Tao Li

Baoqi Huang, Tao Li, Brian D. O. Anderson et al.

In this paper, we study performance limits of sensor localization from a novel perspective. Specifically, we consider the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) in single-hop sensor localization using measurements from received signal strength (RSS), time of arrival (TOA) and bearing, respectively, but differently from the existing work, we statistically analyze the trace of the associated CRLB matrix (i.e. as a scalar metric for performance limits of sensor localization) by assuming anchor locations are random. By the Central Limit Theorems for $U$-statistics, we show that as the number of the anchors increases, this scalar metric is asymptotically normal in the RSS/bearing case, and converges to a random variable which is an affine transformation of a chi-square random variable of degree 2 in the TOA case. Moreover, we provide formulas quantitatively describing the relationship among the mean and standard deviation of the scalar metric, the number of the anchors, the parameters of communication channels, the noise statistics in measurements and the spatial distribution of the anchors. These formulas, though asymptotic in the number of the anchors, in many cases turn out to be remarkably accurate in predicting performance limits, even if the number is small. Simulations are carried out to confirm our results.

Xingyu Lyu, Ning Wang, Yang Xiao et al.

Federated Learning (FL) is a popular paradigm enabling clients to jointly train a global model without sharing raw data. However, FL is known to be vulnerable towards backdoor attacks due to its distributed nature. As participants, attackers can upload model updates that effectively compromise FL. What's worse, existing defenses are mostly designed under independent-and-identically-distributed (iid) settings, hence neglecting the fundamental non-iid characteristic of FL. Here we propose FLBuff for tackling backdoor attacks even under non-iids. The main challenge for such defenses is that non-iids bring benign and malicious updates closer, hence harder to separate. FLBuff is inspired by our insight that non-iids can be modeled as omni-directional expansion in representation space while backdoor attacks as uni-directional. This leads to the key design of FLBuff, i.e., a supervised-contrastive-learning model extracting penultimate-layer representations to create a large in-between buffer layer. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that FLBuff consistently outperforms state-of-the-art defenses.