Lance Ying

Lance Ying, Tan Zhi-Xuan, Vikash Mansinghka et al. · mit

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

Lance Ying, Katherine M. Collins, Megan Wei et al. · cambridge, mit

Human beings are social creatures. We routinely reason about other agents, and a crucial component of this social reasoning is inferring people's goals as we learn about their actions. In many settings, we can perform intuitive but reliable goal inference from language descriptions of agents, actions, and the background environments. In this paper, we study this process of language driving and influencing social reasoning in a probabilistic goal inference domain. We propose a neuro-symbolic model that carries out goal inference from linguistic inputs of agent scenarios. The "neuro" part is a large language model (LLM) that translates language descriptions to code representations, and the "symbolic" part is a Bayesian inverse planning engine. To test our model, we design and run a human experiment on a linguistic goal inference task. Our model closely matches human response patterns and better predicts human judgements than using an LLM alone.

Lance Ying, Tan Zhi-Xuan, Lionel Wong et al. · mit

How do people understand and evaluate claims about others' beliefs, even though these beliefs cannot be directly observed? In this paper, we introduce a cognitive model of epistemic language interpretation, grounded in Bayesian inferences about other agents' goals, beliefs, and intentions: a language-augmented Bayesian theory-of-mind (LaBToM). By translating natural language into an epistemic ``language-of-thought'' with grammar-constrained LLM decoding, then evaluating these translations against the inferences produced by inverting a generative model of rational action and perception, LaBToM captures graded plausibility judgments of epistemic claims. We validate our model in an experiment where participants watch an agent navigate a maze to find keys hidden in boxes needed to reach their goal, then rate sentences about the agent's beliefs. In contrast with multimodal LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini Pro) and ablated models, our model correlates highly with human judgments for a wide range of expressions, including modal language, uncertainty expressions, knowledge claims, likelihood comparisons, and attributions of false belief.

Lance Ying, Aydan Y. Huang, Aviv Netanyahu et al.

People infer rich social information from others' actions. These inferences are often constrained by the physical world: what agents can do, what obstacles permit, and how the physical actions of agents causally change an environment and other agents' mental states and behavior. We propose that such rich social perception is more than visual pattern matching, but rather a reasoning process grounded in an integration of intuitive psychology with intuitive physics. To test this hypothesis, we introduced PHASE (PHysically grounded Abstract Social Events), a large dataset of procedurally generated animations, depicting physically simulated two-agent interactions on a 2D surface. Each animation follows the style of the Heider and Simmel movie, with systematic variation in environment geometry, object dynamics, agent capacities, goals, and relationships (friendly/adversarial/neutral). We then present a computational model, SIMPLE, a physics-grounded Bayesian inverse planning model that integrates planning, probabilistic planning, and physics simulation to infer agents' goals and relations from their trajectories. Our experimental results showed that SIMPLE achieved high accuracy and agreement with human judgments across diverse scenarios, while feedforward baseline models -- including strong vision-language models -- and physics-agnostic inverse planning failed to achieve human-level performance and did not align with human judgments. These results suggest that our model provides a computational account for how people understand physically grounded social scenes by inverting a generative model of physics and agents.

Lance Ying, Xinyi Li, Shivam Aarya et al.

Spoken language instructions are ubiquitous in agent collaboration. However, in real-world human-robot collaboration, following human spoken instructions can be challenging due to various speaker and environmental factors, such as background noise or mispronunciation. When faced with noisy auditory inputs, humans can leverage the collaborative context in the embodied environment to interpret noisy spoken instructions and take pragmatic assistive actions. In this paper, we present a cognitively inspired neurosymbolic model, Spoken Instruction Following through Theory of Mind (SIFToM), which leverages a Vision-Language Model with model-based mental inference to enable robots to pragmatically follow human instructions under diverse speech conditions. We test SIFToM in both simulated environments (VirtualHome) and real-world human-robot collaborative settings with human evaluations. Results show that SIFToM can significantly improve the performance of a lightweight base VLM (Gemini 2.5 Flash), outperforming state-of-the-art VLMs (Gemini 2.5 Pro) and approaching human-level accuracy on challenging spoken instruction following tasks.

Lance Ying, Ryan Truong, Prafull Sharma et al.

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play \textbf{all conceivable human games}, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy -- the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10\% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

Marcel Binz, Elif Akata, Abdullah Almaatouq et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.

Tan Zhi-Xuan, Lance Ying, Vikash Mansinghka et al. · mit

People often give instructions whose meaning is ambiguous without further context, expecting that their actions or goals will disambiguate their intentions. How can we build assistive agents that follow such instructions in a flexible, context-sensitive manner? This paper introduces cooperative language-guided inverse plan search (CLIPS), a Bayesian agent architecture for pragmatic instruction following and goal assistance. Our agent assists a human by modeling them as a cooperative planner who communicates joint plans to the assistant, then performs multimodal Bayesian inference over the human's goal from actions and language, using large language models (LLMs) to evaluate the likelihood of an instruction given a hypothesized plan. Given this posterior, our assistant acts to minimize expected goal achievement cost, enabling it to pragmatically follow ambiguous instructions and provide effective assistance even when uncertain about the goal. We evaluate these capabilities in two cooperative planning domains (Doors, Keys & Gems and VirtualHome), finding that CLIPS significantly outperforms GPT-4V, LLM-based literal instruction following and unimodal inverse planning in both accuracy and helpfulness, while closely matching the inferences and assistive judgments provided by human raters.

Lance Ying, Katherine M. Collins, Lionel Wong et al.

Recent benchmark studies have claimed that AI has approached or even surpassed human-level performances on various cognitive tasks. However, this position paper argues that current AI evaluation paradigms are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically-invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on ten existing AI benchmarks, suggesting significant biases and flaws in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for developing future benchmarks that will enable more rigorous and meaningful evaluations of human-like cognitive capacities in AI with various implications for such AI applications.

Lance Ying, Kunal Jha, Shivam Aarya et al.

Verbal communication plays a crucial role in human cooperation, particularly when the partners only have incomplete information about the task, environment, and each other's mental state. In this paper, we propose a novel cooperative communication framework, Goal-Oriented Mental Alignment (GOMA). GOMA formulates verbal communication as a planning problem that minimizes the misalignment between the parts of agents' mental states that are relevant to the goals. This approach enables an embodied assistant to reason about when and how to proactively initialize communication with humans verbally using natural language to help achieve better cooperation. We evaluate our approach against strong baselines in two challenging environments, Overcooked (a multiplayer game) and VirtualHome (a household simulator). Our experimental results demonstrate that large language models struggle with generating meaningful communication that is grounded in the social and physical context. In contrast, our approach can successfully generate concise verbal communication for the embodied assistant to effectively boost the performance of the cooperation as well as human users' perception of the assistant.

Hyunwoo Kim, Melanie Sclar, Tan Zhi-Xuan et al. · nvidia, uw

Existing LLM reasoning methods have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks, such as solving math and coding problems. However, applying these methods to scenarios without ground-truth answers or rule-based verification methods - such as tracking the mental states of an agent - remains challenging. Inspired by the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm, we introduce thought-tracing, an inference-time reasoning algorithm designed to trace the mental states of specific agents by generating hypotheses and weighting them based on observations without relying on ground-truth solutions to questions in datasets. Our algorithm is modeled after the Bayesian theory-of-mind framework, using LLMs to approximate probabilistic inference over agents' evolving mental states based on their perceptions and actions. We evaluate thought-tracing on diverse theory-of-mind benchmarks, demonstrating significant performance improvements compared to baseline LLMs. Our experiments also reveal interesting behaviors of the recent reasoning models - e.g., o3 and R1 - on theory-of-mind, highlighting the difference of social reasoning compared to other domains.

Lance Ying, Tan Zhi-Xuan, Lionel Wong et al. · mit

Despite the fact that beliefs are mental states that cannot be directly observed, humans talk about each others' beliefs on a regular basis, often using rich compositional language to describe what others think and know. What explains this capacity to interpret the hidden epistemic content of other minds? In this paper, we take a step towards an answer by grounding the semantics of belief statements in a Bayesian theory-of-mind: By modeling how humans jointly infer coherent sets of goals, beliefs, and plans that explain an agent's actions, then evaluating statements about the agent's beliefs against these inferences via epistemic logic, our framework provides a conceptual role semantics for belief, explaining the gradedness and compositionality of human belief attributions, as well as their intimate connection with goals and plans. We evaluate this framework by studying how humans attribute goals and beliefs while watching an agent solve a doors-and-keys gridworld puzzle that requires instrumental reasoning about hidden objects. In contrast to pure logical deduction, non-mentalizing baselines, and mentalizing that ignores the role of instrumental plans, our model provides a much better fit to human goal and belief attributions, demonstrating the importance of theory-of-mind for a semantics of belief.

Lionel Wong, Katherine M. Collins, Lance Ying et al.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

Lance Ying, Katherine M. Collins, Prafull Sharma et al.

Human intelligence exhibits a remarkable capacity for rapid adaptation and effective problem-solving in novel and unfamiliar contexts. We argue that this profound adaptability is fundamentally linked to the efficient construction and refinement of internal representations of the environment, commonly referred to as world models, and we refer to this adaptation mechanism as world model induction. However, current understanding and evaluation of world models in artificial intelligence (AI) remains narrow, often focusing on static representations learned from training on massive corpora of data, instead of the efficiency and efficacy in learning these representations through interaction and exploration within a novel environment. In this Perspective, we provide a view of world model induction drawing on decades of research in cognitive science on how humans learn and adapt so efficiently; we then call for a new evaluation framework for assessing adaptive world models in AI. Concretely, we propose a new benchmarking paradigm based on suites of carefully designed games with genuine, deep and continually refreshing novelty in the underlying game structures -- we refer to this class of games as novel games. We detail key desiderata for constructing these games and propose appropriate metrics to explicitly challenge and evaluate the agent's ability for rapid world model induction. We hope that this new evaluation framework will inspire future evaluation efforts on world models in AI and provide a crucial step towards developing AI systems capable of human-like rapid adaptation and robust generalization -- a critical component of artificial general intelligence.

Lance Ying, Ryan Truong, Katherine M. Collins et al. · mit

Drawing real world social inferences usually requires taking into account information from multiple modalities. Language is a particularly powerful source of information in social settings, especially in novel situations where language can provide both abstract information about the environment dynamics and concrete specifics about an agent that cannot be easily visually observed. In this paper, we propose Language-Informed Rational Agent Synthesis (LIRAS), a framework for drawing context-specific social inferences that integrate linguistic and visual inputs. LIRAS frames multimodal social reasoning as a process of constructing structured but situation-specific agent and environment representations - leveraging multimodal language models to parse language and visual inputs into unified symbolic representations, over which a Bayesian inverse planning engine can be run to produce granular probabilistic judgments. On a range of existing and new social reasoning tasks derived from cognitive science experiments, we find that our model (instantiated with a comparatively lightweight VLM) outperforms ablations and state-of-the-art models in capturing human judgments across all domains.

Katherine M. Collins, Cedegao E. Zhang, Graham Todd et al.

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over $100$ novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

Lance Ying, Daniel Xu, Alicia Zhang et al.

People regularly make inferences about objects in the world that they cannot see by flexibly integrating information from multiple sources: auditory and visual cues, language, and our prior beliefs and knowledge about the scene. How are we able to so flexibly integrate many sources of information to make sense of the world around us, even if we have no direct knowledge? In this work, we propose a neurosymbolic model that uses neural networks to parse open-ended multimodal inputs and then applies a Bayesian model to integrate different sources of information to evaluate different hypotheses. We evaluate our model with a novel object guessing game called ``What's in the Box?'' where humans and models watch a video clip of an experimenter shaking boxes and then try to guess the objects inside the boxes. Through a human experiment, we show that our model correlates strongly with human judgments, whereas unimodal ablated models and large multimodal neural model baselines show poor correlation.

Matteo Bortoletto, Yichao Zhou, Lance Ying et al.

While humans are inherently social creatures, the challenge of identifying when and how to assist and collaborate with others - particularly when pursuing independent goals - can hinder cooperation. To address this challenge, we aim to develop an AI system that provides useful feedback to promote prosocial behaviour - actions that benefit others, even when not directly aligned with one's own goals. We introduce ProToM, a Theory of Mind-informed facilitator that promotes prosocial actions in multi-agent systems by providing targeted, context-sensitive feedback to individual agents. ProToM first infers agents' goals using Bayesian inverse planning, then selects feedback to communicate by maximising expected utility, conditioned on the inferred goal distribution. We evaluate our approach against baselines in two multi-agent environments: Doors, Keys, and Gems, as well as Overcooked. Our results suggest that state-of-the-art large language and reasoning models fall short of communicating feedback that is both contextually grounded and well-timed - leading to higher communication overhead and task speedup. In contrast, ProToM provides targeted and helpful feedback, achieving a higher success rate, shorter task completion times, and is consistently preferred by human users.

Lance Ying, Almog Hillel, Ryan Truong et al. · mit

A key feature of human theory-of-mind is the ability to attribute beliefs to other agents as mentalistic explanations for their behavior. But given the wide variety of beliefs that agents may hold about the world and the rich language we can use to express them, which specific beliefs are people inclined to attribute to others? In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that people prefer to attribute beliefs that are good explanations for the behavior they observe. We develop a computational model that quantifies the explanatory strength of a (natural language) statement about an agent's beliefs via three factors: accuracy, informativity, and causal relevance to actions, each of which can be computed from a probabilistic generative model of belief-driven behavior. Using this model, we study the role of each factor in how people selectively attribute beliefs to other agents. We investigate this via an experiment where participants watch an agent collect keys hidden in boxes in order to reach a goal, then rank a set of statements describing the agent's beliefs about the boxes' contents. We find that accuracy and informativity perform reasonably well at predicting these rankings when combined, but that causal relevance is the single factor that best explains participants' responses.

Lance Ying, Amrit Romana, Emily Mower Provost

In recent years, deep-learning-based speech emotion recognition models have outperformed classical machine learning models. Previously, neural network designs, such as Multitask Learning, have accounted for variations in emotional expressions due to demographic and contextual factors. However, existing models face a few constraints: 1) they rely on a clear definition of domains (e.g. gender, noise condition, etc.) and the availability of domain labels; 2) they often attempt to learn domain-invariant features while emotion expressions can be domain-specific. In the present study, we propose the Nonparametric Hierarchical Neural Network (NHNN), a lightweight hierarchical neural network model based on Bayesian nonparametric clustering. In comparison to Multitask Learning approaches, the proposed model does not require domain/task labels. In our experiments, the NHNN models generally outperform the models with similar levels of complexity and state-of-the-art models in within-corpus and cross-corpus tests. Through clustering analysis, we show that the NHNN models are able to learn group-specific features and bridge the performance gap between groups.