11.6AIMar 8, 2024
Looking Ahead to Avoid Being Late: Solving Hard-Constrained Traveling Salesman ProblemJingxiao Chen, Ziqin Gong, Minghuan Liu et al.
Many real-world problems can be formulated as a constrained Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). However, the constraints are always complex and numerous, making the TSPs challenging to solve. When the number of complicated constraints grows, it is time-consuming for traditional heuristic algorithms to avoid illegitimate outcomes. Learning-based methods provide an alternative to solve TSPs in a soft manner, which also supports GPU acceleration to generate solutions quickly. Nevertheless, the soft manner inevitably results in difficulty solving hard-constrained problems with learning algorithms, and the conflicts between legality and optimality may substantially affect the optimality of the solution. To overcome this problem and to have an effective solution against hard constraints, we proposed a novel learning-based method that uses looking-ahead information as the feature to improve the legality of TSP with Time Windows (TSPTW) solutions. Besides, we constructed TSPTW datasets with hard constraints in order to accurately evaluate and benchmark the statistical performance of various approaches, which can serve the community for future research. With comprehensive experiments on diverse datasets, MUSLA outperforms existing baselines and shows generalizability potential.
16.1AIOct 10, 2018
Learning to Communicate Implicitly By ActionsZheng Tian, Shihao Zou, Ian Davies et al.
In situations where explicit communication is limited, human collaborators act by learning to: (i) infer meaning behind their partner's actions, and (ii) convey private information about the state to their partner implicitly through actions. The first component of this learning process has been well-studied in multi-agent systems, whereas the second --- which is equally crucial for successful collaboration --- has not. To mimic both components mentioned above, thereby completing the learning process, we introduce a novel algorithm: Policy Belief Learning (PBL). PBL uses a belief module to model the other agent's private information and a policy module to form a distribution over actions informed by the belief module. Furthermore, to encourage communication by actions, we propose a novel auxiliary reward which incentivizes one agent to help its partner to make correct inferences about its private information. The auxiliary reward for communication is integrated into the learning of the policy module. We evaluate our approach on a set of environments including a matrix game, particle environment and the non-competitive bidding problem from contract bridge. We show empirically that this auxiliary reward is effective and easy to generalize. These results demonstrate that our PBL algorithm can produce strong pairs of agents in collaborative games where explicit communication is disabled.