Guanhua Wang

Guanhua Wang, Heyang Qin, Sam Ade Jacobs et al.

Zero Redundancy Optimizer (ZeRO) has been used to train a wide range of large language models on massive GPUs clusters due to its ease of use, efficiency, and good scalability. However, when training on low-bandwidth clusters, or at scale which forces batch size per GPU to be small, ZeRO's effective throughput is limited because of high communication volume from gathering weights in forward pass, backward pass, and averaging gradients. This paper introduces three communication volume reduction techniques, which we collectively refer to as ZeRO++, targeting each of the communication collectives in ZeRO. First is block-quantization based all-gather. Second is data remapping that trades-off communication for more memory. Third is a novel all-to-all based quantized gradient averaging paradigm as replacement of reduce-scatter collective, which preserves accuracy despite communicating low precision data. Collectively, ZeRO++ reduces communication volume of ZeRO by 4x, enabling up to 2.16x better throughput at 384 GPU scale.

Guanhua Wang, Shivaram Venkataraman, Amar Phanishayee et al.

Model parameter synchronization across GPUs introduces high overheads for data-parallel training at scale. Existing parameter synchronization protocols cannot effectively leverage available network resources in the face of ever increasing hardware heterogeneity. To address this, we propose Blink, a collective communication library that dynamically generates optimal communication primitives by packing spanning trees. We propose techniques to minimize the number of trees generated and extend Blink to leverage heterogeneous communication channels for faster data transfers. Evaluations show that compared to the state-of-the-art (NCCL), Blink can achieve up to 8x faster model synchronization, and reduce end-to-end training time for image classification tasks by up to 40%.

Guanhua Wang, Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Arnab Kumar Biswas et al.

Spectre attacks disclosed in early 2018 expose data leakage scenarios via cache side channels. Specifically, speculatively executed paths due to branch mis-prediction may bring secret data into the cache which are then exposed via cache side channels even after the speculative execution is squashed. Symbolic execution is a well-known test generation method to cover program paths at the level of the application software. In this paper, we extend symbolic execution with modelingof cache and speculative execution. Our tool KLEESPECTRE, built on top of the KLEE symbolic execution engine, can thus provide a testing engine to check for the data leakage through cache side-channel as shown via Spectre attacks. Our symbolic cache model can verify whether the sensitive data leakage due to speculative execution can be observed by an attacker at a given program point. Our experiments show that KLEESPECTREcan effectively detect data leakage along speculatively executed paths and our cache model can further make the leakage detection much more precise.

Guanhua Wang, Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Ivan Gotovchits et al.

The Spectre vulnerability in modern processors has been widely reported. The key insight in this vulnerability is that speculative execution in processors can be misused to access the secrets. Subsequently, even though the speculatively executed instructions are squashed, the secret may linger in micro-architectural states such as cache, and can potentially be accessed by an attacker via side channels. In this paper, we propose oo7, a static analysis approach that can mitigate Spectre attacks by detecting potentially vulnerable code snippets in program binaries and protecting them against the attack by patching them. Our key contribution is to balance the concerns of effectiveness, analysis time and run-time overheads. We employ control flow extraction, taint analysis, and address analysis to detect tainted conditional branches and speculative memory accesses. oo7 can detect all fifteen purpose-built Spectre-vulnerable code patterns, whereas Microsoft compiler with Spectre mitigation option can only detect two of them. We also report the results of a large-scale study on applying oo7 to over 500 program binaries (average binary size 261 KB) from different real-world projects. We protect programs against Spectre attack by selectively inserting fences only at vulnerable conditional branches to prevent speculative execution. Our approach is experimentally observed to incur around 5.9% performance overheads on SPECint benchmarks.