Cristian Curaba

h-index1
2papers

2 Papers

83.9CLJun 1
Fixing FOLIO and MALLS: Verified Annotations and an LLM-assisted Framework to Focus Human Relabeling

Andrea Brunello, Cristian Curaba, Luca Geatti et al.

Accurate translation from Natural Language to First-Order Logic (NL-to-FOL) underpins neurosymbolic AI systems and Natural Language Inference (NLI), making the quality of NL-to-FOL benchmarks essential -- yet these datasets have never been rigorously audited. Our first contribution is to present a systematic human inspection of the validation split of \textsf{FOLIO} and a subset of \textsf{MALLS} test instances, finding that approximately 39% and 36% of entries, respectively, contain incorrect FOL formalizations (i.e., ground truth labels), with additional rates of ambiguous NL sentences (16.4% and 48%) and incorrect NLI labels in \textsf{FOLIO} (8.4%). Our second contribution is to develop and release corrected ground truths for such datasets, showing that annotation errors distort model evaluation on a reference benchmark task: testing three state-of-the-art LLMs (Gemma~4 31B-it, Qwen3-30B-A3B, and GPT-4o-mini) with the corrected ground truths yields accuracy gains from +9 to +22 percentage points. Motivated by these findings, we propose an LLM-based framework to support humans in manual reviewing NL-to-FOL datasets. By directing reviewers toward the most error-prone instances, we empirically show that it is possible to achieve 90% dataset accuracy after reviewing fewer than 24% of instances, compared to over 70% required by unguided review. We release all human-verified annotations and the code for our framework.

CRNov 20, 2024
CryptoFormalEval: Integrating LLMs and Formal Verification for Automated Cryptographic Protocol Vulnerability Detection

Cristian Curaba, Denis D'Ambrosi, Alessandro Minisini et al.

Cryptographic protocols play a fundamental role in securing modern digital infrastructure, but they are often deployed without prior formal verification. This could lead to the adoption of distributed systems vulnerable to attack vectors. Formal verification methods, on the other hand, require complex and time-consuming techniques that lack automatization. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark to assess the ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to autonomously identify vulnerabilities in new cryptographic protocols through interaction with Tamarin: a theorem prover for protocol verification. We created a manually validated dataset of novel, flawed, communication protocols and designed a method to automatically verify the vulnerabilities found by the AI agents. Our results about the performances of the current frontier models on the benchmark provides insights about the possibility of cybersecurity applications by integrating LLMs with symbolic reasoning systems.