Kyle Cox

Kyle Cox, Darius Kianersi, Adrià Garriga-Alonso

As chain-of-thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness -- whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with 0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction flips model answers in over 50% of cases, significantly exceeding orthogonal baselines. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions) and confabulation (fabricating false premises). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.

Chi-Yang Hsu, Kyle Cox, Jiawei Xu et al.

We present the Thought Graph as a novel framework to support complex reasoning and use gene set analysis as an example to uncover semantic relationships between biological processes. Our framework stands out for its ability to provide a deeper understanding of gene sets, significantly surpassing GSEA by 40.28% and LLM baselines by 5.38% based on cosine similarity to human annotations. Our analysis further provides insights into future directions of biological processes naming, and implications for bioinformatics and precision medicine.

Kyle Cox, Jiawei Xu, Yikun Han et al.

An interesting behavior in large language models (LLMs) is prompt sensitivity. When provided with different but semantically equivalent versions of the same prompt, models may produce very different distributions of answers. This suggests that the uncertainty reflected in a model's output distribution for one prompt may not reflect the model's uncertainty about the meaning of the prompt. We model prompt sensitivity as a type of generalization error, and show that sampling across the semantic ``concept space'' with paraphrasing perturbations improves uncertainty calibration without compromising accuracy. Additionally, we introduce a new metric for uncertainty decomposition in black-box LLMs that improves upon entropy-based decomposition by modeling semantic continuities in natural language generation. We show that this decomposition metric can be used to quantify how much LLM uncertainty is attributed to prompt sensitivity. Our work introduces a new way to improve uncertainty calibration in prompt-sensitive language models, and provides evidence that some LLMs fail to exhibit consistent general reasoning about the meanings of their inputs.