Pengfei He

Pengfei He, Zhenwei Dai, Xianfeng Tang et al.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) have demonstrated strong capabilities in solving complex tasks but remain vulnerable when agents receive unreliable messages. This vulnerability stems from a fundamental gap: LLM agents treat all incoming messages equally without evaluating their trustworthiness. While some existing studies approach trustworthiness, they focus on a single type of harmfulness rather than analyze it in a holistic approach from multiple trustworthiness perspectives. We address this gap by proposing a comprehensive definition of trustworthiness inspired by human communication theory (Grice, 1975). Our definition identifies six orthogonal trust dimensions that provide interpretable measures of trustworthiness. Building on this definition, we introduce the Attention Trust Score (A -Trust), a lightweight, attention-based method for evaluating the trustworthiness of messages. We then develop a principled trust management system (TMS) for LLM -MAS that supports both message-level and agent-level trust assessments. Experiments across diverse multi-agent settings and tasks demonstrate that our TMS significantly improves robustness against malicious inputs.

Pengfei He, Ash Fox, Lesly Miculicich et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in assisting cybersecurity tasks, yet existing approaches struggle with automatic vulnerability discovery and exploitation due to limited interaction, weak execution grounding, and a lack of experience reuse. We propose Co-RedTeam, a security-aware multi-agent framework designed to mirror real-world red-teaming workflows by integrating security-domain knowledge, code-aware analysis, execution-grounded iterative reasoning, and long-term memory. Co-RedTeam decomposes vulnerability analysis into coordinated discovery and exploitation stages, enabling agents to plan, execute, validate, and refine actions based on real execution feedback while learning from prior trajectories. Extensive evaluations on challenging security benchmarks demonstrate that Co-RedTeam consistently outperforms strong baselines across diverse backbone models, achieving over 60% success rate in vulnerability exploitation and over 10% absolute improvement in vulnerability detection. Ablation and iteration studies further confirm the critical role of execution feedback, structured interaction, and memory for building robust and generalizable cybersecurity agents.

Pengfei He, Zhenwei Dai, Bing He et al.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly rely on tool use to complete real-world tasks. While existing works evaluate the LLMs' tool use capability, they largely focus on the final answers yet overlook the detailed tool usage trajectory, i.e., whether tools are selected, parameterized, and ordered correctly. We introduce TRAJECT-Bench, a trajectory-aware benchmark to comprehensively evaluate LLMs' tool use capability through diverse tasks with fine-grained evaluation metrics. TRAJECT-Bench pairs high-fidelity, executable tools across practical domains with tasks grounded in production-style APIs, and synthesizes trajectories that vary in breadth (parallel calls) and depth (interdependent chains). Besides final accuracy, TRAJECT-Bench also reports trajectory-level diagnostics, including tool selection and argument correctness, and dependency/order satisfaction. Analyses reveal failure modes such as similar tool confusion and parameter-blind selection, and scaling behavior with tool diversity and trajectory length where the bottleneck of transiting from short to mid-length trajectories is revealed, offering actionable guidance for LLMs' tool use.