2.3IMSep 27, 2018
Novel Sparse Recovery Algorithms for 3D Debris Localization using Rotating Point Spread Function ImageryChao Wang, Robert Plemmons, Sudhakar Prasad et al. · mila
An optical imager that exploits off-center image rotation to encode both the lateral and depth coordinates of point sources in a single snapshot can perform 3D localization and tracking of space debris. When actively illuminated, unresolved space debris, which can be regarded as a swarm of point sources, can scatter a fraction of laser irradiance back into the imaging sensor. Determining the source locations and fluxes is a large-scale sparse 3D inverse problem, for which we have developed efficient and effective algorithms based on sparse recovery using non-convex optimization. Numerical simulations illustrate the efficiency and stability of the algorithms.
1.2QUANT-PHSep 27, 2021
Experimental symmetric private information retrieval with measurement-device-independent quantum networkChao Wang, Wen Yu Kon, Hong Jie Ng et al.
Secure information retrieval is an essential task in today's highly digitised society. In some applications, it may be necessary that user query's privacy and database content's security are enforced. For these settings, symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) could be employed, but its implementation is known to be demanding, requiring a private key-exchange network as the base layer. Here, we report for the first time a realisation of provably-secure SPIR supported by a quantum-secure key-exchange network. The SPIR scheme looks at biometric security, offering secure retrieval of 582-byte fingerprint files from a database with 800 entries. Our experimental results clearly demonstrate the feasibility of SPIR with quantum secure communications, thereby opening up new possibilities in secure distributed data storage and cloud computing over the future Quantum Internet.
4.9CRSep 12, 2019
Debreach: Mitigating Compression Side Channels via Static Analysis and TransformationBrandon Paulsen, Chungha Sung, Peter A. H. Peterson et al.
Compression is an emerging source of exploitable side-channel leakage that threatens data security, particularly in web applications where compression is indispensable for performance reasons. Current approaches to mitigating compression side channels have drawbacks in that they either degrade compression ratio drastically or require too much effort from developers to be widely adopted. To bridge the gap, we develop Debreach, a static analysis and program transformation based approach to mitigating compression side channels. Debreach consists of two steps. First, it uses taint analysis to soundly identify flows of sensitive data in the program and uses code instrumentation to annotate data before feeding them to the compressor. Second, it enhances the compressor to exploit the freedom to not compress of standard compression protocols, thus removing the dependency between sensitive data and the size of the compressor's output. Since Debreach automatically instruments applications and does not change the compression protocols, it has the advantage of being non-disruptive and compatible with existing systems. We have evaluated Debreach on a set of web server applications written in PHP. Our experiments show that, while ensuring leakage-freedom, Debreach can achieve significantly higher compression performance than state-of-the-art approaches.
21.9CRJun 6, 2018
Eliminating Timing Side-Channel Leaks using Program RepairMeng Wu, Shengjian Guo, Patrick Schaumont et al.
We propose a method, based on program analysis and transformation, for eliminating timing side channels in software code that implements security-critical applications. Our method takes as input the original program together with a list of secret variables (e.g., cryptographic keys, security tokens, or passwords) and returns the transformed program as output. The transformed program is guaranteed to be functionally equivalent to the original program and free of both instruction- and cache-timing side channels. Specifically, we ensure that the number of CPU cycles taken to execute any path is independent of the secret data, and the cache behavior of memory accesses, in terms of hits and misses, is independent of the secret data. We have implemented our method in LLVM and validated its effectiveness on a large set of applications, which are cryptographic libraries with 19,708 lines of C/C++ code in total. Our experiments show the method is both scalable for real applications and effective in eliminating timing side channels.