Jian Xu

Zhiyu Mou, Yusen Huo, Rongquan Bai et al.

Recently, auto-bidding technique has become an essential tool to increase the revenue of advertisers. Facing the complex and ever-changing bidding environments in the real-world advertising system (RAS), state-of-the-art auto-bidding policies usually leverage reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms to generate real-time bids on behalf of the advertisers. Due to safety concerns, it was believed that the RL training process can only be carried out in an offline virtual advertising system (VAS) that is built based on the historical data generated in the RAS. In this paper, we argue that there exists significant gaps between the VAS and RAS, making the RL training process suffer from the problem of inconsistency between online and offline (IBOO). Firstly, we formally define the IBOO and systematically analyze its causes and influences. Then, to avoid the IBOO, we propose a sustainable online RL (SORL) framework that trains the auto-bidding policy by directly interacting with the RAS, instead of learning in the VAS. Specifically, based on our proof of the Lipschitz smooth property of the Q function, we design a safe and efficient online exploration (SER) policy for continuously collecting data from the RAS. Meanwhile, we derive the theoretical lower bound on the safety of the SER policy. We also develop a variance-suppressed conservative Q-learning (V-CQL) method to effectively and stably learn the auto-bidding policy with the collected data. Finally, extensive simulated and real-world experiments validate the superiority of our approach over the state-of-the-art auto-bidding algorithm.

Mingyuan Cheng, Xinru Liao, Quan Liu et al.

Learning individual-level treatment effect is a fundamental problem in causal inference and has received increasing attention in many areas, especially in the user growth area which concerns many internet companies. Recently, disentangled representation learning methods that decompose covariates into three latent factors, including instrumental, confounding and adjustment factors, have witnessed great success in treatment effect estimation. However, it remains an open problem how to learn the underlying disentangled factors precisely. Specifically, previous methods fail to obtain independent disentangled factors, which is a necessary condition for identifying treatment effect. In this paper, we propose Disentangled Representations for Counterfactual Regression via Mutual Information Minimization (MIM-DRCFR), which uses a multi-task learning framework to share information when learning the latent factors and incorporates MI minimization learning criteria to ensure the independence of these factors. Extensive experiments including public benchmarks and real-world industrial user growth datasets demonstrate that our method performs much better than state-of-the-art methods.

Kefan Su, Yusen Huo, Zhilin Zhang et al.

Decision-making in large-scale games is an essential research area in artificial intelligence (AI) with significant real-world impact. However, the limited access to realistic large-scale game environments has hindered research progress in this area. In this paper, we present AuctionNet, a benchmark for bid decision-making in large-scale ad auctions derived from a real-world online advertising platform. AuctionNet is composed of three parts: an ad auction environment, a pre-generated dataset based on the environment, and performance evaluations of several baseline bid decision-making algorithms. More specifically, the environment effectively replicates the integrity and complexity of real-world ad auctions through the interaction of several modules: the ad opportunity generation module employs deep generative networks to bridge the gap between simulated and real-world data while mitigating the risk of sensitive data exposure; the bidding module implements diverse auto-bidding agents trained with different decision-making algorithms; and the auction module is anchored in the classic Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction but also allows for customization of auction mechanisms as needed. To facilitate research and provide insights into the environment, we have also pre-generated a substantial dataset based on the environment. The dataset contains 10 million ad opportunities, 48 diverse auto-bidding agents, and over 500 million auction records. Performance evaluations of baseline algorithms such as linear programming, reinforcement learning, and generative models for bid decision-making are also presented as a part of AuctionNet. We believe that AuctionNet is applicable not only to research on bid decision-making in ad auctions but also to the general area of decision-making in large-scale games.

Zhiyu Mou, Yiqin Lv, Miao Xu et al.

Auto-bidding serves as a critical tool for advertisers to improve their advertising performance. Recent progress has demonstrated that AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), which learns a conditional generative planner from offline data, achieves superior performance compared to typical offline reinforcement learning (RL)-based auto-bidding methods. However, existing AIGB methods still face a performance bottleneck due to their inherent inability to explore beyond the static offline dataset. To address this, we propose {AIGB-Pearl} (\emph{{P}lanning with {E}valu{A}tor via RL}), a novel method that integrates generative planning and policy optimization. The core of AIGB-Pearl lies in constructing a trajectory evaluator for scoring generation quality and designing a provably sound KL-Lipschitz-constrained score maximization scheme to ensure safe and efficient exploration beyond the offline dataset. A practical algorithm incorporating the synchronous coupling technique is further devised to ensure the model regularity required by the proposed scheme. Extensive experiments on both simulated and real-world advertising systems demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of our approach.

Zhiyu Mou, Miao Xu, Rongquan Bai et al.

Many online advertising platforms provide advertisers with auto-bidding services to enhance their advertising performance. However, most existing auto-bidding algorithms fail to accurately capture the auto-bidding problem formulation that the platform truly faces, let alone solve it. Actually, we argue that the platform should try to help optimize each advertiser's performance to the greatest extent -- which makes $ε$-Nash Equilibrium ($ε$-NE) a necessary solution concept -- while maximizing the social welfare of all the advertisers for the platform's long-term value. Based on this, we introduce the \emph{Nash-Equilibrium Constrained Bidding} (NCB), a new formulation of the auto-bidding problem from the platform's perspective. Specifically, it aims to maximize the social welfare of all advertisers under the $ε$-NE constraint. However, the NCB problem presents significant challenges due to its constrained bi-level structure and the typically large number of advertisers involved. To address these challenges, we propose a \emph{Bi-level Policy Gradient} (BPG) framework with theoretical guarantees. Notably, its computational complexity is independent of the number of advertisers, and the associated gradients are straightforward to compute. Extensive simulated and real-world experiments validate the effectiveness of the BPG framework.