Jie Zhang

Ran Zhang, Xuanhua He, Li Xueheng et al.

The field of pan-sharpening has recently seen a trend towards increasingly large and complex models, often trained on single, specific satellite datasets. This one-dataset, one-model approach leads to high computational overhead and impractical deployment. More critically, it overlooks a core challenge: poor generalization from reduced-resolution (RR) training to real-world full-resolution (FR) data. In response to this issue, we challenge this paradigm. We introduce a multiple-in-one training strategy, where a single, compact model is trained simultaneously on three distinct satellite datasets (WV2, WV3, and GF2). Our experiments show the primary benefit of this unified strategy is a significant and universal boost in FR generalization (QNR) across all tested models, directly addressing this overlooked problem. This paradigm also inherently solves the one-model-per-dataset challenge, and we support it with a highly reproducible, dependency-free codebase for true usability. Finally, we propose PanTiny, a lightweight framework designed specifically for this new, robust paradigm. We demonstrate it achieves a superior performance-to-efficiency balance, proving that principled, simple and robust design is more effective than brute-force scaling in this practical setting. Our work advocates for a community-wide shift towards creating efficient, deployable, and truly generalizable models for pan-sharpening. The code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Zirconium233/PanTiny.

Shanghai AI Lab, Xiaoyang Chen, Yunhao Chen et al.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-$45^\circ$ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.