Yiding Feng

Shipra Agrawal, Yiding Feng, Wei Tang

We consider a novel pricing and advertising framework, where a seller not only sets product price but also designs flexible 'advertising schemes' to influence customers' valuation of the product. We impose no structural restriction on the seller's feasible advertising strategies and allow her to advertise the product by disclosing or concealing any information. Following the literature in information design, this fully flexible advertising can be modeled as the seller being able to choose any information policy that signals the product quality/characteristic to the customers. Customers observe the advertising signal and infer a Bayesian belief over the products. We aim to investigate two questions in this work: (1) What is the value of advertising? To what extent can advertising enhance a seller's revenue? (2) Without any apriori knowledge of the customers' demand function, how can a seller adaptively learn and optimize both pricing and advertising strategies using past purchase responses? To study the first question, we introduce and study the value of advertising - a revenue gap between using advertising vs not advertising, and we provide a crisp tight characterization for this notion for a broad family of problems. For the second question, we study the seller's dynamic pricing and advertising problem with demand uncertainty. Our main result for this question is a computationally efficient online algorithm that achieves an optimal $O(T^{2/3}(m\log T)^{1/3})$ regret rate when the valuation function is linear in the product quality. Here $m$ is the cardinality of the discrete product quality domain and $T$ is the time horizon. This result requires some mild regularity assumptions on the valuation function, but no Lipschitz or smoothness assumption on the customers' demand function. We also obtain several improved results for the widely considered special case of additive valuations.

Yiding Feng, Wei Tang

We introduce and study the persuasive calibration problem, where a principal aims to provide trustworthy predictions about underlying events to a downstream agent to make desired decisions. We adopt the standard calibration framework that regulates predictions to be unbiased conditional on their own value, and thus, they can reliably be interpreted at the face value by the agent. Allowing a small calibration error budget, we aim to answer the following question: what is and how to compute the optimal predictor under this calibration error budget, especially when there exists incentive misalignment between the principal and the agent? We focus on standard Lt-norm Expected Calibration Error (ECE) metric. We develop a general framework by viewing predictors as post-processed versions of perfectly calibrated predictors. Using this framework, we first characterize the structure of the optimal predictor. Specifically, when the principal's utility is event-independent and for L1-norm ECE, we show: (1) the optimal predictor is over-(resp. under-) confident for high (resp. low) true expected outcomes, while remaining perfectly calibrated in the middle; (2) the miscalibrated predictions exhibit a collinearity structure with the principal's utility function. On the algorithmic side, we provide a FPTAS for computing approximately optimal predictor for general principal utility and general Lt-norm ECE. Moreover, for the L1- and L-Infinity-norm ECE, we provide polynomial-time algorithms that compute the exact optimal predictor.

Yiding Feng, Jiashuo Jiang, Yige Wang

We study online resource allocation under non-stationary demand with a minimum offline data requirement. In this problem, a decision-maker must allocate multiple types of resources to sequentially arriving queries over a finite horizon. Each query belongs to a finite set of types with fixed resource consumption and a stochastic reward drawn from an unknown, type-specific distribution. Critically, the environment exhibits arbitrary non-stationarity -- arrival distributions may shift unpredictably-while the algorithm requires only one historical sample per period to operate effectively. We distinguish two settings based on sample informativeness: (i) reward-observed samples containing both query type and reward realization, and (ii) the more challenging type-only samples revealing only query type information. We propose a novel type-dependent quantile-based meta-policy that decouples the problem into modular components: reward distribution estimation, optimization of target service probabilities via fluid relaxation, and real-time decisions through dynamic acceptance thresholds. For reward-observed samples, our static threshold policy achieves $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret. For type-only samples, we first establish that sublinear regret is impossible without additional structure; under a mild minimum-arrival-probability assumption, we design both a partially adaptive policy attaining the same $\tilde{O}({T})$ bound and, more significantly, a fully adaptive resolving policy with careful rounding that achieves the first poly-logarithmic regret guarantee of $O((\log T)^3)$ for non-stationary multi-resource allocation. Our framework advances prior work by operating with minimal offline data (one sample per period), handling arbitrary non-stationarity without variation-budget assumptions, and supporting multiple resource constraints.

Yiding Feng, Vahideh Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh et al.

We consider a natural dynamic staffing problem in which a decision-maker sequentially hires workers over a finite horizon to meet an unknown demand revealed at the end. Predictions about demand arrive over time and become increasingly accurate, while worker availability decreases. This creates a fundamental trade-off between hiring early to avoid understaffing (when workers are more available but forecasts are less reliable) and hiring late to avoid overstaffing (when forecasts are more accurate but availability is lower). This problem is motivated by last-mile delivery operations, where companies such as Amazon rely on gig-economy workers whose availability declines closer to the operating day. To address practical limitations of Bayesian models (in particular, to remain agnostic to the underlying forecasting method), we study this problem under adversarial predictions. In this model, sequential predictions are adversarially chosen uncertainty intervals that (approximately) contain the true demand. The objective is to minimize worst-case staffing imbalance cost. Our main result is a simple and computationally efficient online algorithm that is minimax optimal. We first characterize the minimax cost against a restricted adversary via a polynomial-size linear program, then show how to emulate this solution in the general case. While our base model focuses on a single demand, we extend the framework to multiple demands (with egalitarian/utilitarian objectives), to settings with costly reversals of hiring decisions, and to inconsistent prediction intervals. We also introduce a practical "re-solving" variant of our algorithm, which we prove is also minimax optimal. Finally we conduct numerical experiments showing that our algorithms outperform Bayesian heuristics in both cost and speed, and are competitive with (approximate or exact) Bayesian-optimal policies when those can be computed.

Yiding Feng, Wei Tang

In many applications, decision-makers must choose between multiple predictive models that may all be miscalibrated. Which model (i.e., predictor) is more "useful" in downstream decision tasks? To answer this, our first contribution introduces the notion of the informativeness gap between any two predictors, defined as the maximum normalized payoff advantage one predictor offers over the other across all decision-making tasks. Our framework strictly generalizes several existing notions: it subsumes U-Calibration [KLST-23] and Calibration Decision Loss [HW-24], which compare a miscalibrated predictor to its calibrated counterpart, and it recovers Blackwell informativeness [Bla-51, Bla-53] as a special case when both predictors are perfectly calibrated. Our second contribution is a dual characterization of the informativeness gap, which gives rise to a natural informativeness measure that can be viewed as a relaxed variant of the earth mover's distance (EMD) between two prediction distributions. We show that this measure satisfies natural desiderata: it is complete and sound, and it can be estimated sample-efficiently in the prediction-only access setting. Along the way, we also obtain novel combinatorial structural results when applying this measure to perfectly calibrated predictors.

Yiding Feng, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu

We introduce and study the online Bayesian recommendation problem for a platform, who can observe a utility-relevant state of a product, repeatedly interacting with a population of myopic users through an online recommendation mechanism. This paradigm is common in a wide range of scenarios in the current Internet economy. For each user with her own private preference and belief, the platform commits to a recommendation strategy to utilize his information advantage on the product state to persuade the self-interested user to follow the recommendation. The platform does not know user's preferences and beliefs, and has to use an adaptive recommendation strategy to persuade with gradually learning user's preferences and beliefs in the process. We aim to design online learning policies with no Stackelberg regret for the platform, i.e., against the optimum policy in hindsight under the assumption that users will correspondingly adapt their behaviors to the benchmark policy. Our first result is an online policy that achieves double logarithm regret dependence on the number of rounds. We then present a hardness result showing that no adaptive online policy can achieve regret with better dependency on the number of rounds. Finally, by formulating the platform's problem as optimizing a linear program with membership oracle access, we present our second online policy that achieves regret with polynomial dependence on the number of states but logarithm dependence on the number of rounds.