6.8CRApr 24, 2019
Security Analysis of Near-Field Communication (NFC) PaymentsDennis Giese, Kevin Liu, Michael Sun et al.
Near-Field Communication (NFC) is a modern technology for short range communication with a variety of applications ranging from physical access control to contactless payments. These applications are often heralded as being more secure, as they require close physical proximity and do not involve Wi-Fi or mobile networks. However, these systems are still vulnerable to security attacks at the time of transaction, as they require little to no additional authentication from the user's end. In this paper, we propose a method to attack mobile-based NFC payment methods and make payments at locations far away from where the attack occurs. We evaluate our methods on our personal Apple and Google Pay accounts and demonstrate two successful attacks on these NFC payment systems.
5.9GTFeb 14, 2019
The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling ApproachGuy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Aleksandrs Slivkins et al.
We empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition. Systems that learn from interactions with users often engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal decisions in order to acquire new information for future decisions. However, when multiple systems are competing for the same market of users, exploration may hurt a system's reputation in the near term, with adverse competitive effects. In particular, a system may enter a "death spiral", when the short-term reputation cost decreases the number of users for the system to learn from, which degrades its performance relative to competition and further decreases its market share. We ask whether better exploration algorithms are incentivized under competition. We run extensive numerical experiments in a stylized duopoly model in which two firms deploy multi-armed bandit algorithms and compete for myopic users. We find that duopoly and monopoly tend to favor a primitive "greedy algorithm" that does not explore and leads to low consumer welfare, whereas a temporary monopoly (a duopoly with an early entrant) may incentivize better bandit algorithms and lead to higher consumer welfare. Our findings shed light on the first-mover advantage in the digital economy by exploring the role that data can play as a barrier to entry in online markets.