Sen Li

h-index40
2papers
5,606citations

2 Papers

7.1LGSep 26, 2025Code
Triple-BERT: Do We Really Need MARL for Order Dispatch on Ride-Sharing Platforms?

Zijian Zhao, Sen Li

On-demand ride-sharing platforms, such as Uber and Lyft, face the intricate real-time challenge of bundling and matching passengers-each with distinct origins and destinations-to available vehicles, all while navigating significant system uncertainties. Due to the extensive observation space arising from the large number of drivers and orders, order dispatching, though fundamentally a centralized task, is often addressed using Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). However, independent MARL methods fail to capture global information and exhibit poor cooperation among workers, while Centralized Training Decentralized Execution (CTDE) MARL methods suffer from the curse of dimensionality. To overcome these challenges, we propose Triple-BERT, a centralized Single Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method designed specifically for large-scale order dispatching on ride-sharing platforms. Built on a variant TD3, our approach addresses the vast action space through an action decomposition strategy that breaks down the joint action probability into individual driver action probabilities. To handle the extensive observation space, we introduce a novel BERT-based network, where parameter reuse mitigates parameter growth as the number of drivers and orders increases, and the attention mechanism effectively captures the complex relationships among the large pool of driver and orders. We validate our method using a real-world ride-hailing dataset from Manhattan. Triple-BERT achieves approximately an 11.95% improvement over current state-of-the-art methods, with a 4.26% increase in served orders and a 22.25% reduction in pickup times. Our code, trained model parameters, and processed data are publicly available at the repository https://github.com/RS2002/Triple-BERT .

1.2SYOct 1, 2015
Uniform-Price Mechanism Design for a Large Population of Dynamic Agents

Sen Li, Wei Zhang

This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group objectives. The coordination problem is formulated as a dynamic mechanism design problem. A mechanism is proposed based on the competitive equilibrium of the large population game. We derive the conditions for the general nonlinear dynamic systems under which the proposed mechanism is incentive compatible and can implement the social choice function in $ε$-Nash equilibrium. In addition, we show that for linear quadratic problems with bounded parameters, the proposed mechanism can maximize the social welfare subject to a total resource constraint in $ε$-dominant strategy equilibrium.