Guoming Zhang

Jiahao Wang, Sikun Yang, Heinz Koeppl et al.

Probabilistic approaches for handling count-valued time sequences have attracted amounts of research attentions because their ability to infer explainable latent structures and to estimate uncertainties, and thus are especially suitable for dealing with \emph{noisy} and \emph{incomplete} count data. Among these models, Poisson-Gamma Dynamical Systems (PGDSs) are proven to be effective in capturing the evolving dynamics underlying observed count sequences. However, the state-of-the-art PGDS still fails to capture the \emph{time-varying} transition dynamics that are commonly observed in real-world count time sequences. To mitigate this gap, a non-stationary PGDS is proposed to allow the underlying transition matrices to evolve over time, and the evolving transition matrices are modeled by sophisticatedly-designed Dirichlet Markov chains. Leveraging Dirichlet-Multinomial-Beta data augmentation techniques, a fully-conjugate and efficient Gibbs sampler is developed to perform posterior simulation. Experiments show that, in comparison with related models, the proposed non-stationary PGDS achieves improved predictive performance due to its capacity to learn non-stationary dependency structure captured by the time-evolving transition matrices.

Fangtian Zhong, Zekai Chen, Minghui Xu et al.

Malware is a piece of software that was written with the intent of doing harm to data, devices, or people. Since a number of new malware variants can be generated by reusing codes, malware attacks can be easily launched and thus become common in recent years, incurring huge losses in businesses, governments, financial institutes, health providers, etc. To defeat these attacks, malware classification is employed, which plays an essential role in anti-virus products. However, existing works that employ either static analysis or dynamic analysis have major weaknesses in complicated reverse engineering and time-consuming tasks. In this paper, we propose a visualized malware classification framework called VisMal, which provides highly efficient categorization with acceptable accuracy. VisMal converts malware samples into images and then applies a contrast-limited adaptive histogram equalization algorithm to enhance the similarity between malware image regions in the same family. We provided a proof-of-concept implementation and carried out an extensive evaluation to verify the performance of our framework. The evaluation results indicate that VisMal can classify a malware sample within 4.0ms and have an average accuracy of 96.0%. Moreover, VisMal provides security engineers with a simple visualization approach to further validate its performance.

Guoming Zhang, Chen Yan, Xiaoyu Ji et al.

Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various systems into voice controllable systems(VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control the systems. Hidden voice commands, though hidden, are nonetheless audible. In this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f > 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the modulated low frequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated, recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems. We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode, and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine (SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to inaudible voice command attacks.