Dong Hao

Shawn Li, Huixian Gong, Hao Dong et al.

Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection is essential for ensuring the robustness of machine learning models by identifying samples that deviate from the training distribution. While traditional OOD detection has primarily focused on single-modality inputs, such as images, recent advances in multimodal models have demonstrated the potential of leveraging multiple modalities (e.g., video, optical flow, audio) to enhance detection performance. However, existing methods often overlook intra-class variability within in-distribution (ID) data, assuming that samples of the same class are perfectly cohesive and consistent. This assumption can lead to performance degradation, especially when prediction discrepancies are uniformly amplified across all samples. To address this issue, we propose Dynamic Prototype Updating (DPU), a novel plug-and-play framework for multimodal OOD detection that accounts for intra-class variations. Our method dynamically updates class center representations for each class by measuring the variance of similar samples within each batch, enabling adaptive adjustments. This approach allows us to amplify prediction discrepancies based on the updated class centers, thereby improving the model's robustness and generalization across different modalities. Extensive experiments on two tasks, five datasets, and nine base OOD algorithms demonstrate that DPU significantly improves OOD detection performance, setting a new state-of-the-art in multimodal OOD detection, with improvements of up to 80 percent in Far-OOD detection. To facilitate accessibility and reproducibility, our code is publicly available on GitHub.

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao

This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each other. Our goal is to incentivize the intermediaries to diffuse the auction information to individuals they can reach, including their private buyers and neighboring intermediaries, so that more potential buyers are able to participate in the auction. To this end, we build a diffusion-based auction framework which incorporates the strategic interaction of intermediaries. It is showed that the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism within the framework can achieve the maximum social welfare, but it may decrease the seller's revenue or even lead to a deficit. To overcome the revenue issue, we propose a novel auction, called critical neighborhood auction, which not only maximizes the social welfare, but also improves the seller's revenue comparing to the VCG mechanism with/without intermediaries.

Chenrui Tie, Yue Chen, Ruihai Wu et al.

Imitation learning, e.g., diffusion policy, has been proven effective in various robotic manipulation tasks. However, extensive demonstrations are required for policy robustness and generalization. To reduce the demonstration reliance, we leverage spatial symmetry and propose ET-SEED, an efficient trajectory-level SE(3) equivariant diffusion model for generating action sequences in complex robot manipulation tasks. Further, previous equivariant diffusion models require the per-step equivariance in the Markov process, making it difficult to learn policy under such strong constraints. We theoretically extend equivariant Markov kernels and simplify the condition of equivariant diffusion process, thereby significantly improving training efficiency for trajectory-level SE(3) equivariant diffusion policy in an end-to-end manner. We evaluate ET-SEED on representative robotic manipulation tasks, involving rigid body, articulated and deformable object. Experiments demonstrate superior data efficiency and manipulation proficiency of our proposed method, as well as its ability to generalize to unseen configurations with only a few demonstrations. Website: https://et-seed.github.io/

Lijun Wu, Dong Hao, Zhiyi Fan

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved outstanding performance across a wide range of graph-related tasks. However, their "black-box" nature poses significant challenges to their explainability, and existing methods often fail to effectively capture the intricate interaction patterns among nodes within the network. In this work, we propose a novel explainability framework, GraphEXT, which leverages cooperative game theory and the concept of social externalities. GraphEXT partitions graph nodes into coalitions, decomposing the original graph into independent subgraphs. By integrating graph structure as an externality and incorporating the Shapley value under externalities, GraphEXT quantifies node importance through their marginal contributions to GNN predictions as the nodes transition between coalitions. Unlike traditional Shapley value-based methods that primarily focus on node attributes, our GraphEXT places greater emphasis on the interactions among nodes and the impact of structural changes on GNN predictions. Experimental studies on both synthetic and real-world datasets show that GraphEXT outperforms existing baseline methods in terms of fidelity across diverse GNN architectures , significantly enhancing the explainability of GNN models.

Xiaoqi Li, Jiaming Liu, Nuowei Han et al.

The 3D weakly-supervised visual grounding task aims to localize oriented 3D boxes in point clouds based on natural language descriptions without requiring annotations to guide model learning. This setting presents two primary challenges: category-level ambiguity and instance-level complexity. Category-level ambiguity arises from representing objects of fine-grained categories in a highly sparse point cloud format, making category distinction challenging. Instance-level complexity stems from multiple instances of the same category coexisting in a scene, leading to distractions during grounding. To address these challenges, we propose a novel weakly-supervised grounding approach that explicitly differentiates between categories and instances. In the category-level branch, we utilize extensive category knowledge from a pre-trained external detector to align object proposal features with sentence-level category features, thereby enhancing category awareness. In the instance-level branch, we utilize spatial relationship descriptions from language queries to refine object proposal features, ensuring clear differentiation among objects. These designs enable our model to accurately identify target-category objects while distinguishing instances within the same category. Compared to previous methods, our approach achieves state-of-the-art performance on three widely used benchmarks: Nr3D, Sr3D, and ScanRef.

Yuhang Guo, Dong Hao, Bin Li et al.

Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone allocation in Myerson's Lemma is a cornerstone, a general principle of allocation rules for strategyproof network auctions is still missing. We show that, due to the absence of such a principle, even extensions to multi-unit network auctions with single-unit demand present unexpected difficulties, and all pioneering researches fail to be strategyproof. For the first time in this field, we identify two categories of monotone allocation rules on networks: Invitation-Depressed Monotonicity (ID-MON) and Invitation-Promoted Monotonicity (IP-MON). They encompass all existing allocation rules of network auctions as specific instances. For any given ID-MON or IP-MON allocation rule, we characterize the existence and sufficient conditions for the strategyproof payment rules, and show that among all such payment rules, the revenue-maximizing one exists and is computationally feasible. With these results, the obstacle of combinatorial network auction with single-minded bidders is now resolved.

Yuhang Guo, Dong Hao

In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller's revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.

Jie Ren, Yewen Li, Zihan Ding et al.

Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has successfully solved various problems recently, typically with a unimodal policy representation. However, grasping distinguishable skills for some tasks with non-unique optima can be essential for further improving its learning efficiency and performance, which may lead to a multimodal policy represented as a mixture-of-experts (MOE). To our best knowledge, present DRL algorithms for general utility do not deploy this method as policy function approximators due to the potential challenge in its differentiability for policy learning. In this work, we propose a probabilistic mixture-of-experts (PMOE) implemented with a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) for multimodal policy, together with a novel gradient estimator for the indifferentiability problem, which can be applied in generic off-policy and on-policy DRL algorithms using stochastic policies, e.g., Soft Actor-Critic (SAC) and Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO). Experimental results testify the advantage of our method over unimodal polices and two different MOE methods, as well as a method of option frameworks, based on the above two types of DRL algorithms, on six MuJoCo tasks. Different gradient estimations for GMM like the reparameterisation trick (Gumbel-Softmax) and the score-ratio trick are also compared with our method. We further empirically demonstrate the distinguishable primitives learned with PMOE and show the benefits of our method in terms of exploration.

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao et al.

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.

Dengji Zhao, Bin Li, Junping Xu et al.

We consider a market where a seller sells multiple units of a commodity in a social network. Each node/buyer in the social network can only directly communicate with her neighbours, i.e. the seller can only sell the commodity to her neighbours if she could not find a way to inform other buyers. In this paper, we design a novel promotion mechanism that incentivizes all buyers, who are aware of the sale, to invite all their neighbours to join the sale, even though there is no guarantee that their efforts will be paid. While traditional sale promotions such as sponsored search auctions cannot guarantee a positive return for the advertiser (the seller), our mechanism guarantees that the seller's revenue is better than not using the advertising. More importantly, the seller does not need to pay if the advertising is not beneficial to her.

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao et al.

In an economic market, sellers, infomediaries and customers constitute an economic network. Each seller has her own customer group and the seller's private customers are unobservable to other sellers. Therefore, a seller can only sell commodities among her own customers unless other sellers or infomediaries share her sale information to their customer groups. However, a seller is not incentivized to share others' sale information by default, which leads to inefficient resource allocation and limited revenue for the sale. To tackle this problem, we develop a novel mechanism called customer sharing mechanism (CSM) which incentivizes all sellers to share each other's sale information to their private customer groups. Furthermore, CSM also incentivizes all customers to truthfully participate in the sale. In the end, CSM not only allocates the commodities efficiently but also optimizes the seller's revenue.

Dong Hao, Kai Li, Tao Zhou

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly determined by all participants. This work discovers that the scale of a player's capability to unilaterally influence the payoffs may have been much underestimated. Under the conventional iterated prisoner's dilemma, we develop a general framework for controlling the feasible region where the players' payoff pairs lie. A control strategy player is able to confine the payoff pairs in her objective region, as long as this region has feasible linear boundaries. With this framework, many well-known existing strategies can be categorized and various new strategies with nice properties can be further identified. We show that the control strategies perform well either in a tournament or against a human-like opponent.

Ratha Pech, Dong Hao, Liming Pan et al.

Inspired by practical importance of social networks, economic networks, biological networks and so on, studies on large and complex networks have attracted a surge of attentions in the recent years. Link prediction is a fundamental issue to understand the mechanisms by which new links are added to the networks. We introduce the method of robust principal component analysis (robust PCA) into link prediction, and estimate the missing entries of the adjacency matrix. On one hand, our algorithm is based on the sparsity and low rank property of the matrix, on the other hand, it also performs very well when the network is dense. This is because a relatively dense real network is also sparse in comparison to the complete graph. According to extensive experiments on real networks from disparate fields, when the target network is connected and sufficiently dense, whatever it is weighted or unweighted, our method is demonstrated to be very effective and with prediction accuracy being considerably improved comparing with many state-of-the-art algorithms.