Yu Bai

Ziang Song, Song Mei, Yu Bai

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample complexity for finding a Nash equilibrium in general-sum games scales exponentially in the number of players due to the size of the joint action space, and there is a matching exponential lower bound. This paper investigates what learning goals admit better sample complexities in the setting of $m$-player general-sum Markov games with $H$ steps, $S$ states, and $A_i$ actions per player. First, we design algorithms for learning an $ε$-Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) in $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^5S\max_{i\le m} A_i / ε^2)$ episodes, and an $ε$-Correlated Equilibrium (CE) in $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^6S\max_{i\le m} A_i^2 / ε^2)$ episodes. This is the first line of results for learning CCE and CE with sample complexities polynomial in $\max_{i\le m} A_i$. Our algorithm for learning CE integrates an adversarial bandit subroutine which minimizes a weighted swap regret, along with several novel designs in the outer loop. Second, we consider the important special case of Markov Potential Games, and design an algorithm that learns an $ε$-approximate Nash equilibrium within $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(S\sum_{i\le m} A_i / ε^3)$ episodes (when only highlighting the dependence on $S$, $A_i$, and $ε$), which only depends linearly in $\sum_{i\le m} A_i$ and significantly improves over existing efficient algorithm in the $ε$ dependence. Overall, our results shed light on what equilibria or structural assumptions on the game may enable sample-efficient learning with many players.

Zitong Yang, Yu Bai, Song Mei

Recent work showed that there could be a large gap between the classical uniform convergence bound and the actual test error of zero-training-error predictors (interpolators) such as deep neural networks. To better understand this gap, we study the uniform convergence in the nonlinear random feature model and perform a precise theoretical analysis on how uniform convergence depends on the sample size and the number of parameters. We derive and prove analytical expressions for three quantities in this model: 1) classical uniform convergence over norm balls, 2) uniform convergence over interpolators in the norm ball (recently proposed by Zhou et al. (2020)), and 3) the risk of minimum norm interpolator. We show that, in the setting where the classical uniform convergence bound is vacuous (diverges to $\infty$), uniform convergence over the interpolators still gives a non-trivial bound of the test error of interpolating solutions. We also showcase a different setting where classical uniform convergence bound is non-vacuous, but uniform convergence over interpolators can give an improved sample complexity guarantee. Our result provides a first exact comparison between the test errors and uniform convergence bounds for interpolators beyond simple linear models.

Yu Bai, Chi Jin, Huan Wang et al.

Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different reward functions, thus the game is general-sum. The majority of existing results in this field focuses on either symmetric solution concepts (e.g. Nash equilibrium) or zero-sum games. It remains open how to learn the Stackelberg equilibrium -- an asymmetric analog of the Nash equilibrium -- in general-sum games efficiently from noisy samples. This paper initiates the theoretical study of sample-efficient learning of the Stackelberg equilibrium, in the bandit feedback setting where we only observe noisy samples of the reward. We consider three representative two-player general-sum games: bandit games, bandit-reinforcement learning (bandit-RL) games, and linear bandit games. In all these games, we identify a fundamental gap between the exact value of the Stackelberg equilibrium and its estimated version using finitely many noisy samples, which can not be closed information-theoretically regardless of the algorithm. We then establish sharp positive results on sample-efficient learning of Stackelberg equilibrium with value optimal up to the gap identified above, with matching lower bounds in the dependency on the gap, error tolerance, and the size of the action spaces. Overall, our results unveil unique challenges in learning Stackelberg equilibria under noisy bandit feedback, which we hope could shed light on future research on this topic.

Qinghua Liu, Tiancheng Yu, Yu Bai et al.

Model-based algorithms -- algorithms that explore the environment through building and utilizing an estimated model -- are widely used in reinforcement learning practice and theoretically shown to achieve optimal sample efficiency for single-agent reinforcement learning in Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). However, for multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, the current best known sample complexity for model-based algorithms is rather suboptimal and compares unfavorably against recent model-free approaches. In this paper, we present a sharp analysis of model-based self-play algorithms for multi-agent Markov games. We design an algorithm -- Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI) for two-player zero-sum Markov games that is able to output an $ε$-approximate Nash policy in $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^3SAB/ε^2)$ episodes of game playing, where $S$ is the number of states, $A,B$ are the number of actions for the two players respectively, and $H$ is the horizon length. This significantly improves over the best known model-based guarantee of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^4S^2AB/ε^2)$, and is the first that matches the information-theoretic lower bound $Ω(H^3S(A+B)/ε^2)$ except for a $\min\{A,B\}$ factor. In addition, our guarantee compares favorably against the best known model-free algorithm if $\min \{A,B\}=o(H^3)$, and outputs a single Markov policy while existing sample-efficient model-free algorithms output a nested mixture of Markov policies that is in general non-Markov and rather inconvenient to store and execute. We further adapt our analysis to designing a provably efficient task-agnostic algorithm for zero-sum Markov games, and designing the first line of provably sample-efficient algorithms for multi-player general-sum Markov games.

Ming Yin, Yu Bai, Yu-Xiang Wang

The problem of Offline Policy Evaluation (OPE) in Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a critical step towards applying RL in real-life applications. Existing work on OPE mostly focus on evaluating a fixed target policy $π$, which does not provide useful bounds for offline policy learning as $π$ will then be data-dependent. We address this problem by simultaneously evaluating all policies in a policy class $Π$ -- uniform convergence in OPE -- and obtain nearly optimal error bounds for a number of global / local policy classes. Our results imply that the model-based planning achieves an optimal episode complexity of $\widetilde{O}(H^3/d_mε^2)$ in identifying an $ε$-optimal policy under the time-inhomogeneous episodic MDP model ($H$ is the planning horizon, $d_m$ is a quantity that reflects the exploration of the logging policy $μ$). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the optimal rate is shown to be possible for the offline RL setting and the paper is the first that systematically investigates the uniform convergence in OPE.

Yu Bai, Chi Jin, Tiancheng Yu

This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by playing against itself without any direct supervision. In a tabular episodic Markov game with $S$ states, $A$ max-player actions and $B$ min-player actions, the best existing algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium requires $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(S^2AB)$ steps of game playing, when only highlighting the dependency on $(S,A,B)$. In contrast, the best existing lower bound scales as $Ω(S(A+B))$ and has a significant gap from the upper bound. This paper closes this gap for the first time: we propose an optimistic variant of the \emph{Nash Q-learning} algorithm with sample complexity $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(SAB)$, and a new \emph{Nash V-learning} algorithm with sample complexity $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(S(A+B))$. The latter result matches the information-theoretic lower bound in all problem-dependent parameters except for a polynomial factor of the length of each episode. In addition, we present a computational hardness result for learning the best responses against a fixed opponent in Markov games---a learning objective different from finding the Nash equilibrium.

Yu Bai, Chi Jin

Self-play, where the algorithm learns by playing against itself without requiring any direct supervision, has become the new weapon in modern Reinforcement Learning (RL) for achieving superhuman performance in practice. However, the majority of exisiting theory in reinforcement learning only applies to the setting where the agent plays against a fixed environment; it remains largely open whether self-play algorithms can be provably effective, especially when it is necessary to manage the exploration/exploitation tradeoff. We study self-play in competitive reinforcement learning under the setting of Markov games, a generalization of Markov decision processes to the two-player case. We introduce a self-play algorithm---Value Iteration with Upper/Lower Confidence Bound (VI-ULCB)---and show that it achieves regret $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ after playing $T$ steps of the game, where the regret is measured by the agent's performance against a \emph{fully adversarial} opponent who can exploit the agent's strategy at \emph{any} step. We also introduce an explore-then-exploit style algorithm, which achieves a slightly worse regret of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$, but is guaranteed to run in polynomial time even in the worst case. To the best of our knowledge, our work presents the first line of provably sample-efficient self-play algorithms for competitive reinforcement learning.

Yu Bai, Jason D. Lee

Recent theoretical work has established connections between over-parametrized neural networks and linearized models governed by he Neural Tangent Kernels (NTKs). NTK theory leads to concrete convergence and generalization results, yet the empirical performance of neural networks are observed to exceed their linearized models, suggesting insufficiency of this theory. Towards closing this gap, we investigate the training of over-parametrized neural networks that are beyond the NTK regime yet still governed by the Taylor expansion of the network. We bring forward the idea of \emph{randomizing} the neural networks, which allows them to escape their NTK and couple with quadratic models. We show that the optimization landscape of randomized two-layer networks are nice and amenable to escaping-saddle algorithms. We prove concrete generalization and expressivity results on these randomized networks, which lead to sample complexity bounds (of learning certain simple functions) that match the NTK and can in addition be better by a dimension factor when mild distributional assumptions are present. We demonstrate that our randomization technique can be generalized systematically beyond the quadratic case, by using it to find networks that are coupled with higher-order terms in their Taylor series.