Wenhao Li

Wenhao Li, Yue Lin, Xiangfeng Wang et al.

Information design (ID) explores how a sender influence the optimal behavior of receivers to achieve specific objectives. While ID originates from everyday human communication, existing game-theoretic and machine learning methods often model information structures as numbers, which limits many applications to toy games. This work leverages LLMs and proposes a verbalized framework in Bayesian persuasion (BP), which extends classic BP to real-world games involving human dialogues for the first time. Specifically, we map the BP to a verbalized mediator-augmented extensive-form game, where LLMs instantiate the sender and receiver. To efficiently solve the verbalized game, we propose a generalized equilibrium-finding algorithm combining LLM and game solver. The algorithm is reinforced with techniques including verbalized commitment assumptions, verbalized obedience constraints, and information obfuscation. Numerical experiments in dialogue scenarios, such as recommendation letters, courtroom interactions, and law enforcement, validate that our framework can both reproduce theoretical results in classic BP and discover effective persuasion strategies in more complex natural language and multi-stage scenarios.

Yun Hua, Haosheng Chen, Shiqin Wang et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show strong collaborative performance in multi-agent systems with predefined roles and workflows. However, in open-ended environments lacking coordination rules, agents tend to act in self-interested ways. The central challenge in achieving coordination lies in credit assignment -- fairly evaluating each agent's contribution and designing pricing mechanisms that align their heterogeneous goals. This problem is critical as LLMs increasingly participate in complex human-AI collaborations, where fair compensation and accountability rely on effective pricing mechanisms. Inspired by how human societies address similar coordination challenges (e.g., through temporary collaborations such as employment or subcontracting), we propose a cooperative workflow, Shapley-Coop. Shapley-Coop integrates Shapley Chain-of-Thought -- leveraging marginal contributions as a principled basis for pricing -- with structured negotiation protocols for effective price matching, enabling LLM agents to coordinate through rational task-time pricing and post-task reward redistribution. This approach aligns agent incentives, fosters cooperation, and maintains autonomy. We evaluate Shapley-Coop across two multi-agent games and a software engineering simulation, demonstrating that it consistently enhances LLM agent collaboration and facilitates equitable credit assignment. These results highlight the effectiveness of Shapley-Coop's pricing mechanisms in accurately reflecting individual contributions during task execution.