Beth Goldberg

Jonathan Stray, Ian Baker, George Beknazar-Yuzbashev et al. · uw

We report the first direct comparisons of multiple alternative social media algorithms on multiple platforms on outcomes of societal interest. We used a browser extension to modify which posts were shown to desktop social media users, randomly assigning 9,386 users to a control group or one of five alternative ranking algorithms which simultaneously altered content across three platforms for six months during the US 2024 presidential election. This reduced our preregistered index of affective polarization by an average of 0.03 standard deviations (p < 0.05), including a 1.5 degree decrease in differences between the 100 point inparty and outparty feeling thermometers. We saw reductions in active use time for Facebook (-0.37 min/day) and Reddit (-0.2 min/day), but an increase of 0.32 min/day (p < 0.01) for X/Twitter. We saw an increase in reports of negative social media experiences but found no effects on well-being, news knowledge, outgroup empathy, perceptions of and support for partisan violence. This implies that bridging content can improve some societal outcomes without necessarily conflicting with the engagement-driven business model of social media.

Beth Goldberg, Diana Acosta-Navas, Michiel Bakker et al.

Two substantial technological advances have reshaped the public square in recent decades: first with the advent of the internet and second with the recent introduction of large language models (LLMs). LLMs offer opportunities for a paradigm shift towards more decentralized, participatory online spaces that can be used to facilitate deliberative dialogues at scale, but also create risks of exacerbating societal schisms. Here, we explore four applications of LLMs to improve digital public squares: collective dialogue systems, bridging systems, community moderation, and proof-of-humanity systems. Building on the input from over 70 civil society experts and technologists, we argue that LLMs both afford promising opportunities to shift the paradigm for conversations at scale and pose distinct risks for digital public squares. We lay out an agenda for future research and investments in AI that will strengthen digital public squares and safeguard against potential misuses of AI.

Rachel Xu, Nhu Le, Rebekah Park et al.

We conducted in-person ethnography in India and the US to investigate how young people (18-24) trusted online content, just as generative AI (genAI) became mainstream. We found that when online, how participants determined what content to trust was shaped by emotional states, which we term "information modes." Our participants reflexively shifted between modes to maintain "emotional equilibrium," and eschewed engaging literacy skills in the more passive modes in which they spent the most time. We found participants imported trust heuristics from established online contexts into emerging ones (i.e., genAI). This led them to use ill-fitting trust heuristics, and exposed them to the risk of trusting false and misleading information. While many had reservations about AI, prioritizing efficiency, they used genAI and habitual heuristics to quickly achieve goals at the expense of accuracy. We conclude that literacy interventions designed to match users' distinct information modes will be most effective.

Amelia Hassoun, Ariel Abonizio, Katy Osborn et al.

Advances in generative AI (GenAI) have raised concerns about detecting and discerning AI-generated content from human-generated content. Most existing literature assumes a paradigm where 'expert' organized disinformation creators and flawed AI models deceive 'ordinary' users. Based on longitudinal ethnographic research with misinformation creators and consumers between 2022-2023, we instead find that GenAI supports bricolage work, where non-experts increasingly use GenAI to remix, repackage, and (re)produce content to meet their personal needs and desires. This research yielded four key findings: First, participants primarily used GenAI for creation, rather than truth-seeking. Second, a spreading 'influencer millionaire' narrative drove participants to become content creators, using GenAI as a productivity tool to generate a volume of (often misinformative) content. Third, GenAI lowered the barrier to entry for content creation across modalities, enticing consumers to become creators and significantly increasing existing creators' output. Finally, participants used Gen AI to learn and deploy marketing tactics to expand engagement and monetize their content. We argue for shifting analysis from the public as consumers of AI content to bricoleurs who use GenAI creatively, often without a detailed understanding of its underlying technology. We analyze how these understudied emergent uses of GenAI produce new or accelerated misinformation harms, and their implications for AI products, platforms and policies.

Nahema Marchal, Rachel Xu, Rasmi Elasmar et al.

Generative, multimodal artificial intelligence (GenAI) offers transformative potential across industries, but its misuse poses significant risks. Prior research has shed light on the potential of advanced AI systems to be exploited for malicious purposes. However, we still lack a concrete understanding of how GenAI models are specifically exploited or abused in practice, including the tactics employed to inflict harm. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of GenAI misuse tactics, informed by existing academic literature and a qualitative analysis of approximately 200 observed incidents of misuse reported between January 2023 and March 2024. Through this analysis, we illuminate key and novel patterns in misuse during this time period, including potential motivations, strategies, and how attackers leverage and abuse system capabilities across modalities (e.g. image, text, audio, video) in the wild.