1.2GTMar 15, 2022
Multi-Unit Diffusion Auctions with IntermediariesBin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao
This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each other. Our goal is to incentivize the intermediaries to diffuse the auction information to individuals they can reach, including their private buyers and neighboring intermediaries, so that more potential buyers are able to participate in the auction. To this end, we build a diffusion-based auction framework which incorporates the strategic interaction of intermediaries. It is showed that the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism within the framework can achieve the maximum social welfare, but it may decrease the seller's revenue or even lead to a deficit. To overcome the revenue issue, we propose a novel auction, called critical neighborhood auction, which not only maximizes the social welfare, but also improves the seller's revenue comparing to the VCG mechanism with/without intermediaries.
4.1LGSep 15, 2025
On the Regularity and Fairness of Combinatorial Multi-Armed BanditXiaoyi Wu, Bin Li
The combinatorial multi-armed bandit model is designed to maximize cumulative rewards in the presence of uncertainty by activating a subset of arms in each round. This paper is inspired by two critical applications in wireless networks, where it's not only essential to maximize cumulative rewards but also to guarantee fairness among arms (i.e., the minimum average reward required by each arm) and ensure reward regularity (i.e., how often each arm receives the reward). In this paper, we propose a parameterized regular and fair learning algorithm to achieve these three objectives. In particular, the proposed algorithm linearly combines virtual queue-lengths (tracking the fairness violations), Time-Since-Last-Reward (TSLR) metrics, and Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) estimates in its weight measure. Here, TSLR is similar to age-of-information and measures the elapsed number of rounds since the last time an arm received a reward, capturing the reward regularity performance, and UCB estimates are utilized to balance the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation in online learning. By exploring a key relationship between virtual queue-lengths and TSLR metrics and utilizing several non-trivial Lyapunov functions, we analytically characterize zero cumulative fairness violation, reward regularity, and cumulative regret performance under our proposed algorithm. These theoretical outcomes are verified by simulations based on two real-world datasets.
1.2GTJul 19, 2025
Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social NetworksYuhang Guo, Dong Hao, Bin Li et al.
Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone allocation in Myerson's Lemma is a cornerstone, a general principle of allocation rules for strategyproof network auctions is still missing. We show that, due to the absence of such a principle, even extensions to multi-unit network auctions with single-unit demand present unexpected difficulties, and all pioneering researches fail to be strategyproof. For the first time in this field, we identify two categories of monotone allocation rules on networks: Invitation-Depressed Monotonicity (ID-MON) and Invitation-Promoted Monotonicity (IP-MON). They encompass all existing allocation rules of network auctions as specific instances. For any given ID-MON or IP-MON allocation rule, we characterize the existence and sufficient conditions for the strategyproof payment rules, and show that among all such payment rules, the revenue-maximizing one exists and is computationally feasible. With these results, the obstacle of combinatorial network auction with single-minded bidders is now resolved.
17.5LGFeb 10, 2021
An Efficient Pessimistic-Optimistic Algorithm for Stochastic Linear Bandits with General ConstraintsXin Liu, Bin Li, Pengyi Shi et al.
This paper considers stochastic linear bandits with general nonlinear constraints. The objective is to maximize the expected cumulative reward over horizon $T$ subject to a set of constraints in each round $τ\leq T$. We propose a pessimistic-optimistic algorithm for this problem, which is efficient in two aspects. First, the algorithm yields $\tilde{\cal O}\left(\left(\frac{K^{0.75}}δ+d\right)\sqrtτ\right)$ (pseudo) regret in round $τ\leq T,$ where $K$ is the number of constraints, $d$ is the dimension of the reward feature space, and $δ$ is a Slater's constant; and zero constraint violation in any round $τ>τ',$ where $τ'$ is independent of horizon $T.$ Second, the algorithm is computationally efficient. Our algorithm is based on the primal-dual approach in optimization and includes two components. The primal component is similar to unconstrained stochastic linear bandits (our algorithm uses the linear upper confidence bound algorithm (LinUCB)). The computational complexity of the dual component depends on the number of constraints, but is independent of the sizes of the contextual space, the action space, and the feature space. Thus, the overall computational complexity of our algorithm is similar to that of the linear UCB for unconstrained stochastic linear bandits.
10.6LGOct 20, 2020
POND: Pessimistic-Optimistic oNline DispatchingXin Liu, Bin Li, Pengyi Shi et al.
This paper considers constrained online dispatching with unknown arrival, reward and constraint distributions. We propose a novel online dispatching algorithm, named POND, standing for Pessimistic-Optimistic oNline Dispatching, which achieves $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret and $O(1)$ constraint violation. Both bounds are sharp. Our experiments on synthetic and real datasets show that POND achieves low regret with minimal constraint violations.
15.0LGMar 6, 2020
Cost-Sensitive Portfolio Selection via Deep Reinforcement LearningYifan Zhang, Peilin Zhao, Qingyao Wu et al.
Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.
7.3GTMay 23, 2019
Diffusion and Auction on GraphsBin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao et al.
Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.
10.3GTMar 7, 2019
Selling Multiple Items via Social NetworksDengji Zhao, Bin Li, Junping Xu et al.
We consider a market where a seller sells multiple units of a commodity in a social network. Each node/buyer in the social network can only directly communicate with her neighbours, i.e. the seller can only sell the commodity to her neighbours if she could not find a way to inform other buyers. In this paper, we design a novel promotion mechanism that incentivizes all buyers, who are aware of the sale, to invite all their neighbours to join the sale, even though there is no guarantee that their efforts will be paid. While traditional sale promotions such as sponsored search auctions cannot guarantee a positive return for the advertiser (the seller), our mechanism guarantees that the seller's revenue is better than not using the advertising. More importantly, the seller does not need to pay if the advertising is not beneficial to her.
2.5AIMay 23, 2016
Stochastic Patching ProcessXuhui Fan, Bin Li, Yi Wang et al.
Stochastic partition models tailor a product space into a number of rectangular regions such that the data within each region exhibit certain types of homogeneity. Due to constraints of partition strategy, existing models may cause unnecessary dissections in sparse regions when fitting data in dense regions. To alleviate this limitation, we propose a parsimonious partition model, named Stochastic Patching Process (SPP), to deal with multi-dimensional arrays. SPP adopts an "enclosing" strategy to attach rectangular patches to dense regions. SPP is self-consistent such that it can be extended to infinite arrays. We apply SPP to relational modeling and the experimental results validate its merit compared to the state-of-the-arts.
9.7CEJun 18, 2012
On-Line Portfolio Selection with Moving Average ReversionBin Li, Steven C. H. Hoi
On-line portfolio selection has attracted increasing interests in machine learning and AI communities recently. Empirical evidences show that stock's high and low prices are temporary and stock price relatives are likely to follow the mean reversion phenomenon. While the existing mean reversion strategies are shown to achieve good empirical performance on many real datasets, they often make the single-period mean reversion assumption, which is not always satisfied in some real datasets, leading to poor performance when the assumption does not hold. To overcome the limitation, this article proposes a multiple-period mean reversion, or so-called Moving Average Reversion (MAR), and a new on-line portfolio selection strategy named "On-Line Moving Average Reversion" (OLMAR), which exploits MAR by applying powerful online learning techniques. From our empirical results, we found that OLMAR can overcome the drawback of existing mean reversion algorithms and achieve significantly better results, especially on the datasets where the existing mean reversion algorithms failed. In addition to superior trading performance, OLMAR also runs extremely fast, further supporting its practical applicability to a wide range of applications.