Xiaotie Deng

Yurong Chen, Qian Wang, Zhijian Duan et al. · pku

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Chenchen Li et al. · pku

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable convergence guarantees on zero-sum games and potential games, many real-world problems are often a mixture of both and the convergence property of FP has not been fully studied yet. In this paper, we extend the convergence results of FP to the combinations of such games and beyond. Specifically, we derive new conditions for FP to converge by leveraging game decomposition techniques. We further develop a linear relationship unifying cooperation and competition in the sense that these two classes of games are mutually transferable. Finally, we analyze a non-convergent example of FP, the Shapley game, and develop sufficient conditions for FP to converge.

Hongyin Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Ying Wang et al.

A diffusion auction is a market to sell commodities over a social network, where the challenge is to incentivize existing buyers to invite their neighbors in the network to join the market. Existing mechanisms have been designed to solve the challenge in various settings, aiming at desirable properties such as non-deficiency, incentive compatibility and social welfare maximization. Since the mechanisms are employed in dynamic networks with ever-changing structures, buyers could easily generate fake nodes in the network to manipulate the mechanisms for their own benefits, which is commonly known as the Sybil attack. We observe that strategic agents may gain an unfair advantage in existing mechanisms through such attacks. To resist this potential attack, we propose two diffusion auction mechanisms, the Sybil tax mechanism (STM) and the Sybil cluster mechanism (SCM), to achieve both Sybil-proofness and incentive compatibility in the single-item setting. Our proposal provides the first mechanisms to protect the interests of buyers against Sybil attacks with a mild sacrifice of social welfare and revenue.

Xiaotie Deng, Hanyu Li, Ningyuan Li · pku

In this work, a convergence lemma for function $f$ being finite compositions of analytic mappings and the maximum operator is proved. The lemma shows that the set of $δ$-stationary points near an isolated local minimum point $x^*$ is shrinking to $x^*$ as $δ\to 0$. It is a natural extension of the version for strongly convex $C^1$ functions. However, the correctness of the lemma is subtle. Analytic mappings are necessary for the lemma in the sense that replacing it with differentiable or $C^\infty$ mappings makes the lemma false. The proof is based on stratification theorems of semi-analytic sets by Łojasiewicz. An extension of this proof presents a geometric characterization of the set of stationary points of $f$. Finally, a notion of stability on stationary points, called convergence stability, is proposed. It asks, under small numerical errors, whether a reasonable convergent optimization method started near a stationary point should eventually converge to the same stationary point. The concept of convergence stability becomes nontrivial qualitatively only when the objective function is both nonsmooth and nonconvex. Via the convergence lemma, an intuitive equivalent condition for convergence stability of $f$ is proved. These results together provide a new geometric perspective to study the problem of "where-to-converge" in nonsmooth nonconvex optimization.

Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Jiarui Gan et al. · pku

It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computationally tractable and can be highly beneficial for the follower. Meanwhile, they may result in significant payoff losses for the leader, sometimes completely defeating their first-mover advantage. A warning to commitment optimizers, the risk these findings indicate appears to be alleviated to some extent by a strict information advantage the manipulations rely on. That is, the follower knows the full information about both players' payoffs whereas the leader only knows their own payoffs. In this paper, we study the manipulation problem with this information advantage relaxed. We consider the scenario where the follower is not given any information about the leader's payoffs to begin with but has to learn to manipulate by interacting with the leader. The follower can gather necessary information by querying the leader's optimal commitments against contrived best-response behaviors. Our results indicate that the information advantage is not entirely indispensable to the follower's manipulations: the follower can learn the optimal way to manipulate in polynomial time with polynomially many queries of the leader's optimal commitment.

Hongyin Chen, Yubin Ke, Xiaotie Deng et al.

Smart contracts, the stateful programs running on blockchains, often rely on reports. Publishers are paid to publish these reports on the blockchain. Designing protocols that incentivize timely reporting is the prevalent reporting problem. But existing solutions face a security-performance trade-off: Relying on a small set of trusted publishers introduces centralization risks, while allowing open publication results in an excessive number of reports on the blockchain. We identify the root cause of this trade-off to be the standard symmetric reward design, which treats all reports equally. We prove that no symmetric-reward mechanism can overcome the trade-off. We present Personal Random Rewards for Reporting (Prrr), a protocol that assigns random heterogeneous values to reports. We call this novel mechanism-design concept Ex-Ante Synthetic Asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, Prrr is the first game-theoretic mechanism (in any context) that deliberately forms participant asymmetry. Prrr employs a second-price-style settlement to allocate rewards, ensuring incentive compatibility and achieving both security and efficiency. Following the protocol constitutes a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium, robust against collusion and Sybil attacks. Prrr is applicable to numerous smart contracts that rely on timely reports.

Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li · pku

To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence the final game outcome. Through a carefully contrived payoff function misreported to the learning leader, the follower may induce an outcome that benefits him more, compared to the ones when he truthfully behaves. We study the follower's optimal manipulation via such strategic behaviors in extensive-form games. Followers' different attitudes are taken into account. An optimistic follower maximizes his true utility among all game outcomes that can be induced by some payoff function. A pessimistic follower only considers misreporting payoff functions that induce a unique game outcome. For all the settings considered in this paper, we characterize all the possible game outcomes that can be induced successfully. We show that it is polynomial-time tractable for the follower to find the optimal way of misreporting his private payoff information. Our work completely resolves this follower's optimal manipulation problem on an extensive-form game tree.

Hanyu Li, Zhengqi Sun, Xiaotie Deng

Synthetic data becomes crucial for large language model training, but its effectiveness is highly inconsistent. We provide an information-theoretic account of this inconsistency: synthetic data improves a model only when the generation-training loop is information-open, i.e., shaped by external signals (verifiers, environments, or rubrics) that inject task-relevant information beyond the model's current distribution. When the loop is information-closed (relying on the model's own outputs without such signals), the data processing inequality ensures that task-relevant information can only decrease, making collapse a predicted outcome. Among information-open pipelines, both efficiency and generalization hinge on the meta-level of supervision: a coarser signal such as binary correctness treats all acceptable outputs as equivalent, so the behavior it teaches is not tied to any particular domain or surface form and generalizes naturally across tasks and domains. These observations lead to a guiding thesis: learning preferentially converges to the most information-efficient signal component available, which accelerates learning when that component is the intended one, but causes reward hacking when a spurious pattern happens to be simpler.

Rui Ai, Chang Wang, Chenchen Li et al.

Recently the online advertising market has exhibited a gradual shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions. Although there has been a line of works concerning online bidding strategies in first-price auctions, it still remains open how to handle budget constraints in the problem. In the present paper, we initiate the study for a buyer with budgets to learn online bidding strategies in repeated first-price auctions. We propose an RL-based bidding algorithm against the optimal non-anticipating strategy under stationary competition. Our algorithm obtains $\widetilde O(\sqrt T)$-regret if the bids are all revealed at the end of each round. With the restriction that the buyer only sees the winning bid after each round, our modified algorithm obtains $\widetilde O(T^{\frac{7}{12}})$-regret by techniques developed from survival analysis. Our analysis extends to the more general scenario where the buyer has any bounded instantaneous utility function with regrets of the same order.

Zhaohua Chen, Chang Wang, Qian Wang et al.

In today's online advertising markets, a crucial requirement for an advertiser is to control her total expenditure within a time horizon under some budget. Among various budget control methods, throttling has emerged as a popular choice, managing an advertiser's total expenditure by selecting only a subset of auctions to participate in. This paper provides a theoretical panorama of a single advertiser's dynamic budget throttling process in repeated second-price auctions. We first establish a lower bound on the regret and an upper bound on the asymptotic competitive ratio for any throttling algorithm, respectively, when the advertiser's values are stochastic and adversarial. Regarding the algorithmic side, we propose the OGD-CB algorithm, which guarantees a near-optimal expected regret with stochastic values. On the other hand, when values are adversarial, we prove that this algorithm also reaches the upper bound on the asymptotic competitive ratio. We further compare throttling with pacing, another widely adopted budget control method, in repeated second-price auctions. In the stochastic case, we demonstrate that pacing is generally superior to throttling for the advertiser, supporting the well-known result that pacing is asymptotically optimal in this scenario. However, in the adversarial case, we give an exciting result indicating that throttling is also an asymptotically optimal dynamic bidding strategy. Our results bridge the gaps in theoretical research of throttling in repeated auctions and comprehensively reveal the ability of this popular budget-smoothing strategy.

Zhaohua Chen, Rui Ai, Mingwei Yang et al.

We study the framework of a dynamic decision-making scenario with resource constraints. In this framework, an agent, whose target is to maximize the total reward under the initial inventory, selects an action in each round upon observing a random request, leading to a reward and resource consumptions that are further associated with an unknown random external factor. While previous research has already established an $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ worst-case regret for this problem, this work offers two results that go beyond the worst-case perspective: one for the worst-case gap between benchmarks and another for logarithmic regret rates. We first show that an $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ distance between the commonly used fluid benchmark and the online optimum is unavoidable when the former has a degenerate optimal solution. On the algorithmic side, we merge the re-solving heuristic with distribution estimation skills and propose an algorithm that achieves an $\widetilde{O}(1)$ regret as long as the fluid LP has a unique and non-degenerate solution. Furthermore, we prove that our algorithm maintains a near-optimal $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret even in the worst cases and extend these results to the setting where the request and external factor are continuous. Regarding information structure, our regret results are obtained under two feedback models, respectively, where the algorithm accesses the external factor at the end of each round and at the end of a round only when a non-null action is executed.

Zhijian Duan, Yunxuan Ma, Xiaotie Deng

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

Xiaotie Deng, Dongchen Li, Hanyu Li

AI in Math deals with mathematics in a constructive manner so that reasoning becomes automated, less laborious, and less error-prone. For algorithms, the question becomes how to automate analyses for specific problems. For the first time, this work provides an automatic method for approximation analysis on a well-studied problem in theoretical computer science: computing approximate Nash equilibria in two-player games. We observe that such algorithms can be reformulated into a search-and-mix paradigm, which involves a search phase followed by a mixing phase. By doing so, we are able to fully automate the procedure of designing and analyzing the mixing phase. For example, we illustrate how to perform our method with a program to analyze the approximation bounds of all the algorithms in the literature. Same approximation bounds are computed without any hand-written proof. Our automatic method heavily relies on the LP-relaxation structure in approximate Nash equilibria. Since many approximation algorithms and online algorithms adopt the LP relaxation, our approach may be extended to automate the analysis of other algorithms.

Yusen Wu, Xiaotie Deng

This paper proposes DeepRule, an integrated framework for automated business rule generation in retail assortment and pricing optimization. Addressing the systematic misalignment between existing theoretical models and real-world economic complexities, we identify three critical gaps: (1) data modality mismatch where unstructured textual sources (e.g. negotiation records, approval documents) impede accurate customer profiling; (2) dynamic feature entanglement challenges in modeling nonlinear price elasticity and time-varying attributes; (3) operational infeasibility caused by multi-tier business constraints. Our framework introduces a tri-level architecture for above challenges. We design a hybrid knowledge fusion engine employing large language models (LLMs) for deep semantic parsing of unstructured text, transforming distributor agreements and sales assessments into structured features while integrating managerial expertise. Then a game-theoretic constrained optimization mechanism is employed to dynamically reconcile supply chain interests through bilateral utility functions, encoding manufacturer-distributor profit redistribution as endogenous objectives under hierarchical constraints. Finally an interpretable decision distillation interface leveraging LLM-guided symbolic regression to find and optimize pricing strategies and auditable business rules embeds economic priors (e.g. non-negative elasticity) as hard constraints during mathematical expression search. We validate the framework in real retail environments achieving higher profits versus systematic B2C baselines while ensuring operational feasibility. This establishes a close-loop pipeline unifying unstructured knowledge injection, multi-agent optimization, and interpretable strategy synthesis for real economic intelligence.

Hanyu Li, Wenhan Huang, Zhijian Duan et al.

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet economics and multi-agent learning. This paper reviews various algorithms computing the Nash equilibrium and its approximation solutions in finite normal-form games from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. For the theoretical part, we classify algorithms in the literature and present basic ideas on algorithm design and analysis. For the empirical part, we present a comprehensive comparison on the algorithms in the literature over different kinds of games. Based on these results, we provide practical suggestions on implementations and uses of these algorithms. Finally, we present a series of open problems from both theoretical and practical considerations.

Li Jiang, Yusen Wu, Junwu Xiong et al.

Preference datasets are essential for incorporating human preferences into pre-trained language models, playing a key role in the success of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback. However, these datasets often demonstrate conflicting alignment objectives, leading to increased vulnerability to jailbreak attacks and challenges in adapting downstream tasks to prioritize specific alignment objectives without negatively impacting others. In this work, we introduce a novel statistical metric, Alignment Dimension Conflict, to quantify the degree of conflict within preference datasets. We then present \texttt{Hummer} and its fine-grained variant, \texttt{Hummer-F}, as innovative pairwise preference datasets with reduced-conflict alignment objectives. \texttt{Hummer} is built based on UltraFeedback and is enhanced by AI feedback from GPT-4, marking as the first preference dataset aimed at reducing the competition between alignment objectives. Furthermore, we develop reward models, HummerRM and HummerRM-F, which employ a hybrid sampling approach to balance diverse alignment objectives effectively. This sampling method positions HummerRM as an ideal model for domain-specific further fine-tuning and reducing vulnerabilities to attacks.

Yurong Chen, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng et al. · pku

This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and approximately optimal. Our main results are two learning algorithms that can find a nearly optimal bounded contract using a polynomial number of queries, under two standard assumptions in the literature: a costlier action for the agent leads to a better outcome distribution for the principal, and the agent's cost/effort has diminishing returns. Our polynomial query complexity upper bound shows that standard assumptions are sufficient for achieving an exponential improvement upon the known lower bound for general instances. Unlike the existing algorithms, which relied on discretizing the contract space, our algorithms directly learn the underlying outcome distributions. As for the approximate optimality of bounded contracts, we find that they could be far from optimal in terms of multiplicative or additive approximation, but satisfy a notion of mixed approximation.

Zhijian Duan, Yusen Huo, Tianyu Wang et al.

In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions within specified budget constraints. However, such a problem is challenging due to the complex bidding environment faced by diverse advertisers. To address this challenge, we introduce ABPlanner, a few-shot adaptable budget planner designed to improve budget-constrained auto-bidding. ABPlanner is based on a hierarchical bidding framework that decomposes the bidding process into shorter, manageable stages. Within this framework, ABPlanner allocates the budget across all stages, allowing a low-level auto-bidder to bids based on the budget allocation plan. The adaptability of ABPlanner is achieved through a sequential decision-making approach, inspired by in-context reinforcement learning. For each advertiser, ABPlanner adjusts the budget allocation plan episode by episode, using data from previous episodes as prompt for current decisions. This enables ABPlanner to quickly adapt to different advertisers with few-shot data, providing a sample-efficient solution. Extensive simulation experiments and real-world A/B testing validate the effectiveness of ABPlanner, demonstrating its capability to enhance the cumulative value achieved by auto-bidders.

Yuanze Hu, Zhaoxin Fan, Xinyu Wang et al.

Lightweight Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are indispensable for resource-constrained applications. The prevailing approach to aligning vision and language models involves freezing both the vision encoder and the language model while training small connector modules. However, this strategy heavily depends on the intrinsic capabilities of the language model, which can be suboptimal for lightweight models with limited representational capacity. In this work, we investigate this alignment bottleneck through the lens of mutual information, demonstrating that the constrained capacity of the language model inherently limits the Effective Mutual Information (EMI) between multimodal inputs and outputs, thereby compromising alignment quality. To address this challenge, we propose TinyAlign, a novel framework inspired by Retrieval-Augmented Generation, which strategically retrieves relevant context from a memory bank to enrich multimodal inputs and enhance their alignment. Extensive empirical evaluations reveal that TinyAlign significantly reduces training loss, accelerates convergence, and enhances task performance. Remarkably, it allows models to achieve baseline-level performance with only 40\% of the fine-tuning data, highlighting exceptional data efficiency. Our work thus offers a practical pathway for developing more capable lightweight VLMs while introducing a fresh theoretical lens to better understand and address alignment bottlenecks in constrained multimodal systems.

Jiahao Zhang, Tao Lin, Weiqiang Zheng et al. · harvard, pku

In this paper, we investigate a problem of actively learning threshold in latent space, where the unknown reward $g(γ, v)$ depends on the proposed threshold $γ$ and latent value $v$ and it can be $only$ achieved if the threshold is lower than or equal to the unknown latent value. This problem has broad applications in practical scenarios, e.g., reserve price optimization in online auctions, online task assignments in crowdsourcing, setting recruiting bars in hiring, etc. We first characterize the query complexity of learning a threshold with the expected reward at most $ε$ smaller than the optimum and prove that the number of queries needed can be infinitely large even when $g(γ, v)$ is monotone with respect to both $γ$ and $v$. On the positive side, we provide a tight query complexity $\tildeΘ(1/ε^3)$ when $g$ is monotone and the CDF of value distribution is Lipschitz. Moreover, we show a tight $\tildeΘ(1/ε^3)$ query complexity can be achieved as long as $g$ satisfies one-sided Lipschitzness, which provides a complete characterization for this problem. Finally, we extend this model to an online learning setting and demonstrate a tight $Θ(T^{2/3})$ regret bound using continuous-arm bandit techniques and the aforementioned query complexity results.

Xiaotie Deng, Hanyu Li

We argue that AI's future requires more than scaling. To unlock genuine discovery, large language models need a compass: human-crafted symbols to guide their powerful but blind intuition.

Hanyu Li, Dongchen Li, Xiaotie Deng

Algorithm design and analysis is a cornerstone of computer science, but it confronts a major challenge. Proving an algorithm's performance guarantee across all inputs has traditionally required extensive and often error-prone human effort. While AI has shown great success in finding solutions to specific problem instances, automating the discovery of general algorithms with such provable guarantees has remained a significant barrier. This challenge stems from the difficulty of integrating the creative process of algorithm design with the rigorous process of formal analysis. To address this gap, we propose LegoNE, a framework that tightly fuses these two processes for the fundamental and notoriously difficult problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria. LegoNE automatically translates any algorithm written by a simple Python-like language into a constrained optimization problem. Solving this problem derives and proves the algorithm's approximation bound. Using LegoNE, a state-of-the-art large language model rediscovered the state-of-the-art algorithm for two-player games within hours, a feat that had taken human researchers 15 years to achieve. For three-player games, the model discovered a novel algorithm surpassing all existing human-designed ones. This work demonstrates a new human-machine collaborative paradigm for theoretical science: humans reason at a higher-abstract level, using symbols to compress the search space, and AI explores within it, achieving what neither could alone.

Yunxuan Ma, Siqiang Wang, Zhijian Duan et al.

This paper introduces TEDI (Truthful, Expressive, and Dimension-Insensitive approach), a discretization-free algorithm to learn truthful and utility-maximizing mechanisms. Existing learning-based approaches often rely on discretization of outcome spaces to ensure truthfulness, which leads to inefficiency with increasing problem size. To address this limitation, we formalize the concept of pricing rules, defined as functions that map outcomes to prices. Based on this concept, we propose a novel menu mechanism, which can be equivalent to a truthful direct mechanism under specific conditions. The core idea of TEDI lies in its parameterization of pricing rules using Partial GroupMax Network, a new network architecture designed to universally approximate partial convex functions. To learn optimal pricing rules, we develop novel training techniques, including covariance trick and continuous sampling, to derive unbiased gradient estimators compatible with first-order optimization. Theoretical analysis establishes that TEDI guarantees truthfulness, full expressiveness, and dimension-insensitivity. Experimental evaluation in the studied auction setting demonstrates that TEDI achieves strong performance, competitive with or exceeding state-of-the-art methods. This work presents the first approaches to learn truthful mechanisms without outcome discretization, thereby enhancing algorithmic efficiency. The proposed concepts, network architecture, and learning techniques might offer potential value and provide new insights for automated mechanism design and differentiable economics.

Yusen Wu, Junwu Xiong, Xiaotie Deng

Expanding the application of large language models (LLMs) to societal life, instead of primary function only as auxiliary assistants to communicate with only one person at a time, necessitates LLMs' capabilities to independently play roles in multi-user, multi-turn social agent tasks within complex social settings. However, currently the capability has not been systematically measured with available benchmarks. To address this gap, we first introduce an agent task leveling framework grounded in sociological principles. Concurrently, we propose a novel benchmark, How Social Is It (we call it HSII below), designed to assess LLM's social capabilities in comprehensive social agents tasks and benchmark representative models. HSII comprises four stages: format parsing, target selection, target switching conversation, and stable conversation, which collectively evaluate the communication and task completion capabilities of LLMs within realistic social interaction scenarios dataset, HSII-Dataset. The dataset is derived step by step from news dataset. We perform an ablation study by doing clustering to the dataset. Additionally, we investigate the impact of chain of thought (COT) method on enhancing LLMs' social performance. Since COT cost more computation, we further introduce a new statistical metric, COT-complexity, to quantify the efficiency of certain LLMs with COTs for specific social tasks and strike a better trade-off between measurement of correctness and efficiency. Various results of our experiments demonstrate that our benchmark is well-suited for evaluating social skills in LLMs.

Jichen Li, Lijia Xie, Hanting Huang et al.

Strategic mining attacks, such as selfish mining, exploit blockchain consensus protocols by deviating from honest behavior to maximize rewards. Markov Decision Process (MDP) analysis faces scalability challenges in modern digital economics, including blockchain. To address these limitations, reinforcement learning (RL) provides a scalable alternative, enabling adaptive strategy optimization in complex dynamic environments. In this survey, we examine RL's role in strategic mining analysis, comparing it to MDP-based approaches. We begin by reviewing foundational MDP models and their limitations, before exploring RL frameworks that can learn near-optimal strategies across various protocols. Building on this analysis, we compare RL techniques and their effectiveness in deriving security thresholds, such as the minimum attacker power required for profitable attacks. Expanding the discussion further, we classify consensus protocols and propose open challenges, such as multi-agent dynamics and real-world validation. This survey highlights the potential of reinforcement learning (RL) to address the challenges of selfish mining, including protocol design, threat detection, and security analysis, while offering a strategic roadmap for researchers in decentralized systems and AI-driven analytics.

Yunxuan Ma, Yide Bian, Hao Xu et al.

Market equilibrium is one of the most fundamental solution concepts in economics and social optimization analysis. Existing works on market equilibrium computation primarily focus on settings with relatively few buyers. Motivated by this, our paper investigates the computation of market equilibrium in scenarios with a large-scale buyer population, where buyers and goods are represented by their contexts. Building on this realistic and generalized contextual market model, we introduce MarketFCNet, a deep learning-based method for approximating market equilibrium. We start by parameterizing the allocation of each good to each buyer using a neural network, which depends solely on the context of the buyer and the good. Next, we propose an efficient method to unbiasedly estimate the loss function of the training algorithm, enabling us to optimize the network parameters through gradient. To evaluate the approximated solution, we propose a metric called Nash Gap, which quantifies the deviation of the given allocation and price pair from the market equilibrium. Experimental results indicate that MarketFCNet delivers competitive performance and significantly lower running times compared to existing methods as the market scale expands, demonstrating the potential of deep learning-based methods to accelerate the approximation of large-scale contextual market equilibrium.

Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia et al.

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, there has been much empirical progress in automated designing such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to the more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, this paper investigates the automated design of deterministic auctions and introduces OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs). Firstly, we restrict our mechanism to deterministic VVCAs, which are inherently DSIC and IR. Afterward, we utilize a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.

Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen et al.

Automated auction design aims to find empirically high-revenue mechanisms through machine learning. Existing works on multi item auction scenarios can be roughly divided into RegretNet-like and affine maximizer auctions (AMAs) approaches. However, the former cannot strictly ensure dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), while the latter faces scalability issue due to the large number of allocation candidates. To address these limitations, we propose AMenuNet, a scalable neural network that constructs the AMA parameters (even including the allocation menu) from bidder and item representations. AMenuNet is always DSIC and individually rational (IR) due to the properties of AMAs, and it enhances scalability by generating candidate allocations through a neural network. Additionally, AMenuNet is permutation equivariant, and its number of parameters is independent of auction scale. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that AMenuNet outperforms strong baselines in both contextual and non-contextual multi-item auctions, scales well to larger auctions, generalizes well to different settings, and identifies useful deterministic allocations. Overall, our proposed approach offers an effective solution to automated DSIC auction design, with improved scalability and strong revenue performance in various settings.

Mengqian Zhang, Yuhao Li, Jichen Li et al.

The selfish mining attack, arguably the most famous game-theoretic attack in blockchain, indicates that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. Most subsequent works mainly focus on strengthening the selfish mining strategy, thus enabling a single strategic agent more likely to deviate. In sharp contrast, little attention has been paid to the resistant behavior against the selfish mining attack, let alone further equilibrium analysis for miners and mining pools in the blockchain as a multi-agent system. In this paper, first, we propose a strategy called insightful mining to counteract selfish mining. By infiltrating an undercover miner into the selfish pool, the insightful pool could acquire the number of its hidden blocks. We prove that, with this extra insight, the utility of the insightful pool could be strictly greater than the selfish pool's when they have the same mining power. Then we investigate the mining game where all pools can either choose to be honest or take the insightful mining strategy. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of this mining game, and derive three corollaries: (a) each mining game has a pure Nash equilibrium; (b) honest mining is a Nash equilibrium if the largest mining pool has a fraction of mining power no more than 1/3; (c) there are at most two insightful pools under equilibrium no matter how the mining power is distributed.

Zhijian Duan, Jingwu Tang, Yutong Yin et al.

One of the central problems in auction design is developing an incentive-compatible mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's expected revenue. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, recently, there has been much progress on finding the optimal mechanism through deep learning. However, these works either focus on a fixed set of bidders and items, or restrict the auction to be symmetric. In this work, we overcome such limitations by factoring \emph{public} contextual information of bidders and items into the auction learning framework. We propose $\mathtt{CITransNet}$, a context-integrated transformer-based neural network for optimal auction design, which maintains permutation-equivariance over bids and contexts while being able to find asymmetric solutions. We show by extensive experiments that $\mathtt{CITransNet}$ can recover the known optimal solutions in single-item settings, outperform strong baselines in multi-item auctions, and generalize well to cases other than those in training.

Mengqian Zhang, Jichen Li, Zhaohua Chen et al.

Nowadays, sharding is deemed as a promising way to save traditional blockchain protocols from their low scalability. However, such technique also brings several potential risks and huge communication overheads. An improper design may give rise to the inconsistent state among different committees. Further, the communication overheads arising from cross-shard transactions unfortunately reduce the system's performance. In this paper, we first summarize five essential issues that all sharding blockchain designers face. For each issue, we discuss its key challenge and propose our suggested solutions. In order to break the performance bottlenecks, we propose a reputation mechanism for selecting leaders. The term of reputation in our design reflects each node's honest computation resources. In addition, we introduce a referee committee and partial sets in each committee, and design a recovery procedure in case the leader is malicious. Under the design, we prove that malicious leaders will not hurt the system and will be evicted. Furthermore, we conduct a series of simulations to evaluate our design. The results show that selecting leaders by the reputation can dramatically improve the system performance.

Xiaotie Deng, Xinyan Hu, Tao Lin et al.

The convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a timely and important question, with numerous applications in, e.g., online advertising markets. This work focuses on repeated first-price auctions where bidders with fixed values learn to bid using mean-based algorithms -- a large class of online learning algorithms that include popular no-regret algorithms such as Multiplicative Weights Update and Follow the Perturbed Leader. We completely characterize the learning dynamics of mean-based algorithms, under two notions of convergence: (1) time-average: the fraction of rounds where bidders play a Nash equilibrium converges to 1; (2) last-iterate: the mixed strategy profile of bidders converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, the results depend on the number of bidders with the highest value: - If the number is at least three, the dynamics almost surely converges to a Nash equilibrium of the auction, in both time-average and last-iterate. - If the number is two, the dynamics almost surely converges to a Nash equilibrium in time-average but not necessarily last-iterate. - If the number is one, the dynamics may not converge to a Nash equilibrium in time-average or last-iterate. Our discovery opens up new possibilities in the study of the convergence of learning dynamics.

Xiaotie Deng, Ningyuan Li, David Mguni et al.

Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive that computing an approximate Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in a finite-state discounted Stochastic Game within the exponential precision is \textbf{PPAD}-complete. We adopt a function with a polynomially bounded description in the strategy space to convert the MPE computation to a fixed-point problem, even though the stochastic game may demand an exponential number of pure strategies, in the number of states, for each agent. The completeness result follows the reduction of the fixed-point problem to {\sc End of the Line}. Our results indicate that finding an MPE in SGs is highly unlikely to be \textbf{NP}-hard unless \textbf{NP}=\textbf{co-NP}. Our work offers confidence for MARL research to study MPE computation on general-sum SGs and to develop fruitful algorithms as currently on zero-sum SGs.

Zhijian Duan, Wenhan Huang, Dinghuai Zhang et al.

In this paper, we investigate the learnability of the function approximator that approximates Nash equilibrium (NE) for games generated from a distribution. First, we offer a generalization bound using the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning model. The bound describes the gap between the expected loss and empirical loss of the NE approximator. Afterward, we prove the agnostic PAC learnability of the Nash approximator. In addition to theoretical analysis, we demonstrate an application of NE approximator in experiments. The trained NE approximator can be used to warm-start and accelerate classical NE solvers. Together, our results show the practicability of approximating NE through function approximation.

Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin et al.

The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important price learning algorithms in auction design: as the literature shows it can learn approximately optimal reserve prices for revenue-maximizing auctioneers in both repeated auctions and uniform-price auctions. However, in these applications the agents who provide inputs to ERM have incentives to manipulate the inputs to lower the outputted price. We generalize the definition of an incentive-awareness measure proposed by Lavi et al (2019), to quantify the reduction of ERM's outputted price due to a change of $m\ge 1$ out of $N$ input samples, and provide specific convergence rates of this measure to zero as $N$ goes to infinity for different types of input distributions. By adopting this measure, we construct an efficient, approximately incentive-compatible, and revenue-optimal learning algorithm using ERM in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, and show approximate group incentive-compatibility in uniform-price auctions.

Hongyin Chen, Zhaohua Chen, Yukun Cheng et al.

The design of permissioned blockchains places an access control requirement for members to read, access, and write information over the blockchains. In this paper, we study a hierarchical scenario to include three types of participants: providers, collectors, and governors. To be specific, providers forward transactions, collected from terminals, to collectors; collectors upload received transactions to governors after verifying and labeling them; and governors validate a part of received labeled transactions, pack valid ones into a block, and append a new block on the ledger. Collectors in the hierarchical model play a crucial role in the design: they have connections with both providers and governors, and are responsible for collecting, verifying, and uploading transactions. However, collectors are rational and some of them may behave maliciously (not necessarily for their own benefits). In this paper, we introduce a reputation protocol as a measure of the reliability of collectors in the permissioned blockchain environment. Its objective is to encourage collectors to behave truthfully and, in addition, to reduce the verification cost. The verification cost on provider $p$ is defined as the total number of invalid transactions provided by $p$ and checked by governors. Through theoretical analysis, our protocol with the reputation mechanism has a significant improvement in efficiency. Specifically, the verification loss that governors suffer is proved to be asymptotically $O(\sqrt{T_{total}})$ ($T_{total}$, representing the number of transactions verified by governors and provided by $p$), as long as there exists at least one collector who behaves well. At last, two typical cases where our model can be well applied are also demonstrated.

Mengqian Zhang, Jichen Li, Zhaohua Chen et al.

Traditional public distributed ledgers have not been able to scale-out well and work efficiently. Sharding is deemed as a promising way to solve this problem. By partitioning all nodes into small committees and letting them work in parallel, we can significantly lower the amount of communication and computation, reduce the overhead on each node's storage, as well as enhance the throughput of the distributed ledger. Existing sharding-based protocols still suffer from several serious drawbacks. The first thing is that all non-faulty nodes must connect well with each other, which demands a huge number of communication channels in the network. Moreover, previous protocols have faced great loss in efficiency in the case where the honesty of each committee's leader is in question. At the same time, no explicit incentive is provided for nodes to actively participate in the protocol. We present CycLedger, a scalable and secure parallel protocol for distributed ledger via sharding. Our protocol selects a leader and a partial set for each committee, who are in charge of maintaining intra-shard consensus and communicating with other committees, to reduce the amortized complexity of communication, computation, and storage on all nodes. We introduce a novel semi-commitment scheme between committees and a recovery procedure to prevent the system from crashing even when leaders of committees are malicious. To add incentive for the network, we use the concept of reputation, which measures each node's trusty computing power. As nodes with a higher reputation receive more rewards, there is an encouragement for nodes with strong computing ability to work honestly to gain reputation. In this way, we strike out a new path to establish scalability, security, and incentive for the sharding-based distributed ledger.

Chenchen Li, Xiang Yan, Xiaotie Deng et al.

Uplift modeling aims to directly model the incremental impact of a treatment on an individual response. In this work, we address the problem from a new angle and reformulate it as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We conducted extensive experiments on both a synthetic dataset and real-world scenarios, and showed that our method can achieve significant improvement over previous methods.

Chenchen Li, Jialin Wang, Hongwei Wang et al.

User emotion analysis toward videos is to automatically recognize the general emotional status of viewers from the multimedia content embedded in the online video stream. Existing works fall in two categories: 1) visual-based methods, which focus on visual content and extract a specific set of features of videos. However, it is generally hard to learn a mapping function from low-level video pixels to high-level emotion space due to great intra-class variance. 2) textual-based methods, which focus on the investigation of user-generated comments associated with videos. The learned word representations by traditional linguistic approaches typically lack emotion information and the global comments usually reflect viewers' high-level understandings rather than instantaneous emotions. To address these limitations, in this paper, we propose to jointly utilize video content and user-generated texts simultaneously for emotion analysis. In particular, we introduce exploiting a new type of user-generated texts, i.e., "danmu", which are real-time comments floating on the video and contain rich information to convey viewers' emotional opinions. To enhance the emotion discriminativeness of words in textual feature extraction, we propose Emotional Word Embedding (EWE) to learn text representations by jointly considering their semantics and emotions. Afterwards, we propose a novel visual-textual emotion analysis model with Deep Coupled Video and Danmu Neural networks (DCVDN), in which visual and textual features are synchronously extracted and fused to form a comprehensive representation by deep-canonically-correlated-autoencoder-based multi-view learning. Through extensive experiments on a self-crawled real-world video-danmu dataset, we prove that DCVDN significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art baselines.

Chenchen Li, Xiang Yan, Xiaotie Deng et al.

Internet market makers are always facing intense competitive environment, where personalized price reductions or discounted coupons are provided for attracting more customers. Participants in such a price war scenario have to invest a lot to catch up with other competitors. However, such a huge cost of money may not always lead to an improvement of market share. This is mainly due to a lack of information about others' strategies or customers' willingness when participants develop their strategies. In order to obtain this hidden information through observable data, we study the relationship between companies and customers in the Internet price war. Theoretically, we provide a formalization of the problem as a stochastic game with imperfect and incomplete information. Then we develop a variant of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to infer latent variables under the current market environment, which represents the preferences of customers and strategies of competitors. To our best knowledge, it is the first time that LDA is applied to game scenario. We conduct simulated experiments where our LDA model exhibits a significant improvement on finding strategies in the Internet price war by including all available market information of the market maker's competitors. And the model is applied to an open dataset for real business. Through comparisons on the likelihood of prediction for users' behavior and distribution distance between inferred opponent's strategy and the real one, our model is shown to be able to provide a better understanding for the market environment. Our work marks a successful learning method to infer latent information in the environment of price war by the LDA modeling, and sets an example for related competitive applications to follow.