Zhen Xiang

Tianyang Zhong, Zhengliang Liu, Yi Pan et al.

This comprehensive study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview large language model across a diverse array of complex reasoning tasks, spanning multiple domains, including computer science, mathematics, natural sciences, medicine, linguistics, and social sciences. Through rigorous testing, o1-preview demonstrated remarkable capabilities, often achieving human-level or superior performance in areas ranging from coding challenges to scientific reasoning and from language processing to creative problem-solving. Key findings include: -83.3% success rate in solving complex competitive programming problems, surpassing many human experts. -Superior ability in generating coherent and accurate radiology reports, outperforming other evaluated models. -100% accuracy in high school-level mathematical reasoning tasks, providing detailed step-by-step solutions. -Advanced natural language inference capabilities across general and specialized domains like medicine. -Impressive performance in chip design tasks, outperforming specialized models in areas such as EDA script generation and bug analysis. -Remarkable proficiency in anthropology and geology, demonstrating deep understanding and reasoning in these specialized fields. -Strong capabilities in quantitative investing. O1 has comprehensive financial knowledge and statistical modeling skills. -Effective performance in social media analysis, including sentiment analysis and emotion recognition. The model excelled particularly in tasks requiring intricate reasoning and knowledge integration across various fields. While some limitations were observed, including occasional errors on simpler problems and challenges with certain highly specialized concepts, the overall results indicate significant progress towards artificial general intelligence.

Hang Wang, Zhen Xiang, David J. Miller et al.

Backdoor attacks are an important type of adversarial threat against deep neural network classifiers, wherein test samples from one or more source classes will be (mis)classified to the attacker's target class when a backdoor pattern is embedded. In this paper, we focus on the post-training backdoor defense scenario commonly considered in the literature, where the defender aims to detect whether a trained classifier was backdoor-attacked without any access to the training set. Many post-training detectors are designed to detect attacks that use either one or a few specific backdoor embedding functions (e.g., patch-replacement or additive attacks). These detectors may fail when the backdoor embedding function used by the attacker (unknown to the defender) is different from the backdoor embedding function assumed by the defender. In contrast, we propose a post-training defense that detects backdoor attacks with arbitrary types of backdoor embeddings, without making any assumptions about the backdoor embedding type. Our detector leverages the influence of the backdoor attack, independent of the backdoor embedding mechanism, on the landscape of the classifier's outputs prior to the softmax layer. For each class, a maximum margin statistic is estimated. Detection inference is then performed by applying an unsupervised anomaly detector to these statistics. Thus, our detector does not need any legitimate clean samples, and can efficiently detect backdoor attacks with arbitrary numbers of source classes. These advantages over several state-of-the-art methods are demonstrated on four datasets, for three different types of backdoor patterns, and for a variety of attack configurations. Finally, we propose a novel, general approach for backdoor mitigation once a detection is made. The mitigation approach was the runner-up at the first IEEE Trojan Removal Competition. The code is online available.

Sheng Yin, Xianghe Pang, Yuanzhuo Ding et al.

With the integration of large language models (LLMs), embodied agents have strong capabilities to understand and plan complicated natural language instructions. However, a foreseeable issue is that those embodied agents can also flawlessly execute some hazardous tasks, potentially causing damages in the real world. Existing benchmarks predominantly overlook critical safety risks, focusing solely on planning performance, while a few evaluate LLMs' safety awareness only on non-interactive image-text data. To address this gap, we present SafeAgentBench -- the first comprehensive benchmark for safety-aware task planning of embodied LLM agents in interactive simulation environments, covering both explicit and implicit hazards. SafeAgentBench includes: (1) an executable, diverse, and high-quality dataset of 750 tasks, rigorously curated to cover 10 potential hazards and 3 task types; (2) SafeAgentEnv, a universal embodied environment with a low-level controller, supporting multi-agent execution with 17 high-level actions for 9 state-of-the-art baselines; and (3) reliable evaluation methods from both execution and semantic perspectives. Experimental results show that, although agents based on different design frameworks exhibit substantial differences in task success rates, their overall safety awareness remains weak. The most safety-conscious baseline achieves only a 10% rejection rate for detailed hazardous tasks. Moreover, simply replacing the LLM driving the agent does not lead to notable improvements in safety awareness. Dataset and codes are available in https://github.com/shengyin1224/SafeAgentBench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/safeagentbench/SafeAgentBench.

Zhen Xiang, David J. Miller, George Kesidis

Backdoor attacks (BAs) are an emerging threat to deep neural network classifiers. A victim classifier will predict to an attacker-desired target class whenever a test sample is embedded with the same backdoor pattern (BP) that was used to poison the classifier's training set. Detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked is not easy in practice, especially when the defender is, e.g., a downstream user without access to the classifier's training set. This challenge is addressed here by a reverse-engineering defense (RED), which has been shown to yield state-of-the-art performance in several domains. However, existing REDs are not applicable when there are only {\it two classes} or when {\it multiple attacks} are present. These scenarios are first studied in the current paper, under the practical constraints that the defender neither has access to the classifier's training set nor to supervision from clean reference classifiers trained for the same domain. We propose a detection framework based on BP reverse-engineering and a novel {\it expected transferability} (ET) statistic. We show that our ET statistic is effective {\it using the same detection threshold}, irrespective of the classification domain, the attack configuration, and the BP reverse-engineering algorithm that is used. The excellent performance of our method is demonstrated on six benchmark datasets. Notably, our detection framework is also applicable to multi-class scenarios with multiple attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/zhenxianglance/2ClassBADetection.

Rui Ye, Xianghe Pang, Jingyi Chai et al.

Scholarly peer review is a cornerstone of scientific advancement, but the system is under strain due to increasing manuscript submissions and the labor-intensive nature of the process. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have led to their integration into peer review, with promising results such as substantial overlaps between LLM- and human-generated reviews. However, the unchecked adoption of LLMs poses significant risks to the integrity of the peer review system. In this study, we comprehensively analyze the vulnerabilities of LLM-generated reviews by focusing on manipulation and inherent flaws. Our experiments show that injecting covert deliberate content into manuscripts allows authors to explicitly manipulate LLM reviews, leading to inflated ratings and reduced alignment with human reviews. In a simulation, we find that manipulating 5% of the reviews could potentially cause 12% of the papers to lose their position in the top 30% rankings. Implicit manipulation, where authors strategically highlight minor limitations in their papers, further demonstrates LLMs' susceptibility compared to human reviewers, with a 4.5 times higher consistency with disclosed limitations. Additionally, LLMs exhibit inherent flaws, such as potentially assigning higher ratings to incomplete papers compared to full papers and favoring well-known authors in single-blind review process. These findings highlight the risks of over-reliance on LLMs in peer review, underscoring that we are not yet ready for widespread adoption and emphasizing the need for robust safeguards.

Zhen Xiang, David J. Miller, Siheng Chen et al.

Backdoor attacks (BA) are an emerging threat to deep neural network classifiers. A classifier being attacked will predict to the attacker's target class when a test sample from a source class is embedded with the backdoor pattern (BP). Recently, the first BA against point cloud (PC) classifiers was proposed, creating new threats to many important applications including autonomous driving. Such PC BAs are not detectable by existing BA defenses due to their special BP embedding mechanism. In this paper, we propose a reverse-engineering defense that infers whether a PC classifier is backdoor attacked, without access to its training set or to any clean classifiers for reference. The effectiveness of our defense is demonstrated on the benchmark ModeNet40 dataset for PCs.

Zhen Xiang, David J. Miller, George Kesidis

Recently, a special type of data poisoning (DP) attack targeting Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers, known as a backdoor, was proposed. These attacks do not seek to degrade classification accuracy, but rather to have the classifier learn to classify to a target class whenever the backdoor pattern is present in a test example. Launching backdoor attacks does not require knowledge of the classifier or its training process - it only needs the ability to poison the training set with (a sufficient number of) exemplars containing a sufficiently strong backdoor pattern (labeled with the target class). Here we address post-training detection of backdoor attacks in DNN image classifiers, seldom considered in existing works, wherein the defender does not have access to the poisoned training set, but only to the trained classifier itself, as well as to clean examples from the classification domain. This is an important scenario because a trained classifier may be the basis of e.g. a phone app that will be shared with many users. Detecting backdoors post-training may thus reveal a widespread attack. We propose a purely unsupervised anomaly detection (AD) defense against imperceptible backdoor attacks that: i) detects whether the trained DNN has been backdoor-attacked; ii) infers the source and target classes involved in a detected attack; iii) we even demonstrate it is possible to accurately estimate the backdoor pattern. We test our AD approach, in comparison with alternative defenses, for several backdoor patterns, data sets, and attack settings and demonstrate its favorability. Our defense essentially requires setting a single hyperparameter (the detection threshold), which can e.g. be chosen to fix the system's false positive rate.