UniECG: Understanding and Generating ECG in One Unified ModelJiarui Jin, Haoyu Wang, Xiang Lan et al.
Recent unified models such as GPT-5 have achieved encouraging progress on vision-language tasks. However, these unified models typically fail to correctly understand ECG signals and provide accurate medical diagnoses, nor can they correctly generate ECG signals. To address these limitations, we propose UniECG, the first unified model for ECG capable of concurrently performing evidence-based ECG interpretation and text-conditioned ECG generation tasks. Through a decoupled two-stage training approach, the model first learns evidence-based interpretation skills (ECG-to-Text), and then injects ECG generation capabilities (Text-to-ECG) via latent space alignment. UniECG can autonomously choose to interpret or generate an ECG based on user input, significantly extending the capability boundaries of current ECG models. Our code and checkpoints will be made publicly available at https://github.com/PKUDigitalHealth/UniECG upon acceptance.
12.0CRAug 19, 2025
CCFC: Core & Core-Full-Core Dual-Track Defense for LLM Jailbreak ProtectionJiaming Hu, Haoyu Wang, Debarghya Mukherjee et al.
Jailbreak attacks pose a serious challenge to the safe deployment of large language models (LLMs). We introduce CCFC (Core & Core-Full-Core), a dual-track, prompt-level defense framework designed to mitigate LLMs' vulnerabilities from prompt injection and structure-aware jailbreak attacks. CCFC operates by first isolating the semantic core of a user query via few-shot prompting, and then evaluating the query using two complementary tracks: a core-only track to ignore adversarial distractions (e.g., toxic suffixes or prefix injections), and a core-full-core (CFC) track to disrupt the structural patterns exploited by gradient-based or edit-based attacks. The final response is selected based on a safety consistency check across both tracks, ensuring robustness without compromising on response quality. We demonstrate that CCFC cuts attack success rates by 50-75% versus state-of-the-art defenses against strong adversaries (e.g., DeepInception, GCG), without sacrificing fidelity on benign queries. Our method consistently outperforms state-of-the-art prompt-level defenses, offering a practical and effective solution for safer LLM deployment.