Miles Brundage

Aaron Hurst, Adam Lerer, Adam P. Goucher et al. · openai

GPT-4o is an autoregressive omni model that accepts as input any combination of text, audio, image, and video, and generates any combination of text, audio, and image outputs. It's trained end-to-end across text, vision, and audio, meaning all inputs and outputs are processed by the same neural network. GPT-4o can respond to audio inputs in as little as 232 milliseconds, with an average of 320 milliseconds, which is similar to human response time in conversation. It matches GPT-4 Turbo performance on text in English and code, with significant improvement on text in non-English languages, while also being much faster and 50\% cheaper in the API. GPT-4o is especially better at vision and audio understanding compared to existing models. In line with our commitment to building AI safely and consistent with our voluntary commitments to the White House, we are sharing the GPT-4o System Card, which includes our Preparedness Framework evaluations. In this System Card, we provide a detailed look at GPT-4o's capabilities, limitations, and safety evaluations across multiple categories, focusing on speech-to-speech while also evaluating text and image capabilities, and measures we've implemented to ensure the model is safe and aligned. We also include third-party assessments on dangerous capabilities, as well as discussion of potential societal impacts of GPT-4o's text and vision capabilities.

Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal et al. · berkeley, deepmind

We report the development of GPT-4, a large-scale, multimodal model which can accept image and text inputs and produce text outputs. While less capable than humans in many real-world scenarios, GPT-4 exhibits human-level performance on various professional and academic benchmarks, including passing a simulated bar exam with a score around the top 10% of test takers. GPT-4 is a Transformer-based model pre-trained to predict the next token in a document. The post-training alignment process results in improved performance on measures of factuality and adherence to desired behavior. A core component of this project was developing infrastructure and optimization methods that behave predictably across a wide range of scales. This allowed us to accurately predict some aspects of GPT-4's performance based on models trained with no more than 1/1,000th the compute of GPT-4.

Markus Anderljung, Joslyn Barnhart, Anton Korinek et al.

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

Heidy Khlaaf, Pamela Mishkin, Joshua Achiam et al.

Codex, a large language model (LLM) trained on a variety of codebases, exceeds the previous state of the art in its capacity to synthesize and generate code. Although Codex provides a plethora of benefits, models that may generate code on such scale have significant limitations, alignment problems, the potential to be misused, and the possibility to increase the rate of progress in technical fields that may themselves have destabilizing impacts or have misuse potential. Yet such safety impacts are not yet known or remain to be explored. In this paper, we outline a hazard analysis framework constructed at OpenAI to uncover hazards or safety risks that the deployment of models like Codex may impose technically, socially, politically, and economically. The analysis is informed by a novel evaluation framework that determines the capacity of advanced code generation techniques against the complexity and expressivity of specification prompts, and their capability to understand and execute them relative to human ability.

A. Feder Cooper, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Miranda Bogen et al. · deepmind

"Machine unlearning" is a popular proposed solution for mitigating the existence of content in an AI model that is problematic for legal or moral reasons, including privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of specific information from a generative-AI model's parameters, e.g., a particular individual's personal data or the inclusion of copyrighted content in the model's training data. Unlearning is also proposed as a way to prevent a model from generating targeted types of information in its outputs, e.g., generations that closely resemble a particular individual's data or reflect the concept of "Spiderman." Both of these goals--the targeted removal of information from a model and the targeted suppression of information from a model's outputs--present various technical and substantive challenges. We provide a framework for ML researchers and policymakers to think rigorously about these challenges, identifying several mismatches between the goals of unlearning and feasible implementations. These mismatches explain why unlearning is not a general-purpose solution for circumscribing generative-AI model behavior in service of broader positive impact.

Shahar Avin, Haydn Belfield, Miles Brundage et al.

The range of application of artificial intelligence (AI) is vast, as is the potential for harm. Growing awareness of potential risks from AI systems has spurred action to address those risks, while eroding confidence in AI systems and the organizations that develop them. A 2019 study found over 80 organizations that published and adopted "AI ethics principles'', and more have joined since. But the principles often leave a gap between the "what" and the "how" of trustworthy AI development. Such gaps have enabled questionable or ethically dubious behavior, which casts doubts on the trustworthiness of specific organizations, and the field more broadly. There is thus an urgent need for concrete methods that both enable AI developers to prevent harm and allow them to demonstrate their trustworthiness through verifiable behavior. Below, we explore mechanisms (drawn from arXiv:2004.07213) for creating an ecosystem where AI developers can earn trust - if they are trustworthy. Better assessment of developer trustworthiness could inform user choice, employee actions, investment decisions, legal recourse, and emerging governance regimes.

Sandhini Agarwal, Gretchen Krueger, Jack Clark et al.

Recently, there have been breakthroughs in computer vision ("CV") models that are more generalizable with the advent of models such as CLIP and ALIGN. In this paper, we analyze CLIP and highlight some of the challenges such models pose. CLIP reduces the need for task specific training data, potentially opening up many niche tasks to automation. CLIP also allows its users to flexibly specify image classification classes in natural language, which we find can shift how biases manifest. Additionally, through some preliminary probes we find that CLIP can inherit biases found in prior computer vision systems. Given the wide and unpredictable domain of uses for such models, this raises questions regarding what sufficiently safe behaviour for such systems may look like. These results add evidence to the growing body of work calling for a change in the notion of a 'better' model--to move beyond simply looking at higher accuracy at task-oriented capability evaluations, and towards a broader 'better' that takes into account deployment-critical features such as different use contexts, and people who interact with the model when thinking about model deployment.

Mark Chen, Jerry Tworek, Heewoo Jun et al.

We introduce Codex, a GPT language model fine-tuned on publicly available code from GitHub, and study its Python code-writing capabilities. A distinct production version of Codex powers GitHub Copilot. On HumanEval, a new evaluation set we release to measure functional correctness for synthesizing programs from docstrings, our model solves 28.8% of the problems, while GPT-3 solves 0% and GPT-J solves 11.4%. Furthermore, we find that repeated sampling from the model is a surprisingly effective strategy for producing working solutions to difficult prompts. Using this method, we solve 70.2% of our problems with 100 samples per problem. Careful investigation of our model reveals its limitations, including difficulty with docstrings describing long chains of operations and with binding operations to variables. Finally, we discuss the potential broader impacts of deploying powerful code generation technologies, covering safety, security, and economics.

Alex Tamkin, Miles Brundage, Jack Clark et al.

On October 14th, 2020, researchers from OpenAI, the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, and other universities convened to discuss open research questions surrounding GPT-3, the largest publicly-disclosed dense language model at the time. The meeting took place under Chatham House Rules. Discussants came from a variety of research backgrounds including computer science, linguistics, philosophy, political science, communications, cyber policy, and more. Broadly, the discussion centered around two main questions: 1) What are the technical capabilities and limitations of large language models? 2) What are the societal effects of widespread use of large language models? Here, we provide a detailed summary of the discussion organized by the two themes above.

Irene Solaiman, Miles Brundage, Jack Clark et al.

Large language models have a range of beneficial uses: they can assist in prose, poetry, and programming; analyze dataset biases; and more. However, their flexibility and generative capabilities also raise misuse concerns. This report discusses OpenAI's work related to the release of its GPT-2 language model. It discusses staged release, which allows time between model releases to conduct risk and benefit analyses as model sizes increased. It also discusses ongoing partnership-based research and provides recommendations for better coordination and responsible publication in AI.

Amanda Askell, Miles Brundage, Gillian Hadfield

In this paper, we argue that competitive pressures could incentivize AI companies to underinvest in ensuring their systems are safe, secure, and have a positive social impact. Ensuring that AI systems are developed responsibly may therefore require preventing and solving collective action problems between companies. We note that there are several key factors that improve the prospects for cooperation in collective action problems. We use this to identify strategies to improve the prospects for industry cooperation on the responsible development of AI.

Fernando Martínez-Plumed, Shahar Avin, Miles Brundage et al.

We reframe the analysis of progress in AI by incorporating into an overall framework both the task performance of a system, and the time and resource costs incurred in the development and deployment of the system. These costs include: data, expert knowledge, human oversight, software resources, computing cycles, hardware and network facilities, and (what kind of) time. These costs are distributed over the life cycle of the system, and may place differing demands on different developers and users. The multidimensional performance and cost space we present can be collapsed to a single utility metric that measures the value of the system for different stakeholders. Even without a single utility function, AI advances can be generically assessed by whether they expand the Pareto surface. We label these types of costs as neglected dimensions of AI progress, and explore them using four case studies: Alpha* (Go, Chess, and other board games), ALE (Atari games), ImageNet (Image classification) and Virtual Personal Assistants (Siri, Alexa, Cortana, and Google Assistant). This broader model of progress in AI will lead to novel ways of estimating the potential societal use and impact of an AI system, and the establishment of milestones for future progress.

Miles Brundage, Shahar Avin, Jack Clark et al.

This report surveys the landscape of potential security threats from malicious uses of AI, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and mitigate these threats. After analyzing the ways in which AI may influence the threat landscape in the digital, physical, and political domains, we make four high-level recommendations for AI researchers and other stakeholders. We also suggest several promising areas for further research that could expand the portfolio of defenses, or make attacks less effective or harder to execute. Finally, we discuss, but do not conclusively resolve, the long-term equilibrium of attackers and defenders.

Kai Arulkumaran, Marc Peter Deisenroth, Miles Brundage et al.

Deep reinforcement learning is poised to revolutionise the field of AI and represents a step towards building autonomous systems with a higher level understanding of the visual world. Currently, deep learning is enabling reinforcement learning to scale to problems that were previously intractable, such as learning to play video games directly from pixels. Deep reinforcement learning algorithms are also applied to robotics, allowing control policies for robots to be learned directly from camera inputs in the real world. In this survey, we begin with an introduction to the general field of reinforcement learning, then progress to the main streams of value-based and policy-based methods. Our survey will cover central algorithms in deep reinforcement learning, including the deep $Q$-network, trust region policy optimisation, and asynchronous advantage actor-critic. In parallel, we highlight the unique advantages of deep neural networks, focusing on visual understanding via reinforcement learning. To conclude, we describe several current areas of research within the field.

Miles Brundage

Participants in recent discussions of AI-related issues ranging from intelligence explosion to technological unemployment have made diverse claims about the nature, pace, and drivers of progress in AI. However, these theories are rarely specified in enough detail to enable systematic evaluation of their assumptions or to extrapolate progress quantitatively, as is often done with some success in other technological domains. After reviewing relevant literatures and justifying the need for more rigorous modeling of AI progress, this paper contributes to that research program by suggesting ways to account for the relationship between hardware speed increases and algorithmic improvements in AI, the role of human inputs in enabling AI capabilities, and the relationships between different sub-fields of AI. It then outlines ways of tailoring AI progress models to generate insights on the specific issue of technological unemployment, and outlines future directions for research on AI progress.