Haotian Wang

h-index3
2papers
86citations

2 Papers

10.2CVJul 10, 2025Code
PacGDC: Label-Efficient Generalizable Depth Completion with Projection Ambiguity and Consistency

Haotian Wang, Aoran Xiao, Xiaoqin Zhang et al.

Generalizable depth completion enables the acquisition of dense metric depth maps for unseen environments, offering robust perception capabilities for various downstream tasks. However, training such models typically requires large-scale datasets with metric depth labels, which are often labor-intensive to collect. This paper presents PacGDC, a label-efficient technique that enhances data diversity with minimal annotation effort for generalizable depth completion. PacGDC builds on novel insights into inherent ambiguities and consistencies in object shapes and positions during 2D-to-3D projection, allowing the synthesis of numerous pseudo geometries for the same visual scene. This process greatly broadens available geometries by manipulating scene scales of the corresponding depth maps. To leverage this property, we propose a new data synthesis pipeline that uses multiple depth foundation models as scale manipulators. These models robustly provide pseudo depth labels with varied scene scales, affecting both local objects and global layouts, while ensuring projection consistency that supports generalization. To further diversify geometries, we incorporate interpolation and relocation strategies, as well as unlabeled images, extending the data coverage beyond the individual use of foundation models. Extensive experiments show that PacGDC achieves remarkable generalizability across multiple benchmarks, excelling in diverse scene semantics/scales and depth sparsity/patterns under both zero-shot and few-shot settings. Code: https://github.com/Wang-xjtu/PacGDC.

9.8LGMay 30, 2023Code
Competing for Shareable Arms in Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandits

Renzhe Xu, Haotian Wang, Xingxuan Zhang et al.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel Selfish MPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.