Jun Zhu

Yu Tian, Xiao Yang, Yinpeng Dong et al.

Extremely large image generators offer significant transformative potential across diverse sectors. It allows users to design specific prompts to generate realistic images through some black-box APIs. However, some studies reveal that image generators are notably susceptible to attacks and generate Not Suitable For Work (NSFW) contents by manually designed toxin texts, especially imperceptible to human observers. We urgently need a multitude of universal and transferable prompts to improve the safety of image generators, especially black-box-released APIs. Nevertheless, they are constrained by labor-intensive design processes and heavily reliant on the quality of the given instructions. To achieve this, we introduce a black-box stealthy prompt attack (BSPA) that adopts a retriever to simulate attacks from API users. It can effectively harness filter scores to tune the retrieval space of sensitive words for matching the input prompts, thereby crafting stealthy prompts tailored for image generators. Significantly, this approach is model-agnostic and requires no internal access to the model's features, ensuring its applicability to a wide range of image generators. Building on BSPA, we have constructed an automated prompt tool and a comprehensive prompt attack dataset (NSFWeval). Extensive experiments demonstrate that BSPA effectively explores the security vulnerabilities in a variety of state-of-the-art available black-box models, including Stable Diffusion XL, Midjourney, and DALL-E 2/3. Furthermore, we develop a resilient text filter and offer targeted recommendations to ensure the security of image generators against prompt attacks in the future.

Yijun Yang, Lichao Wang, Xiao Yang et al.

Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) integrate visual data processing, expanding their real-world applications, but also increasing the risk of generating unsafe responses. In response, leading companies have implemented Multi-Layered safety defenses, including alignment training, safety system prompts, and content moderation. However, their effectiveness against sophisticated adversarial attacks remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose MultiFaceted Attack, a novel attack framework designed to systematically bypass Multi-Layered Defenses in VLLMs. It comprises three complementary attack facets: Visual Attack that exploits the multimodal nature of VLLMs to inject toxic system prompts through images; Alignment Breaking Attack that manipulates the model's alignment mechanism to prioritize the generation of contrasting responses; and Adversarial Signature that deceives content moderators by strategically placing misleading information at the end of the response. Extensive evaluations on eight commercial VLLMs in a black-box setting demonstrate that MultiFaceted Attack achieves a 61.56% attack success rate, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by at least 42.18%.