Lingyun Ying

Xing Zhang, Zikang Huang, Gang Yang et al.

High-quality fuzz harnesses are essential for effective gray-box fuzzing. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer promise for automating this task, existing one-turn generation methods suffer from hallucinations and inadequate coverage due to coarse-grained function targeting and misaligned generation workflows. We present SynapseFlow, an automatic harness generator that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: dataflow-aware function aggregation and a staged, rollback-enabled generation workflow decomposition. SynapseFlow first analyzes source code to construct Structural Flow Graphs and extract coherent Function Triplets. It then synthesizes harnesses via a decomposed four-stage process governed by a staged rollback algorithm to ensure correctness. We evaluated SynapseFlow on 25 real-world open-source software projects. The experimental results indicate that SynapseFlow outperforms state-of-the-art tools (OSS-Fuzz-Gen, CKGFuzzer, PromeFuzz), achieving 3.07$\times$, 1.71$\times$, and 4.26$\times$ higher branch coverage, and 1.77$\times$, 1.51$\times$, and 1.36$\times$ higher bug detection rates, respectively. Most importantly, SynapseFlow discovered 7 previously unreported bugs (5 assigned CVEs), demonstrating its practical effectiveness in real-world bug discovery.

Zidong Zhang, Zhentao Xie, Lingyun Ying et al.

Mini-programs have become a dominant paradigm for lightweight application deployment within super apps such as WeChat. To support seamless integration, super apps provide OAuth mechanisms for user login. However, improper integration of OAuth-based Authentication (OBA) flows by third-party developers can lead to critical security flaws. In this paper, we discover three new types of runtime OBA misuses that differ from prior static-code-based studies, enabling attackers to impersonate victims. To assess their real-world impact, we design and implement MINIAUTH, the first analysis framework for systematically analyzing OBA misuse at scale. MINIAUTH automatically pinpoints the OBA login page of a mini-program, executes the workflow dynamically, and analyzes its runtime behaviors. This enables it to handle obfuscated mini-programs and uncover vulnerabilities that existing approaches cannot detect. Applying MINIAUTH to 44,273 WeChat and 2,721 Baidu mini-programs, we uncover 1,834 misuse cases, including critical logic flaws that enable client-side identity forgery via exposed credentials and authentication bypass through static or plaintext identifiers. Our cross-platform evaluation further shows that such misuses are not confined to a single ecosystem but consistently appear across different mini-program platforms. We also identify a cryptographic design flaw in Baidu's OBA APIs that allows brute-forcing of session keys. We responsibly disclosed our findings to the developers and platforms, receiving acknowledgments and assigned CNVD/CNNVD IDs. These results underscore the need for more robust developer guidance and enhanced platform-level safeguards.

Jiawei Xu, Wenxuan Fu, Haoyu Bu et al.

Malware continues to evolve rapidly, and more than 450,000 new samples are captured every day, which makes manual malware analysis impractical. However, existing deep learning detection models need manual feature engineering or require high computational overhead for long training processes, which might be laborious to select feature space and difficult to retrain for mitigating model aging. Therefore, a crucial requirement for a detector is to realize automatic and efficient detection. In this paper, we propose a lightweight malware detection model called SeqNet which could be trained at high speed with low memory required on the raw binaries. By avoiding contextual confusion and reducing semantic loss, SeqNet maintains the detection accuracy when reducing the number of parameters to only 136K. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods and the low training cost requirement of SeqNet in our experiments. Besides, we make our datasets and codes public to stimulate further academic research.

Yuanmin Xie, Xiangfan Wu, Wenhao Wu et al.

Algorithmic Complexity Vulnerabilities (ACVs) arise when adversarial inputs trigger worst-case execution behavior, causing severe performance degradation or Denial-of-Service conditions. A key but underexplored source is shadow complexity: non-trivial computational costs hidden inside seemingly benign standard library APIs. Because these costs are invisible at call sites, attackers can exploit them to induce unexpected superlinear runtime behavior. Existing ACV detectors often rely on fuzzing, symbolic execution, or hybrid analysis, but they are usually language-specific, require substantial manual effort to construct harnesses, and depend on heavy runtime instrumentation. We present ShadowProbe, a scalable and language-extensible framework for discovering ACVs through lightweight static analysis, automated reconstruction of execution contexts, and Large Language Model (LLM) assisted test generation. ShadowProbe uses a structured multi-stage pipeline: it statically screens for candidate functions guided by shadow-complexity signals, reconstructs minimal executable contexts from project-level symbols, and synthesizes size-controlled inputs to probe worst-case behavior. It then validates candidates using execution-time measurements and robust statistical growth inference, separating true algorithmic blowups from runtime noise such as garbage collection and JIT compilation effects. We evaluate ShadowProbe on the WISE benchmark, where it consistently improves analysis efficiency over existing approaches. We further apply it to large-scale systems including CPython, the JDK, Zig, Rustc, and vLLM, uncovering many previously unknown ACVs, many of which have been confirmed and partially remediated by maintainers. These results show that ShadowProbe can identify hidden algorithmic risks across diverse real-world codebases.

Guoqiang Chen, Lingyun Ying, Ziyang Song et al.

Retrieving binary code via natural language queries is a pivotal capability for downstream tasks in the software security domain, such as vulnerability detection and malware analysis. However, it is challenging to identify binary functions semantically relevant to the user query from thousands of candidates, as the absence of symbolic information distinguishes this task from source code retrieval. In this paper, we introduce, BinSeek, a two-stage cross-modal retrieval framework for stripped binary code analysis. It consists of two models: BinSeek-Embedding is trained on large-scale dataset to learn the semantic relevance of the binary code and the natural language description, furthermore, BinSeek-Reranker learns to carefully judge the relevance of the candidate code to the description with context augmentation. To this end, we built an LLM-based data synthesis pipeline to automate training construction, also deriving a domain benchmark for future research. Our evaluation results show that BinSeek achieved the state-of-the-art performance, surpassing the the same scale models by 31.42% in Rec@3 and 27.17% in MRR@3, as well as leading the advanced general-purpose models that have 16 times larger parameters.

Shuqiang Lu, Lingyun Ying, Wenjie Lin et al.

With the development of artificial intelligence algorithms like deep learning models and the successful applications in many different fields, further similar trails of deep learning technology have been made in cyber security area. It shows the preferable performance not only in academic security research but also in industry practices when dealing with part of cyber security issues by deep learning methods compared to those conventional rules. Especially for the malware detection and classification tasks, it saves generous time cost and promotes the accuracy for a total pipeline of malware detection system. In this paper, we construct special deep neural network, ie, MalDeepNet (TB-Malnet and IB-Malnet) for malware dynamic behavior classification tasks. Then we build the family clustering algorithm based on deep learning and fulfil related testing. Except that, we also design a novel malware prediction model which could detect the malware coming in future through the Mal Generative Adversarial Network (Mal-GAN) implementation. All those algorithms present fairly considerable value in related datasets afterwards.