Tianyi Zhang

h-index36
2papers
7,768citations

2 Papers

7.9LGDec 17, 2024
Transferable and Forecastable User Targeting Foundation Model

Bin Dou, Baokun Wang, Yun Zhu et al.

User targeting, the process of selecting targeted users from a pool of candidates for non-expert marketers, has garnered substantial attention with the advancements in digital marketing. However, existing user targeting methods encounter two significant challenges: (i) Poor cross-domain and cross-scenario transferability and generalization, and (ii) Insufficient forecastability in real-world applications. These limitations hinder their applicability across diverse industrial scenarios. In this work, we propose FOUND, an industrial-grade, transferable, and forecastable user targeting foundation model. To enhance cross-domain transferability, our framework integrates heterogeneous multi-scenario user data, aligning them with one-sentence targeting demand inputs through contrastive pre-training. For improved forecastability, the text description of each user is derived based on anticipated future behaviors, while user representations are constructed from historical information. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms existing baselines in cross-domain, real-world user targeting scenarios, showcasing the superior capabilities of FOUND. Moreover, our method has been successfully deployed on the Alipay platform and is widely utilized across various scenarios.

3.3GTMay 14, 2019
Fixed-price Diffusion Mechanism Design

Tianyi Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Wen Zhang et al.

We consider a fixed-price mechanism design setting where a seller sells one item via a social network, but the seller can only directly communicate with her neighbours initially. Each other node in the network is a potential buyer with a valuation derived from a common distribution. With a standard fixed-price mechanism, the seller can only sell the item among her neighbours. To improve her revenue, she needs more buyers to join in the sale. To achieve this, we propose the very first fixed-price mechanism to incentivize the seller's neighbours to inform their neighbours about the sale and to eventually inform all buyers in the network to improve seller's revenue. Compared with the existing mechanisms for the same purpose, our mechanism does not require the buyers to reveal their valuations and it is computationally easy. More importantly, it guarantees that the improved revenue is at least 1/2 of the optimal.