Qi Zhang

Qi Zhang, Edmund H. Durfee, Satinder Singh

Multiagent systems can use commitments as the core of a general coordination infrastructure, supporting both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions. Agents whose objectives are aligned, and where one agent can help another achieve greater reward by sacrificing some of its own reward, should choose a cooperative commitment to maximize their joint reward. We present a solution to the problem of how cooperative agents can efficiently find an (approximately) optimal commitment by querying about carefully-selected commitment choices. We prove structural properties of the agents' values as functions of the parameters of the commitment specification, and develop a greedy method for composing a query with provable approximation bounds, which we empirically show can find nearly optimal commitments in a fraction of the time methods that lack our insights require.

Qi Zhang, Satinder Singh, Edmund Durfee

In cooperative multiagent planning, it can often be beneficial for an agent to make commitments about aspects of its behavior to others, allowing them in turn to plan their own behaviors without taking the agent's detailed behavior into account. Extending previous work in the Bayesian setting, we consider instead a worst-case setting in which the agent has a set of possible environments (MDPs) it could be in, and develop a commitment semantics that allows for probabilistic guarantees on the agent's behavior in any of the environments it could end up facing. Crucially, an agent receives observations (of reward and state transitions) that allow it to potentially eliminate possible environments and thus obtain higher utility by adapting its policy to the history of observations. We develop algorithms and provide theory and some preliminary empirical results showing that they ensure an agent meets its commitments with history-dependent policies while minimizing maximum regret over the possible environments.