Giulio Tononi

William G. P. Mayner, William Marshall, Larissa Albantakis et al.

Integrated information theory provides a mathematical framework to fully characterize the cause-effect structure of a physical system. Here, we introduce PyPhi, a Python software package that implements this framework for causal analysis and unfolds the full cause-effect structure of discrete dynamical systems of binary elements. The software allows users to easily study these structures, serves as an up-to-date reference implementation of the formalisms of integrated information theory, and has been applied in research on complexity, emergence, and certain biological questions. We first provide an overview of the main algorithm and demonstrate PyPhi's functionality in the course of analyzing an example system, and then describe details of the algorithm's design and implementation. PyPhi can be installed with Python's package manager via the command 'pip install pyphi' on Linux and macOS systems equipped with Python 3.4 or higher. PyPhi is open-source and licensed under the GPLv3; the source code is hosted on GitHub at https://github.com/wmayner/pyphi . Comprehensive and continually-updated documentation is available at https://pyphi.readthedocs.io/ . The pyphi-users mailing list can be joined at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/pyphi-users . A web-based graphical interface to the software is available at http://integratedinformationtheory.org/calculate.html .

Graham Findlay, William Marshall, Larissa Albantakis et al.

Developments in machine learning and computing power suggest that artificial general intelligence is within reach. This raises the question of artificial consciousness: if a computer were to be functionally equivalent to a human, being able to do all we do, would it experience sights, sounds, and thoughts, as we do when we are conscious? Answering this question in a principled manner can only be done on the basis of a theory of consciousness that is grounded in phenomenology and that states the necessary and sufficient conditions for any system, evolved or engineered, to support subjective experience. Here we employ Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which provides principled tools to determine whether a system is conscious, to what degree, and the content of its experience. We consider pairs of systems constituted of simple Boolean units, one of which -- a basic stored-program computer -- simulates the other with full functional equivalence. By applying the principles of IIT, we demonstrate that (i) two systems can be functionally equivalent without being phenomenally equivalent, and (ii) that this conclusion is not dependent on the simulated system's function. We further demonstrate that, according to IIT, it is possible for a digital computer to simulate our behavior, possibly even by simulating the neurons in our brain, without replicating our experience. This contrasts sharply with computational functionalism, the thesis that performing computations of the right kind is necessary and sufficient for consciousness.

Larissa Albantakis, Giulio Tononi

If we take the subjective character of consciousness seriously, consciousness becomes a matter of "being" rather than "doing". Because "doing" can be dissociated from "being", functional criteria alone are insufficient to decide whether a system possesses the necessary requirements for being a physical substrate of consciousness. The dissociation between "being" and "doing" is most salient in artificial general intelligence, which may soon replicate any human capacity: computers can perform complex functions (in the limit resembling human behavior) in the absence of consciousness. Complex behavior becomes meaningless if it is not performed by a conscious being.

Larissa Albantakis, Francesco Massari, Maggie Beheler-Amass et al.

In science, macro level descriptions of the causal interactions within complex, dynamical systems are typically deemed convenient, but ultimately reducible to a complete causal account of the underlying micro constituents. Yet, such a reductionist perspective is hard to square with several issues related to autonomy and agency: (1) agents require (causal) borders that separate them from the environment, (2) at least in a biological context, agents are associated with macroscopic systems, and (3) agents are supposed to act upon their environment. Integrated information theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al., 2014) offers a quantitative account of causation based on a set of causal principles, including notions such as causal specificity, composition, and irreducibility, that challenges the reductionist perspective in multiple ways. First, the IIT formalism provides a complete account of a system's causal structure, including irreducible higher-order mechanisms constituted of multiple system elements. Second, a system's amount of integrated information ($Φ$) measures the causal constraints a system exerts onto itself and can peak at a macro level of description (Hoel et al., 2016; Marshall et al., 2018). Finally, the causal principles of IIT can also be employed to identify and quantify the actual causes of events ("what caused what"), such as an agent's actions (Albantakis et al., 2019). Here, we demonstrate this framework by example of a simulated agent, equipped with a small neural network, that forms a maximum of $Φ$ at a macro scale.

Larissa Albantakis, William Marshall, Erik Hoel et al.

Actual causation is concerned with the question "what caused what?" Consider a transition between two states within a system of interacting elements, such as an artificial neural network, or a biological brain circuit. Which combination of synapses caused the neuron to fire? Which image features caused the classifier to misinterpret the picture? Even detailed knowledge of the system's causal network, its elements, their states, connectivity, and dynamics does not automatically provide a straightforward answer to the "what caused what?" question. Counterfactual accounts of actual causation based on graphical models, paired with system interventions, have demonstrated initial success in addressing specific problem cases in line with intuitive causal judgments. Here, we start from a set of basic requirements for causation (realization, composition, information, integration, and exclusion) and develop a rigorous, quantitative account of actual causation that is generally applicable to discrete dynamical systems. We present a formal framework to evaluate these causal requirements that is based on system interventions and partitions, and considers all counterfactuals of a state transition. This framework is used to provide a complete causal account of the transition by identifying and quantifying the strength of all actual causes and effects linking the two consecutive system states. Finally, we examine several exemplary cases and paradoxes of causation and show that they can be illuminated by the proposed framework for quantifying actual causation.