Peng Wang

Dawei Yan, Yang Li, Qing-Guo Chen et al.

Compared to single-turn dialogue, multi-turn dialogue involving multiple images better aligns with the needs of real-world human-AI interactions. Additionally, as training data, it provides richer contextual reasoning information, thereby guiding the model to achieve better performance. However, existing vision-language models (VLMs) primarily rely on single-turn dialogue training and evaluation benchmarks. In this paper, following the characteristics of human dialogue, such as focused topics and concise, clear content, we present MMCR (Multimodal Multi-turn Contextual Reasoning), a novel dataset comprising: (1) MMCR-310k -- the largest multi-image multi-turn instruction tuning dataset with 310K contextual dialogues, each covering 1-4 images and 4 or 8 dialogue turns; and (2) MMCR-Bench -- a diagnostic benchmark featuring dialogues, spanning 8 domains (Humanities, Natural, Science, Education, etc.) and 40 sub-topics. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that models fine-tuned with MMCR-310k achieve 5.2\% higher contextual accuracy on MMCR-Bench, while showing consistent improvements on existing benchmarks (+1.1\% on AI2D, +1.2\% on MMMU and MMVet). MMCR and prompt engineering will be released publicly.

Jonathan Protzenko, Jean-Karim Zinzindohoué, Aseem Rastogi et al.

We present Low*, a language for low-level programming and verification, and its application to high-assurance optimized cryptographic libraries. Low* is a shallow embedding of a small, sequential, well-behaved subset of C in F*, a dependently-typed variant of ML aimed at program verification. Departing from ML, Low* does not involve any garbage collection or implicit heap allocation; instead, it has a structured memory model à la CompCert, and it provides the control required for writing efficient low-level security-critical code. By virtue of typing, any Low* program is memory safe. In addition, the programmer can make full use of the verification power of F* to write high-level specifications and verify the functional correctness of Low* code using a combination of SMT automation and sophisticated manual proofs. At extraction time, specifications and proofs are erased, and the remaining code enjoys a predictable translation to C. We prove that this translation preserves semantics and side-channel resistance. We provide a new compiler back-end from Low* to C and, to evaluate our approach, we implement and verify various cryptographic algorithms, constructions, and tools for a total of about 28,000 lines of code, specification and proof. We show that our Low* code delivers performance competitive with existing (unverified) C cryptographic libraries, suggesting our approach may be applicable to larger-scale low-level software.