the modified dataset generated by MDP, the image and its label are not consistent ($e.g.$, a cat-like image is labeled as the dog), whereas the DNNs trained on it can still achieve good performance on benign testing set. As such, this method can protect privacy when the dataset is leaked. Extensive experiments are conducted, which verify the effectiveness and feasibility of our method. The code for reproducing main results is available at \url{https://github.com/PerdonLiu/Visual-Privacy-Protection-via-Mapping-Distortion}.

Yiming Li, Yang Zhang, Qingtao Tang et al.

$k$-means algorithm is one of the most classical clustering methods, which has been widely and successfully used in signal processing. However, due to the thin-tailed property of the Gaussian distribution, $k$-means algorithm suffers from relatively poor performance on the dataset containing heavy-tailed data or outliers. Besides, standard $k$-means algorithm also has relatively weak stability, $i.e.$ its results have a large variance, which reduces its credibility. In this paper, we propose a robust and stable $k$-means variant, dubbed the $t$-$k$-means, as well as its fast version to alleviate those problems. Theoretically, we derive the $t$-$k$-means and analyze its robustness and stability from the aspect of the loss function and the expression of the clustering center, respectively. Extensive experiments are also conducted, which verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed method. The code for reproducing main results is available at \url{https://github.com/THUYimingLi/t-k-means}.

Yukun Chen, Shuo Shao, Enhao Huang et al.

Backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) have emerged as a significant security threat, allowing adversaries to implant hidden malicious behaviors during the model training phase. Pre-processing-based defense, which is one of the most important defense paradigms, typically focuses on input transformations or backdoor trigger inversion (BTI) to deactivate or eliminate embedded backdoor triggers during the inference process. However, these methods suffer from inherent limitations: transformation-based defenses often fail to balance model utility and defense performance, while BTI-based defenses struggle to accurately reconstruct trigger patterns without prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose REFINE, an inversion-free backdoor defense method based on model reprogramming. REFINE consists of two key components: \textbf{(1)} an input transformation module that disrupts both benign and backdoor patterns, generating new benign features; and \textbf{(2)} an output remapping module that redefines the model's output domain to guide the input transformations effectively. By further integrating supervised contrastive loss, REFINE enhances the defense capabilities while maintaining model utility. Extensive experiments on various benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our REFINE and its resistance to potential adaptive attacks.

Biao Yi, Sishuo Chen, Yiming Li et al.

Backdoor attacks pose an increasingly severe security threat to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) during their development stage. In response, backdoor sample purification has emerged as a promising defense mechanism, aiming to eliminate backdoor triggers while preserving the integrity of the clean content in the samples. However, existing approaches have been predominantly focused on the word space, which are ineffective against feature-space triggers and significantly impair performance on clean data. To address this, we introduce a universal backdoor defense that purifies backdoor samples in the activation space by drawing abnormal activations towards optimized minimum clean activation distribution intervals. The advantages of our approach are twofold: (1) By operating in the activation space, our method captures from surface-level information like words to higher-level semantic concepts such as syntax, thus counteracting diverse triggers; (2) the fine-grained continuous nature of the activation space allows for more precise preservation of clean content while removing triggers. Furthermore, we propose a detection module based on statistical information of abnormal activations, to achieve a better trade-off between clean accuracy and defending performance.

Lei Yu, Meng Han, Yiming Li et al.

Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) is a federated learning paradigm where multiple participants, who share the same set of samples but hold different features, jointly train machine learning models. Although VFL enables collaborative machine learning without sharing raw data, it is still susceptible to various privacy threats. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art in privacy attacks and defenses in VFL. We provide taxonomies for both attacks and defenses, based on their characterizations, and discuss open challenges and future research directions. Specifically, our discussion is structured around the model's life cycle, by delving into the privacy threats encountered during different stages of machine learning and their corresponding countermeasures. This survey not only serves as a resource for the research community but also offers clear guidance and actionable insights for practitioners to safeguard data privacy throughout the model's life cycle.

Huaizhi Ge, Yiming Li, Qifan Wang et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where triggers embedded in poisoned samples can maliciously alter LLMs' behaviors. In this paper, we move beyond attacking LLMs and instead examine backdoor attacks through the novel lens of natural language explanations. Specifically, we leverage LLMs' generative capabilities to produce human-readable explanations for their decisions, enabling direct comparisons between explanations for clean and poisoned samples. Our results show that backdoored models produce coherent explanations for clean inputs but diverse and logically flawed explanations for poisoned data, a pattern consistent across classification and generation tasks for different backdoor attacks. Further analysis reveals key insights into the explanation generation process. At the token level, explanation tokens associated with poisoned samples only appear in the final few transformer layers. At the sentence level, attention dynamics indicate that poisoned inputs shift attention away from the original input context during explanation generation. These findings enhance our understanding of backdoor mechanisms in LLMs and present a promising framework for detecting vulnerabilities through explainability.

Suozhi Huang, Juexiao Zhang, Yiming Li et al.

Collaborative perception leverages rich visual observations from multiple robots to extend a single robot's perception ability beyond its field of view. Many prior works receive messages broadcast from all collaborators, leading to a scalability challenge when dealing with a large number of robots and sensors. In this work, we aim to address \textit{scalable camera-based collaborative perception} with a Transformer-based architecture. Our key idea is to enable a single robot to intelligently discern the relevance of the collaborators and their associated cameras according to a learned spatial prior. This proactive understanding of the visual features' relevance does not require the transmission of the features themselves, enhancing both communication and computation efficiency. Specifically, we present ActFormer, a Transformer that learns bird's eye view (BEV) representations by using predefined BEV queries to interact with multi-robot multi-camera inputs. Each BEV query can actively select relevant cameras for information aggregation based on pose information, instead of interacting with all cameras indiscriminately. Experiments on the V2X-Sim dataset demonstrate that ActFormer improves the detection performance from 29.89% to 45.15% in terms of AP@0.7 with about 50% fewer queries, showcasing the effectiveness of ActFormer in multi-agent collaborative 3D object detection.

Ting Qiao, Xing Liu, Wenke Huang et al.

Large web-scale datasets have driven the rapid advancement of pre-trained language models (PLMs), but unauthorized data usage has raised serious copyright concerns. Existing dataset ownership verification (DOV) methods typically assume that watermarks remain stable during inference; however, this assumption often fails under natural noise and adversary-crafted perturbations. We propose the first certified dataset ownership verification method for PLMs based on dual-space smoothing (i.e., DSSmoothing). To address the challenges of text discreteness and semantic sensitivity, DSSmoothing introduces continuous perturbations in the embedding space to capture semantic robustness and applies controlled token reordering in the permutation space to capture sequential robustness. DSSmoothing consists of two stages: in the first stage, triggers are collaboratively embedded in both spaces to generate norm-constrained and robust watermarked datasets; in the second stage, randomized smoothing is applied in both spaces during verification to compute the watermark robustness (WR) of suspicious models and statistically compare it with the principal probability (PP) values of a set of benign models. Theoretically, DSSmoothing provides provable robustness guarantees for dataset ownership verification by ensuring that WR consistently exceeds PP under bounded dual-space perturbations. Extensive experiments on multiple representative web datasets demonstrate that DSSmoothing achieves stable and reliable verification performance and exhibits robustness against potential adaptive attacks.

Nan wang, Zhiyi Xia, Yiming Li et al.

Quantitative microstructural characterization is fundamental to materials science, where electron micrograph (EM) provides indispensable high-resolution insights. However, progress in deep learning-based EM characterization has been hampered by the scarcity of large-scale, diverse, and expert-annotated datasets, due to acquisition costs, privacy concerns, and annotation complexity. To address this issue, we introduce UniEM-3M, the first large-scale and multimodal EM dataset for instance-level understanding. It comprises 5,091 high-resolution EMs, about 3 million instance segmentation labels, and image-level attribute-disentangled textual descriptions, a subset of which will be made publicly available. Furthermore, we are also releasing a text-to-image diffusion model trained on the entire collection to serve as both a powerful data augmentation tool and a proxy for the complete data distribution. To establish a rigorous benchmark, we evaluate various representative instance segmentation methods on the complete UniEM-3M and present UniEM-Net as a strong baseline model. Quantitative experiments demonstrate that this flow-based model outperforms other advanced methods on this challenging benchmark. Our multifaceted release of a partial dataset, a generative model, and a comprehensive benchmark -- available at huggingface -- will significantly accelerate progress in automated materials analysis.

Carter Sifferman, Yiquan Li, Yiming Li et al.

We aim to recover the geometry of 3D parametric scenes using very few depth measurements from low-cost, commercially available time-of-flight sensors. These sensors offer very low spatial resolution (i.e., a single pixel), but image a wide field-of-view per pixel and capture detailed time-of-flight data in the form of time-resolved photon counts. This time-of-flight data encodes rich scene information and thus enables recovery of simple scenes from sparse measurements. We investigate the feasibility of using a distributed set of few measurements (e.g., as few as 15 pixels) to recover the geometry of simple parametric scenes with a strong prior, such as estimating the 6D pose of a known object. To achieve this, we design a method that utilizes both feed-forward prediction to infer scene parameters, and differentiable rendering within an analysis-by-synthesis framework to refine the scene parameter estimate. We develop hardware prototypes and demonstrate that our method effectively recovers object pose given an untextured 3D model in both simulations and controlled real-world captures, and show promising initial results for other parametric scenes. We additionally conduct experiments to explore the limits and capabilities of our imaging solution.

Zonglin Lyu, Juexiao Zhang, Mingxuan Lu et al.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a variety of promising capabilities in robotics, including long-horizon planning and commonsense reasoning. However, their performance in place recognition is still underexplored. In this work, we introduce multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to visual place recognition (VPR), where a robot must localize itself using visual observations. Our key design is to use vision-based retrieval to propose several candidates and then leverage language-based reasoning to carefully inspect each candidate for a final decision. Specifically, we leverage the robust visual features produced by off-the-shelf vision foundation models (VFMs) to obtain several candidate locations. We then prompt an MLLM to describe the differences between the current observation and each candidate in a pairwise manner, and reason about the best candidate based on these descriptions. Our results on three datasets demonstrate that integrating the general-purpose visual features from VFMs with the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs already provides an effective place recognition solution, without any VPR-specific supervised training. We believe our work can inspire new possibilities for applying and designing foundation models, i.e., VFMs, LLMs, and MLLMs, to enhance the localization and navigation of mobile robots.

Mingyan Zhu, Yiming Li, Junfeng Guo et al.

Currently, sample-specific backdoor attacks (SSBAs) are the most advanced and malicious methods since they can easily circumvent most of the current backdoor defenses. In this paper, we reveal that SSBAs are not sufficiently stealthy due to their poisoned-label nature, where users can discover anomalies if they check the image-label relationship. In particular, we demonstrate that it is ineffective to directly generalize existing SSBAs to their clean-label variants by poisoning samples solely from the target class. We reveal that it is primarily due to two reasons, including \textbf{(1)} the `antagonistic effects' of ground-truth features and \textbf{(2)} the learning difficulty of sample-specific features. Accordingly, trigger-related features of existing SSBAs cannot be effectively learned under the clean-label setting due to their mild trigger intensity required for ensuring stealthiness. We argue that the intensity constraint of existing SSBAs is mostly because their trigger patterns are `content-irrelevant' and therefore act as `noises' for both humans and DNNs. Motivated by this understanding, we propose to exploit content-relevant features, $a.k.a.$ (human-relied) attributes, as the trigger patterns to design clean-label SSBAs. This new attack paradigm is dubbed backdoor attack with attribute trigger (BAAT). Extensive experiments are conducted on benchmark datasets, which verify the effectiveness of our BAAT and its resistance to existing defenses.

Yiming Li, Haoxiang Zhong, Xingjun Ma et al.

Visual object tracking (VOT) has been widely adopted in mission-critical applications, such as autonomous driving and intelligent surveillance systems. In current practice, third-party resources such as datasets, backbone networks, and training platforms are frequently used to train high-performance VOT models. Whilst these resources bring certain convenience, they also introduce new security threats into VOT models. In this paper, we reveal such a threat where an adversary can easily implant hidden backdoors into VOT models by tempering with the training process. Specifically, we propose a simple yet effective few-shot backdoor attack (FSBA) that optimizes two losses alternately: 1) a \emph{feature loss} defined in the hidden feature space, and 2) the standard \emph{tracking loss}. We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our FSBA, it can trick the model to lose track of specific objects even when the \emph{trigger} only appears in one or a few frames. We examine our attack in both digital and physical-world settings and show that it can significantly degrade the performance of state-of-the-art VOT trackers. We also show that our attack is resistant to potential defenses, highlighting the vulnerability of VOT models to potential backdoor attacks.

Chuanbiao Song, Yanbo Fan, Yichen Yang et al.

Adversarial training (AT) has been demonstrated as one of the most promising defense methods against various adversarial attacks. To our knowledge, existing AT-based methods usually train with the locally most adversarial perturbed points and treat all the perturbed points equally, which may lead to considerably weaker adversarial robust generalization on test data. In this work, we introduce a new adversarial training framework that considers the diversity as well as characteristics of the perturbed points in the vicinity of benign samples. To realize the framework, we propose a Regional Adversarial Training (RAT) defense method that first utilizes the attack path generated by the typical iterative attack method of projected gradient descent (PGD), and constructs an adversarial region based on the attack path. Then, RAT samples diverse perturbed training points efficiently inside this region, and utilizes a distance-aware label smoothing mechanism to capture our intuition that perturbed points at different locations should have different impact on the model performance. Extensive experiments on several benchmark datasets show that RAT consistently makes significant improvement on standard adversarial training (SAT), and exhibits better robust generalization.

Yiming Li, Tongqing Zhai, Yong Jiang et al.

Backdoor attack intends to inject hidden backdoor into the deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the prediction of infected models will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger. Currently, most existing backdoor attacks adopted the setting of static trigger, $i.e.,$ triggers across the training and testing images follow the same appearance and are located in the same area. In this paper, we revisit this attack paradigm by analyzing trigger characteristics. We demonstrate that this attack paradigm is vulnerable when the trigger in testing images is not consistent with the one used for training. As such, those attacks are far less effective in the physical world, where the location and appearance of the trigger in the digitized image may be different from that of the one used for training. Moreover, we also discuss how to alleviate such vulnerability. We hope that this work could inspire more explorations on backdoor properties, to help the design of more advanced backdoor attack and defense methods.

Yiming Li, Yanjie Li, Yalei Lv et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to the \emph{backdoor attack}, which intends to embed hidden backdoors in DNNs by poisoning training data. The attacked model behaves normally on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be changed to a particular target label if hidden backdoors are activated. So far, backdoor research has mostly been conducted towards classification tasks. In this paper, we reveal that this threat could also happen in semantic segmentation, which may further endanger many mission-critical applications ($e.g.$, autonomous driving). Except for extending the existing attack paradigm to maliciously manipulate the segmentation models from the image-level, we propose a novel attack paradigm, the \emph{fine-grained attack}, where we treat the target label ($i.e.$, annotation) from the object-level instead of the image-level to achieve more sophisticated manipulation. In the annotation of poisoned samples generated by the fine-grained attack, only pixels of specific objects will be labeled with the attacker-specified target class while others are still with their ground-truth ones. Experiments show that the proposed methods can successfully attack semantic segmentation models by poisoning only a small proportion of training data. Our method not only provides a new perspective for designing novel attacks but also serves as a strong baseline for improving the robustness of semantic segmentation methods.

Yiming Li, Shan Liu, Yu Chen et al.

As the successor of H.265/HEVC, the new versatile video coding standard (H.266/VVC) can provide up to 50% bitrate saving with the same subjective quality, at the cost of increased decoding complexity. To accelerate the application of the new coding standard, a real-time H.266/VVC software decoder that can support various platforms is implemented, where SIMD technologies, parallelism optimization, and the acceleration strategies based on the characteristics of each coding tool are applied. As the mobile devices have become an essential carrier for video services nowadays, the mentioned optimization efforts are not only implemented for the x86 platform, but more importantly utilized to highly optimize the decoding performance on the ARM platform in this work. The experimental results show that when running on the Apple A14 SoC (iPhone 12pro), the average single-thread decoding speed of the present implementation can achieve 53fps (RA and LB) for full HD (1080p) bitstreams generated by VTM-11.0 reference software using 8bit Common Test Conditions (CTC). When multi-threading is enabled, an average of 32 fps (RA) can be achieved when decoding the 4K bitstreams.