Hongyi Guo

Jiaheng Wei, Yuanshun Yao, Jean-Francois Ton et al.

LLM hallucination, i.e. generating factually incorrect yet seemingly convincing answers, is currently a major threat to the trustworthiness and reliability of LLMs. The first step towards solving this complicated problem is to measure it. However, existing hallucination metrics require having a benchmark dataset with gold-standard answers, i.e. "best" or "correct" answers written by humans. Such requirements make hallucination measurement costly and prone to human errors. In this work, we propose Factualness Evaluations via Weighting LLMs (FEWL), an innovative hallucination metric that is specifically designed for the scenario when gold-standard answers are absent. FEWL leverages the answers from off-the-shelf LLMs that serve as a proxy of gold-standard answers. The key challenge is how to quantify the expertise of reference LLMs resourcefully. We show FEWL has certain theoretical guarantees and demonstrate empirically it gives more accurate hallucination measures than naively using reference LLMs. We also show how to leverage FEWL to reduce hallucination through both in-context learning and supervised fine-tuning. Extensive experiment results on Truthful-QA, CHALE, and HaluEval datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of FEWL.

Liheng Chen, Hongyi Guo, Yali Du et al.

In many real-world problems, a team of agents need to collaborate to maximize the common reward. Although existing works formulate this problem into a centralized learning with decentralized execution framework, which avoids the non-stationary problem in training, their decentralized execution paradigm limits the agents' capability to coordinate. Inspired by the concept of correlated equilibrium, we propose to introduce a coordination signal to address this limitation, and theoretically show that following mild conditions, decentralized agents with the coordination signal can coordinate their individual policies as manipulated by a centralized controller. The idea of introducing coordination signal is to encapsulate coordinated strategies into the signals, and use the signals to instruct the collaboration in decentralized execution. To encourage agents to learn to exploit the coordination signal, we propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel coordination module that can be integrated with most existing MARL frameworks. SIC casts a common signal sampled from a pre-defined distribution to all agents, and introduces an information-theoretic regularization to facilitate the consistency between the observed signal and agents' policies. Our experiments show that SIC consistently improves performance over well-recognized MARL models in both matrix games and a predator-prey game with high-dimensional strategy space.