Leah Walker

Ritwik Gupta, Leah Walker, Rodolfo Corona et al.

Current regulations on powerful AI capabilities are narrowly focused on "foundation" or "frontier" models. However, these terms are vague and inconsistently defined, leading to an unstable foundation for governance efforts. Critically, policy debates often fail to consider the data used with these models, despite the clear link between data and model performance. Even (relatively) "small" models that fall outside the typical definitions of foundation and frontier models can achieve equivalent outcomes when exposed to sufficiently specific datasets. In this work, we illustrate the importance of considering dataset size and content as essential factors in assessing the risks posed by models both today and in the future. More broadly, we emphasize the risk posed by over-regulating reactively and provide a path towards careful, quantitative evaluation of capabilities that can lead to a simplified regulatory environment.

Ritwik Gupta, Leah Walker, Andrew W. Reddie

U.S. export controls on semiconductors are widely known to be permeable, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) steadily creating state-of-the-art artificial intelligence (AI) models with exfiltrated chips. This paper presents the first concrete, public evidence of how leading PRC AI labs evade and circumvent U.S. export controls. We examine how Chinese companies, notably Tencent, are not only using chips that are restricted under U.S. export controls but are also finding ways to circumvent these regulations by using software and modeling techniques that maximize less capable hardware. Specifically, we argue that Tencent's ability to power its Hunyuan-Large model with non-export controlled NVIDIA H20s exemplifies broader gains in efficiency in machine learning that have eroded the moat that the United States initially built via its existing export controls. Finally, we examine the implications of this finding for the future of the United States' export control strategy.

Jeremy Kepner, Jonathan Bernays, Stephen Buckley et al.

Adversarial Internet robots (botnets) represent a growing threat to the safe use and stability of the Internet. Botnets can play a role in launching adversary reconnaissance (scanning and phishing), influence operations (upvoting), and financing operations (ransomware, market manipulation, denial of service, spamming, and ad click fraud) while obfuscating tailored tactical operations. Reducing the presence of botnets on the Internet, with the aspirational target of zero, is a powerful vision for galvanizing policy action. Setting a global goal, encouraging international cooperation, creating incentives for improving networks, and supporting entities for botnet takedowns are among several policies that could advance this goal. These policies raise significant questions regarding proper authorities/access that cannot be answered in the abstract. Systems analysis has been widely used in other domains to achieve sufficient detail to enable these questions to be dealt with in concrete terms. Defeating botnets using an observe-pursue-counter architecture is analyzed, the technical feasibility is affirmed, and the authorities/access questions are significantly narrowed. Recommended next steps include: supporting the international botnet takedown community, expanding network observatories, enhancing the underlying network science at scale, conducting detailed systems analysis, and developing appropriate policy frameworks.