Yang Cai

Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément et al.

We study last-iterate convergence properties of algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum games based on Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$). Despite their widespread use for solving real games, virtually nothing is known about their last-iterate convergence. A major obstacle to analyzing RM-type dynamics is that their regret operators lack Lipschitzness and (pseudo)monotonicity. We start by showing numerically that several variants used in practice, such as RM$^+$, predictive RM$^+$ and alternating RM$^+$, all lack last-iterate convergence guarantees even on a simple $3\times 3$ matrix game. We then prove that recent variants of these algorithms based on a smoothing technique, extragradient RM$^{+}$ and smooth Predictive RM$^+$, enjoy asymptotic last-iterate convergence (without a rate), $1/\sqrt{t}$ best-iterate convergence, and when combined with restarting, linear-rate last-iterate convergence. Our analysis builds on a new characterization of the geometric structure of the limit points of our algorithms, marking a significant departure from most of the literature on last-iterate convergence. We believe that our analysis may be of independent interest and offers a fresh perspective for studying last-iterate convergence in algorithms based on non-monotone operators.

Yue Wu, Weiqiang Zheng, Yang Cai et al.

We revisit the convergence guarantees of the Extragradient (EG) method for unconstrained biaffine min-max optimization. It is known that EG with a fixed stepsize achieves a $Θ(T^{-1/2})$ last-iterate convergence rate, which is slower than the optimal $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1})$ rate attainable by incorporating additional mechanisms such as anchoring. Motivated by recent advances showing that dynamic stepsizes alone can significantly accelerate gradient descent, we ask whether dynamic stepsizes can similarly accelerate the last-iterate convergence of EG. We present the first positive result in this direction. Specifically, we provide a deterministic dynamic stepsize schedule that accelerates the convergence rate of EG to $\mathcal{O}(T^{-2/3+\varepsilon})$ for any $\varepsilon > 0$. We also show that this rate is tight when the extrapolation and update steps of EG use the same stepsize. We then show that allowing different stepsizes for the extrapolation and update steps further improves the convergence rate to the near-optimal $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1+\varepsilon})$. Our analysis reduces stepsize scheduling to an optimization problem, whose solution leads to a stepsize schedule that follows (a discretization of) a power-law distribution. Our proposed stepsize schedules and analysis extend to other methods, such as Optimistic Gradient (OG), and suggest broader applicability to general min-max optimization problems.

Yixin Liu, Argyris Oikonomou, Weiqiang Zheng et al.

Many alignment methods, including reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), rely on the Bradley-Terry reward assumption, which is not always sufficient to capture the full range and complexity of general human preferences. We explore RLHF under a general preference framework by modeling the alignment problem as a two-player zero-sum game in a game-theoretic framework, where the Nash equilibrium policy guarantees a 50% win rate against any competing policy. However, previous self-play algorithms for finding the Nash policy either diverge or only converge to a Nash policy in a modified game, even in a simple synthetic setting, thereby failing to maintain the 50% win rate guarantee against all other policies. We propose a meta-algorithm, Convergent Meta Alignment Algorithm (COMAL), for language model alignment with general preferences, inspired by convergent algorithms in game theory. We provide theoretical analysis that our meta-algorithm converges to an exact Nash policy in the last iterate and demonstrate its effectiveness on a range of synthetic and preference optimization datasets. COMAL is simple and can be integrated with many existing methods designed for preference optimization with minimal changes, and empirically it consistently maintains above 60.2% and 56.8% win rates, when applied to Llama-3-8B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B, against all compared algorithms under controlled evaluations.

Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément et al.

Non-ergodic convergence of learning dynamics in games is widely studied recently because of its importance in both theory and practice. Recent work (Cai et al., 2024) showed that a broad class of learning dynamics, including Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU), can exhibit arbitrarily slow last-iterate convergence even in simple $2 \times 2$ matrix games, despite many of these dynamics being known to converge asymptotically in the last iterate. It remains unclear, however, whether these algorithms achieve fast non-ergodic convergence under weaker criteria, such as best-iterate convergence. We show that for $2\times 2$ matrix games, OMWU achieves an $O(T^{-1/6})$ best-iterate convergence rate, in stark contrast to its slow last-iterate convergence in the same class of games. Furthermore, we establish a lower bound showing that OMWU does not achieve any polynomial random-iterate convergence rate, measured by the expected duality gaps across all iterates. This result challenges the conventional wisdom that random-iterate convergence is essentially equivalent to best-iterate convergence, with the former often used as a proxy for establishing the latter. Our analysis uncovers a new connection to dynamic regret and presents a novel two-phase approach to best-iterate convergence, which could be of independent interest.

Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément et al.

Self-play via online learning is one of the premier ways to solve large-scale two-player zero-sum games, both in theory and practice. Particularly popular algorithms include optimistic multiplicative weights update (OMWU) and optimistic gradient-descent-ascent (OGDA). While both algorithms enjoy $O(1/T)$ ergodic convergence to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, OMWU offers several advantages including logarithmic dependence on the size of the payoff matrix and $\widetilde{O}(1/T)$ convergence to coarse correlated equilibria even in general-sum games. However, in terms of last-iterate convergence in two-player zero-sum games, an increasingly popular topic in this area, OGDA guarantees that the duality gap shrinks at a rate of $O(1/\sqrt{T})$, while the best existing last-iterate convergence for OMWU depends on some game-dependent constant that could be arbitrarily large. This begs the question: is this potentially slow last-iterate convergence an inherent disadvantage of OMWU, or is the current analysis too loose? Somewhat surprisingly, we show that the former is true. More generally, we prove that a broad class of algorithms that do not forget the past quickly all suffer the same issue: for any arbitrarily small $δ>0$, there exists a $2\times 2$ matrix game such that the algorithm admits a constant duality gap even after $1/δ$ rounds. This class of algorithms includes OMWU and other standard optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader algorithms.