Yan Chen

Xing Li, Xue Leng, Yan Chen

Serverless computing is a new cloud service model that reduces both cloud providers' and consumers' costs through extremely agile development, operation, and charging mechanisms and has been widely applied since its emergence. Nevertheless, some characteristics of serverless computing, such as fragmented application boundaries, have raised new security challenges. Considerable literature work has been committed to addressing these challenges. Commercial and open-source serverless platforms implement many security measures to enhance serverless environments. This paper presents the first survey of serverless security that considers both literature work and industrial security measures. We summarize the primary security challenges, analyze corresponding solutions from the literature and industry, and identify potential research opportunities. Then, we conduct a gap analysis of the academic and industrial solutions as well as commercial and open-source serverless platforms' security capabilities, and finally, we present a complete picture of current serverless security research.

Zhenyuan Li, Qi Alfred Chen, Runqing Yang et al.

With the development of information technology, the border of the cyberspace gets much broader, exposing more and more vulnerabilities to attackers. Traditional mitigation-based defence strategies are challenging to cope with the current complicated situation. Security practitioners urgently need better tools to describe and modelling attacks for defence. The provenance graph seems like an ideal method for threat modelling with powerful semantic expression ability and attacks historic correlation ability. In this paper, we firstly introduce the basic concepts about system-level provenance graph and proposed typical system architecture for provenance graph-based threat detection and investigation. A comprehensive provenance graph-based threat detection system can be divided into three modules, namely, "data collection module", "data management module", and "threat detection modules". Each module contains several components and involves many research problem. We systematically analyzed the algorithms and design details involved. By comparison, we give the strategy of technology selection. Moreover, we pointed out the shortcomings of the existing work for future improvement.

Shahid Alam, Zhengyang Qu, Ryan Riley et al.

According to the Symantec and F-Secure threat reports, mobile malware development in 2013 and 2014 has continued to focus almost exclusively ~99% on the Android platform. Malware writers are applying stealthy mutations (obfuscations) to create malware variants, thwarting detection by signature based detectors. In addition, the plethora of more sophisticated detectors making use of static analysis techniques to detect such variants operate only at the bytecode level, meaning that malware embedded in native code goes undetected. A recent study shows that 86% of the most popular Android applications contain native code, making this a plausible threat. This paper proposes DroidNative, an Android malware detector that uses specific control flow patterns to reduce the effect of obfuscations, provides automation and platform independence, and as far as we know is the first system that operates at the Android native code level, allowing it to detect malware embedded in both native code and bytecode. When tested with traditional malware variants it achieves a detection rate (DR) of 99.48%, compared to academic and commercial tools' DRs that range from 8.33% -- 93.22%. When tested with a dataset of 2240 samples DroidNative achieves a DR of 99.16%, a false positive rate of 0.4% and an average detection time of 26.87 sec/sample.