Yang Zhang

Zhongzhi Yu, Yang Zhang, Kaizhi Qian et al.

Despite the impressive performance recently achieved by automatic speech recognition (ASR), we observe two primary challenges that hinder its broader applications: (1) The difficulty of introducing scalability into the model to support more languages with limited training, inference, and storage overhead; (2) The low-resource adaptation ability that enables effective low-resource adaptation while avoiding over-fitting and catastrophic forgetting issues. Inspired by recent findings, we hypothesize that we can address the above challenges with modules widely shared across languages. To this end, we propose an ASR framework, dubbed \METHODNS, that, \textit{for the first time}, simultaneously achieves strong multilingual scalability and low-resource adaptation ability thanks to its modularize-then-assemble strategy. Specifically, \METHOD learns a small set of generalizable sub-modules and adaptively assembles them for different languages to reduce the multilingual overhead and enable effective knowledge transfer for low-resource adaptation. Extensive experiments and visualizations demonstrate that \METHOD can effectively discover language similarity and improve multilingual and low-resource ASR performance over state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods, e.g., under multilingual-ASR, our framework achieves a 0.13$\sim$2.41 lower character error rate (CER) with 30\% smaller inference overhead over SOTA solutions on multilingual ASR and a comparable CER, with nearly 50 times fewer trainable parameters over SOTA solutions on low-resource tuning, respectively.

Yue Zhou, Henry Peng Zou, Barbara Di Eugenio et al.

We find that language models have difficulties generating fallacious and deceptive reasoning. When asked to generate deceptive outputs, language models tend to leak honest counterparts but believe them to be false. Exploiting this deficiency, we propose a jailbreak attack method that elicits an aligned language model for malicious output. Specifically, we query the model to generate a fallacious yet deceptively real procedure for the harmful behavior. Since a fallacious procedure is generally considered fake and thus harmless by LLMs, it helps bypass the safeguard mechanism. Yet the output is factually harmful since the LLM cannot fabricate fallacious solutions but proposes truthful ones. We evaluate our approach over five safety-aligned large language models, comparing four previous jailbreak methods, and show that our approach achieves competitive performance with more harmful outputs. We believe the findings could be extended beyond model safety, such as self-verification and hallucination.