Lei Zhang

Sucheng Ren, Xianhang Li, Haoqin Tu et al.

The vision community has started to build with the recently developed state space model, Mamba, as the new backbone for a range of tasks. This paper shows that Mamba's visual capability can be significantly enhanced through autoregressive pretraining, a direction not previously explored. Efficiency-wise, the autoregressive nature can well capitalize on the Mamba's unidirectional recurrent structure, enabling faster overall training speed compared to other training strategies like mask modeling. Performance-wise, autoregressive pretraining equips the Mamba architecture with markedly higher accuracy over its supervised-trained counterparts and, more importantly, successfully unlocks its scaling potential to large and even huge model sizes. For example, with autoregressive pretraining, a base-size Mamba attains 83.2\% ImageNet accuracy, outperforming its supervised counterpart by 2.0\%; our huge-size Mamba, the largest Vision Mamba to date, attains 85.0\% ImageNet accuracy (85.5\% when finetuned with $384\times384$ inputs), notably surpassing all other Mamba variants in vision. The code is available at \url{https://github.com/OliverRensu/ARM}.

Mukesh Ghimire, Lei Zhang, Zhe Xu et al.

We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his payoff without violating the constraints, while that of Player 2 is to violate the state constraints if possible, or to maximize the payoff otherwise. One example of the game is a man-to-man matchup in football. Without state constraints, Cardaliaguet (2007) showed that the value of such a game exists and is convex to the common belief of players. Our theoretical contribution is an extension of this result to games with state constraints and the derivation of the primal and dual subdynamic principles necessary for computing behavioral strategies. Different from existing works that are concerned about the scalability of no-regret learning in games with discrete dynamics, our study reveals the underlying structure of strategies for belief manipulation resulting from information asymmetry and state constraints. This structure will be necessary for scalable learning on games with continuous actions and long time windows. We use a simplified football game to demonstrate the utility of this work, where we reveal player positions and belief states in which the attacker should (or should not) play specific random deceptive moves to take advantage of information asymmetry, and compute how the defender should respond.